
# Indian Philosophical Systems


A Critical Review based on Vedānta Deśika's *Paramata-bhanga* 



S.M.S. Chari

This scholarly work of Dr S.M.S. Chari's deals with the critical review of seventeen philosophical systems as presented in an important philosophical treatise of the thirteenth century titled Paramata-bhanga contributed by Vedānta Deśika, an illustrious successor to Rāmānuja, who is the chief exponent of Viśistādvaita Vedānta. The main objective of Paramata-bhanga is to establish that Viśistādvaita is a sound system of philosophy as compared to the several other Non-Vedic as well as Vedic schools and also Vedānta schools developed by Śankara, Yādavaprakāśa, Bhāskara, and other exponents of post-Rāmānuja period. The original text written in Maņipravāļa (a mixture of Tamil and Sanskrit) language contains, besides a brief account of the fundamental doctrines of Viśistādvaita. The schools covered are Cārvāka, Buddhism, Jainism, Sānkhya, Yoga, Vaiśesika, Nyāya, Pūrvamīmāmsā, Pāśupata, Śabdabrahma-vivartavāda, and Advaita Vedānta.

Among the extant philosophical classics, Paramata-bhanga is a unique work. Realizing the importance of the Paramata-bhanga for the comparative study of Indian philosophy, late Dr Chari tried to give a lucid exposition of this treatise in English. This volume, which is the first of its kind, would be invaluable for students of Indian philosophy in general and Visiṣṭādvaita in particular.



#### Indian Philosophical Systems

This scholarly work of Dr S.M.S. Chari's deals with the critical review of seventeen philosophical systems as presented in an important philosophical treatise of the thirteenth century titled *Paramata-bhanga* contributed by Vedānta Dešika, an illustrious successor to Rāmānuja, who is the chief exponent of Viśiṣṭādvaita Vedānta. The main objective of *Paramata-bhanga* is to establish that Viśiṣṭādvaita is a sound system of philosophy as compared to the several other Non-Vedic as well as Vedic schools and also Vedānta schools developed by Śaṅkara, Yādavaprakāśa, Bhāskara, and other exponents of post-Rāmānuja period. The original text written in Maṇipravāļa (a mixture of Tamil and Sanskrit) language contains, besides a brief account of the fundamental doctrines of Viśiṣṭādvaita. The schools covered are Cārvāka, Buddhism, Jainism, Sāṅkhya, Yoga, Vaiśeṣika, Nyāya, Pūrvamīmāmsā, Pāśupata, Śabdabrahma-vivartavāda, and Advaita Vedānta.

Among the extant philosophical classics, Paramata-bhanga is a unique work. Realizing the importance of the Paramata-bhanga for the comparative study of Indian philosophy, late Dr Chari tried to give a lucid exposition of this treatise in English. This volume, which is the first of its kind, would be invaluable for students of Indian philosophy in general and Visistadvaita in particular.

Dr S.M. Srinivasa Chari was a distinguished scholar trained up by eminent traditional teachers. He did his PhD from the University of Madras. His other published works are: Advaita and Visisṭādvaita: A study based on Vedānta Deśika's Śatadūṣaṇī with a Foreword by Dr S. Radhakrishnan; Fundamentals of Viśiṣṭādvaita: A study based on Vedānta Deśika's Tattvamuktā-kalāpa; Vaiṣṇavism—Its Philosophy, Theology and Religious Discipline, The Philosophy and Theistic Mysticism of the Ālvars; The Philosophy of the Vedāntasūtra: A study based on the Evaluation of the commentaries of Śaṅkara, Rāmānuja, and Madhva; The Philosophy of the Upaniṣads: A study based on the Evaluation of the commentaries of Śaṅkara, Rāmānuja, and Madhva; The Philosophy of the Bhagavadgītā: A study based on the Evaluation of the commentaries of Śaṅkara, Rāmānuja, and Madhva; and The Philosophy of Viśiṣṭādvaita Vedānta: A study based on Vedānta Deśika's Adhikaraṇa Sārāvalā.

#### innian Philosophical S. a. and

because home on the shade a male 2012 of a may also a mily of the property of

And the second control of the second control

meses planted and a collinary of the series of the series

## Indian Philosophical Systems

A Critical Review based on Vedānta Deśika's Paramata-bhanga

S.M.S. Chari



Munshiram Manoharlal Publishers Pvt. Ltd.

#### ISBN 978-81-215-1199-5 First published 2011

© 2011, Chari, S.M. Srinivasa

All rights reserved including those of translation into other languages.

No part of this book may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form, or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwise, without the written permission of the publisher.

Printed in India
Published by Vikram Jain for

Munshiram Manoharlal Publishers Pvt. Ltd. PO Box 5715, 54 Rani Jhansi Road, New Delhi 110 055, INDIA

www.mrmlbooks.com

To the memory of
my Ācārya
Śrī Goṣṭhīpuram Sowmyanārāyaṇācārya Swāmī
with profound respect and gratitude

In the memory of
my Activa
Surfatherors Summanularityanicings Sultmi
with projound suspect and gratitude

## Contents

For	eword (उपोद्घातम्)	ix
Pre	face	хi
Abl	reviations	xv
	PART I	
	Fundamental Doctrines of Viśiṣṭādvaita	1
1	The Doctrine of Jiva (Cit-tattva)	3
2	The Doctrine of Cosmic Matter (Acit-tattva)	12
3	The Doctrine of Brahman (Para-tattva)	29
	PART II	
	CRITICAL REVIEW OF OTHER SCHOOLS	41
4	Cārvāka School	49
5	Buddhism	68
6	Jainism	87
7	Vaiseșika School	96
8	Nyāya School	107
9	Nirīśvaramīmāmsā School	111
10	Sānkhya School	116
	Yoga School	127
	Pāśupata School	131
	Pañcarātra School	136
	Śabda-brahma-Vivartavāda of Vaiyākaraņa	142
	Advaita Vedānta of Śankara	149
	Dvaita Vedānta of Madhva	161

#### viii Contents

17	Bhedābheda Vedānta of Bhāskara	
	and Yādavaprakāśa	176
18	Other Bhedābheda Schools	187
19	Schools of Śivādvaita and Navya-Viśiṣṭādvaita	198
20	The Doctrine of Upāya	203
21	The Doctrine of Puruṣārtha	215
22	General Evaluation and Conclusion	219
Glossary		235
Bibliography		245
Index		948

foods frankatusenskus landskartusenskusk

#### Foreword (उपोद्घातम्)

श्रीभगवद्रामानुजमुनिभिः प्रवर्तितस्य विशिष्टाद्वैतदर्शनस्य पोषणार्थं रक्षणार्थं च कृतावतारैः निगमान्तमहादेशिकैः शताधिकानि ग्रन्थरत्नानि प्रणीतानि अध्ययनाध्यापनप्रणाल्या प्रचारमुपगतानि च प्रकाशन्ते इति विश्वविदितमेतत्। हयग्रीवकृपाकटाक्षवशात् प्राप्तं सर्वतन्त्रस्वातन्त्र्यं काव्यनाटकादिनिर्माणनैपुण्यं अप्रतिमप्रतिभा तर्ककौशलम् इत्यादिकं तेषां ग्रन्थेषु स्पष्टं प्रकटं भवति। स्वमतसंरक्षणार्थं मतान्तरपरिशीलनं स्वमतानुसारिणां विश्वासदार्द्याच अवश्यकर्तव्यमिति प्राक्तनग्रन्थपरिशीलनां स्पष्टम्। तस्मात् भगवद्रामानुजसिद्धान्तरक्षणाय मतान्तरखण्डनं तत्त्वमुक्ताकलापन्यायसिद्धाञ्जनादिग्रन्थेषु आचार्यवर्यैः तत्र तत्र सुष्टु विहितम्। तथापिं इदं परतया तत्तन्मानुवादपूर्वकं परिशीलनं कर्तव्यमिति अभिप्रायेण परमतभङ्गाभिधानं ग्रन्थमन्वग्रहीषुः आचार्यवर्याः।

अयं च ग्रन्थः संस्कृतपदिमश्रया द्रविडभाषया मणिप्रवालनामिकया संदृब्धः अतिप्रौढः गम्भीरार्थश्च शास्त्रेषु चिरपरिचयवतां विदुषामिष दुरूहः। तथापि तत्तन्मतस्वरूपं तत्तन्मतपोषकयुक्तिप्रदर्शनपूर्वकं सम्यगनूद्य तदूषणं प्रमाणयुक्तिभ्यां ग्रन्थेऽत्र कृतिमिति इतरग्रन्थापेक्षयात्र विशेषः। माधवाचार्यादिकृतसर्वदर्शनादि ग्रन्थेष्वदृश्याः तत्तन्मतपोषकतया आचार्यैः प्रोक्ताः अनेका युक्तयोऽत्र दृश्यन्ते तेषां समाधानार्थं प्रदर्शिताः प्रतियुक्तयोऽपि आचार्यप्रदर्शिताः अत्र अवलोक्यन्ते।

अनेन नूतनेन ग्रन्थेन दार्शनिका नितरामुपकृता भवन्ति। अत्र नास्तिकदर्शनानि त्रीणि आस्तिकदर्शनानि षट् भर्तृहरिप्रभृतिभिः प्रवर्तितं वैयाकरणदर्शनं निरीश्वरमीमांसादर्शनं, तत्काले स्थितानि शाङ्करभास्करयादवप्रकाशमतानि च परिशीलितानि। माध्वमतं आचार्यसमीपप्राक्कालेऽवतीर्णमपि विष्णुपारम्यप्रपञ्चसत्यत्वादिस्वीकारत् स्वसन्निकृष्टमतत्वेन स्वीकृत्य तदूषणं न कृतमाचार्यैः। पाञ्चरात्रप्रामाण्यं च तद्प्रामाण्ययुक्त्या भासखण्डनपूर्वकं स्थापितमिति स्थितिः। आदौ चिदचिदीश्वरतत्त्वानि अधिकारत्रयेण प्रतिपाद्य तदनन्तरं बहुभिः अधिकारैः मतान्तराणि अनुवादपूर्वकं खण्डितानि।

अस्य परमतभङ्गनाम्नः ग्रन्थरत्नस्य एतावत्पर्यन्तम् आङ्ग्लभाषायां न केनापि विमर्शपूर्वकम् अध्ययनम् (critical study) कृतम्। तत्तु न सामान्यं कार्यम्। रास्त्रेषु विशिष्य दर्शनेषु पाण्डित्यं भाषान्तरनैपुण्यं धारयालेखनसामर्थ्यं चावश्यकम्। इदं महत्तरं कार्यं दार्शनिकप्रवर्रैः एस्.एम्. श्रीनिवासाचार्यैः निर्व्यूढमिति महान् सन्तोष उपजायते। एते हि संस्कृते दर्शने च एम्.ए. उपिधधारिणः पी.एच्.डी. उपिधिधारिणः शास्त्रोक्तरीत्या गुरुकुलवासेन प्रख्यातानामाचार्यश्रेष्ठानां गोष्ठीपुरं स्वामीति प्रसिद्धानां सौम्यनारायणाचार्याणां सकाशात् अधिगतश्रीभाष्यादिग्रन्थाः उपनिषत्प्रस्थाने सूत्रप्रस्थाने गीताप्रस्थाने च विशिष्टाद्वैतमेव अभिप्रेतिमिति—तथा आल्वार् प्रबन्धेषु, रहस्यग्रन्थेषु च तत् अभिप्रेतिमिति निरूपणपरान् ग्रन्थान् विलिख्य प्रकाशितवन्तः। एवं तत्त्वमुक्ताकलापस्य अधिकरणसारावल्याश्च विशिष्टमध्ययनं एतैः प्रकाशितम्।

अधुना परमतभङ्गस्य विशिष्टमध्ययनं प्रकाश्यते। इतः परं लेखनार्थमवशिष्टं किमपि नास्ति। आङ्ग्लभाषायां विशिष्टाद्वैतदर्शनस्थापकतया बहुप्रकाराः ग्रन्थाः अन्यैः न कैरपि कृता इति मन्ये।

प्रायो नवतिवयस्का अपीमे अनवरतं ग्रन्थपरामर्शे व्यापृता इति महतः प्रमोदस्य स्थानमेतत्।

स्वकीयं जीवनं भगवद्रामानुजदर्शनमतयोः पोषणार्थं व्ययितमिति जानन्तः सर्वेऽपि श्रीवैष्णवाः सन्तुष्टा भवेयुः अभिनन्देयुश्चैतान् आचार्यानिति प्रार्थये।

> महामहोपाध्याय: एन्.एस्. रामानुजताताचार्य: (N.S. RAMANUJA TATACHARYA)

#### **Preface**

TEDÂNTA DEŚIKA, an illustrious successor to Rāmānuja, wrote two important philosophical treatises titled Tattva-muktäkalāpa and Adhikarana-sārāvalī, devoted primarily to establish that Viśistādvaita Vedānta is a sound system of philosophy. He also contributed another important philosophical work under the title Paramata-bhanga in which he presents a critical review of the main tenets of sixteen schools of thought covering the non-Vedic schools such as Cārvāka, Buddhism, Jainism and also Vedic schools such as Nyāya, Vaišeṣika, Sāṅkhya, Yoga, Pāśupata, Pürvamīmāmsā, Vaiyākaraņa, Bhāskara, Advaita, and Visistādvaita. The main purpose of this work is to show how Visistādvaita Vedānta expounded by Śrī Rāmānuja on the unquestionable authority of the Upanisads and the Vedāntasūtra of Bādarāyana is the soundest system of philosophy as compared to all other Indian philosophical schools of thought, including Advaita Vedānta of Śańkara as well as other Vedānta schools which were in vogue prior to Rāmānuja and those which were developed later. This is a unique classic since in one compendium Vedānta Deśika gives a brief exposition of the main tenets of all the Indian philosophical systems including Vedanta and highlights their merits as well as defects.

In two of my earlier publications, I have dealt with Tattva-muktā-kalāpa and Adhikaraṇa-sārāvalī and justified the claim of Vedānta Deśika that Viśiṣṭādvaita Darśana is a sound system both on philosophical and logical grounds. I have now taken up the study of Paramata-bhanga to demonstrate through a critical review of all other schools of thought including the Vedānta schools, how Viśiṣṭādvaita can be regarded as the soundest philosophical system.

The original text is written in Manipravala, which is Tamil language intermixed with Sanskrit words in a terse style, not easily comprehensible. The statements expressing the prima facie views of the exponents of the concerned schools of thought and also the criticisms against them are brief and cryptic, but significant with deeper implications. In order to make it accessible to the modern scholars interested in the comparative and critical study of Indian philosophy, I have attempted to present it in English.

In order to enhance the value of this treatise, I have drawn material from the source books of the different Darśanas and also included the details of the criticisms furnished in other works of Deśika such as Tattva-muktā-kalāpa, Sarvārtha-siddhi, Nyāya-siddhānjana, Nyāya-pariśuddhi, Seśvara-mīmāmsā, and Śatadūṣaṇī.

In dealing with the Vedānta schools, Vedānta Dešika mentions in the *Paramata-bhanga* only those of Śaṅkara, Bhāskara, Yādavaprakāśa, and Vaiyākaraṇa. The later schools of Vedānta such as Madhva's Dvaita, Bhedābheda of Nimbārka, Śuddhādvaita of Vallabha, Acintya-bhedābheda of Caitanya school, and other Śaivite schools of Vedānta are left out since most of these were developed in post-Dešika period. However, in order to claim that Viśiṣṭādvaita is a sounder system of Vedānta, it is considered desirable to present also, a comparative and critical analysis of the main doctrines of these later schools. I have therefore extended the scope of my treatise to include the consideration of all schools of Vedānta.

It is for the first time that such an attempt is made to present in English and in one volume, a critique of all schools of thought along with Viśiṣṭādvaita. It is hoped that this book would be invaluable for a comparative study of Indian philosophy in general and a fuller understanding of Viśiṣṭādvaita. I should pay my respects to revered Ācārya, the late, Śrī Goṣṭhīpuram Sowmyanārāyaṇācārya Swāmī who imported to me the knowledge of Vedānta. I also wish to pay my respects to His Holiness Śīvan Śatakapa Nārāyaṇa, Yatīndra Mahādeśikan, the present pontiff of Aholia Mutt and also to His Holiness Śrī Abhinava Vāgīśa Brahmatantra Parakala Swamy, the present pontiff of

Parakala Mutt, for inspiring me with blessings to undertake this work. I also express my grateful thanks to the three eminent traditional scholars Mm. N.S. Ramanuja Tatacharya, Mm. K.S. Varadacharya, and Mm. V. Srivatsańkacharya who have helped me in understanding the crucial texts in the *Paramatabhanga*. In the last I am again very grateful to Mm. N.S. Ramanuja Tatacharya for evincing keen interest in my work and for graciously writing the Foreword.

S.M. SRINIVASA CHARI

Bangalore February 7, 2007

Errenand Errenander

#### Abbreviations

AVAdvaita and Viśistādvaita—A Study based on

Satadūşanī

BGBhagavadgītā

Br. Up. Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upanisad Ch.Up. Chāndogya Upaniṣad

FVV Fundamentals of Viśistādvaita

Īśa.Up. **Īśāvāsyopani**șad Ka.Up. Katha Upanisad Kai. Up. Kaivalya Upanisad Māṇḍ.Up. Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad

Mbh. Mahābhārata Muṇḍ.Up. Mundakopanişad NS Nyāya-siddhāñjana

**OIP** Outlines of Indian Philosophy

Paramata-bhanga PMB

Rāmānujabhāsya on VS RBRTS Rahasya-trayasāra

ŚB Šankarabhāsya on VS

Śatadūșaņī SD

Svet. Up. Śvetāśvatara Upanişad Tait.Āra. Taittirīya Āraņyaka Taittiriya Upanişad Tait.Up. TMK Tattva-muktākalāpa

VS Vedāntasūtra

Pātañjala Yogasūtra YS

ngr Kompagasana Makapatan ngandafi Ky nggadda dank

## Part I Fundamental Doctrines of Viśiṣṭādvaita



#### 1

## The Doctrine of Jīva (Cit-tattva)

FTER BRIEFLY EXPLAINING the fundamental metaphysical Acategories of Visistadvaita, Vedanta Desika takes up for detailed examination the doctrine of pva first, following the order in which the three tattvas are mentioned in the Śvetāśvatara Upanisad. Regarding the specific nature of jīva, it is defined as that entity which is sentient in character (cetana), which is wholly and always supported (adheya), and controlled by a Higher Being (vidheya), and which exists for the benefit of the Supreme Being (sesa). Besides, it should be anu or monadic in nature. In other words, jīva is that sentient being which is dependent for its existence on the Supreme Being, which is wholly and always controlled by Him and which exists for the benefit of Paramatman and it is also anu by nature. Alternatively, jīva is defined as that spiritual entity which is self-manifest as "I" (aham pratyaya) and which is qualified by the characteristics of ādheyatva, vidheyatva, śesatva, and anutva. Each of these terms defining the nature of jīvais full of metaphysical significance. The term cetana means that which possesses knowledge as a dharma or attribute. It is therefore a sentient being or spiritual entity unlike non-sentient material entity. The other terms, viz., ādheyatva, vidheyatva, and śesatva would substantiate that the jīva is the śarīra or body of Īśvara in a metaphysical sense and organic or inherent relationship between the jīva and Iśvara similar to the physical body of the niva.

An objection may be raised against this theory. In our ordinary experience, we only know that the  $j\bar{\imath}va$  is the supporter of the physical body but we do not comprehend that the  $j\bar{\imath}va$  is also the body of  $\bar{l}\acute{s}vara$ . Is it then appropriate to regard  $j\bar{\imath}va$ 

as a body of *Īśvara*, which fact is not comprehensible to us? Though, prime facie, this objection is relevant, it is to be admitted, contends Vedānta Désika, on the basis of the Scriptural texts which state that jīva is the śarīra of *Īśvara*. The Antaryāmī Brāhmaṇa clearly states that the jīva is the śarīra of Paramātman who by virtue of His immanence is its Inner Controller. 1

It may also be questioned whether it would be appropriate to regard vidheyatva or being subjected to the control of Iśvara as the nature of  $\bar{n}v\bar{a}tman$ , because it is found that  $\bar{n}va$  is capable of functioning on its own in all activities, both religious and non-religious, and in view of it, it is free to do what it likes and not obligated to obey the commands of a Higher Being. In reply to this, Vedanta Desika explains that Iśvara has endowed jīva with knowledge and capacity and also proper guidance to act in the right direction through the aid of sacred texts. Therefore, it is not inappropriate to attribute the characteristic of vidheyatva to jīva. For one who is dependent upon the body, mind, sense organs, past karma, and other factors for engaging himself in activities, the need to follow the dictates of the śāstra or sacred texts in performing the prescribed deeds and avoidance of what is prohibited (vidheyatva), is fully justified.

When jīva as a sentient being should be able to act on its own, according to its desires, would it be appropriate to regard it as para-śesa-bhūta, that is, dependent in all matters on the Higher Being? This objection is ruled out on the ground that a person such as a servant, though he serves his master for selfish purposes such as for wages, he is still considered subordinate (sesa) insofar as he gives pleasure to his master in serving him loyally. In view of this, Ramanuja defines śesatva as the desire on the part of the subordinate to cause delight to the one who is the Higher Being. Thus it is stated: paragatā atiśaya ādhāna icchayā upādeyatvameva yasya svarūpam.<sup>2</sup> Such a character constitutes the svarūpa of jīva, that is, jīva by its very nature is always subordinate or dependent on the Lord. When the sole motive of the servant is to please his master, the minor selfish purposes for which he may work do not affect his sesatva. The attribution of sesatva to jīva is also justified on the basis of the principle laid down by the Mīmāmsā,

according to which the person who performs the yāga purely for selfish purposes such as attaining svarga, etc. is regarded as śeṣa of the karma.

A more serious objection is raised against the concept of śarīratva employed in respect of jīva as śarīra of Īśvara. When jīvātman is not a mere conglomeration of the various physical and mental organs but also the sarīra or owner of the physical body, how can such a jīva be regarded as the śarīra of İśvara (śarīrin)? This is justified if we properly understand the true meaning of the term śarīra. As Rāmānuja explains, the word śarīra is not to be taken in the ordinary sense as a physical body. The definition offered by Naiyāyikas for śarīra<sup>3</sup> is found to be logically defective, since such a description is not applicable to the physical elements and other entities which are described in the Antaryāmī Brāhmaņa as śarīra of Paramātman. A correct definition of śarīrā, which is applicable to all entities, both sentient and non-sentient, is offered by Rāmānuja. Thus it is defined: yasya cetanasya yaddravyam sarvātmanā svārthe niyantum dhārayitum ca sakyam tat tatsesataikasvarūpam tat tasya sarīram. That is, in respect of a sentient being—either Paramatman or nīvātman, whatever entity wholly and always controlled, sustained and that which exists for the purpose of its controller, that entity is to be regarded as sarīra or body, in the technical sense.4 The two entities should be inseparably related, as long as they endure. The physical body is inseparably related to the jīva. The body is sustained and controlled by jīva. The body exists for the purpose of jīva. Thus jīva is a śarīrī or the owner of the physical body, which is its śarīra. On the basis of the same logic, the relationship between Paramatman and jīvātman and so also other entities in the universe are regarded as śarīra of Paramātman. In view of this explanation, it is but appropriate to regard jīva as the śarīra of Paramātman.

The admission of anutva for jīva is also questioned by the Naiyāyikas who regard jīva as vibhu or all-pervasive. There are a few arguments in support of this theory. First, wherever the body moves, it is found that it experiences both pleasure and pain. In order to account for it, the admission of movement of jīvātman to all places, would amount to unnecessary additional explanation (gaurava). If some fortunes arise in distant places

6

far away from the jīva, the jīva cannot experience it unless it is present there. Besides yogis, muktas, nitya-jīvas living in the transcendental world, are capable of assuming at the same time several bodies. The Gītā also describes jīva as eternal and also as omnipresent (nityaḥ sarvagataḥ sthāṇuḥ). Taking all these facts into consideration, it would be more appropriate to admit vibhutva for jīva as in the case of Paramātman. The Scriptural statement speaking of jīva as aņu is to be interpreted in a different way, according to the critics.

The argument is untenable, contends Vedānta Deśika. It is warranted from our experience that whenever the body experiences pleasure and pain, it experiences them as associated with jīvātman, which also moves along with the body. It is superfluous to postulate for this purpose, the vibhutva of jīva, which is not warranted by Scripture. Fortunes or misfortunes can arise in distant places, out of the will of God and it is not necessary that jīva should be present there. In the case of the yogis, the same one jīva residing in the heart of the body can activate out of his yogic power, all other bodies created by him. The Upanisads which speak of the exit of the jīva from the body (utkrānti), and its movement to higher realms do not allow for admission of vibhutva since what is vibhu cannot have a movement. Hence, the sarvagatatva for jīvātman is to be interpreted appropriately, in the sense that it is capable of entering into all bodies (anupraveśa). The Upanisads categorically state that jīva is anu.5

The Jainas believe that jīvātman is of the dimension of the physical body possessed by jīva. The argument in support of this theory is that the judgment "I am fat" and the experience of pain in the leg and the pleasure arising in the head prove the fact that jīva is pervasive in all parts of the body.

This is untenable, contends Vedānta Deśika. The judgment "I am fat" is a case of delusion. The experience of pain in the leg by the jīva can easily be explained on the basis of the fact that the attributive knowledge of jīva which pervades all over the body, experiences the pain and not by the jīva directly. If this explanation is not admitted, it would amount to the admission of jīva breaking up into several parts in respect of the yogis who can assume different bodies. The description

of  $\bar{j}va$  as ananta or infinite in the state of mukti is to be understood in the sense that the attributive knowledge of  $\bar{j}va$  (dharma-bhūta- $j\bar{n}\bar{a}na$ ) becomes infinite in its range since it becomes totally free from karma which had eclipsed the  $j\bar{n}\bar{a}na$  in the state of bondage. Otherwise, it would conflict with the Śrutis declaring  $j\bar{v}va$  as nirvikāra. The pervasion of  $j\bar{v}va$  throughout the body is to be taken in the sense that it pervades through its  $j\bar{n}\bar{a}na$  which is its essential attribute and not by its  $svar\bar{u}pa$  since it is monadic in nature, as warranted by the Śruti.

The Sānkhyas and so also the Advaitins hold the theory that jīva is essentially of the nature of jīnāna (jīnāna-svarūpa) and hence its pervasion (vyāpti) means pervasion of the very svarūpa. This is not a sound theory because it contradicts the judgment aham jānāmi or "I know." Here the notion "I" stands for the jivātman and knowledge (of the object) is the attributive knowledge of the self. It is well-established by pramanas that the notion "I" (aham-artha) is jīvātman. The Scriptural and Smrti texts also affirm that nvatman is both of the nature of knowledge and also possesses knowledge as its dharma (jñānagunaka). 6 The stray Scriptural statements which state that pvatman is only of the nature of knowledge (prajñā-ghana eva) is to be understood that atman is wholly constituted of consciousness and that it has no element of jadatva or invertness. This is comparable to the illustration of saindhava-ghana or the lump of salt cited by the Brhadaranyaka Upanisad which implies that it is wholly of the nature of salt and does not contain in it any non-salt particle (jadāmśu-vyudāsādi para).

According to the Vīśiṣṭadvaita, the entity denoted by "I" (ahamartha) is the true self. It is not to be confused with the ahankāra or ego which is caused by the delusion of the physical body as the self. Nor is it the product of mahat-tattva, the evolute of prakṛti. The antaḥkaraṇa which is the internal sense organ, which is inert or jaḍa like any physical product, cannot be regarded as the true self, which is of the nature of pure consciousness. Viśiṣṭādvaita Vedānta draws a distinction between pratyak and parāk. What is self-revealed, that is, self-manifest, is pratyak, whereas what manifests itself for others is parāk. The jīvātman reveals itself for itself, whereas dharma-bhūta-

jñāna reveals objects to the self, but it itself does not know the objects revealed to the self. Dharma-bhūta-jñāna is also self-luminous because at the time it reveals the objects to the self, it does not require another knowledge to prove its functioning. The Advaitins contend that if knowledge is revealed by some other knowledge, it ceases to be knowledge. This is untenable because it cannot be proved by inferential argument adopted by the Advaitins in support of it. The Scriptural texts also do not support this theory.

The nva is eternal (nitya) as stated in the Upanisads. The birth and death of jīva, the presence and absence of jñāna for jīva, the Scriptural statements that jīva is created by Īśvara and the statement that purusa dissolves itself in Paramātman should not be construed to mean that jīvas are not eternal (anitya). Death and birth of jīva imply the association and dissociation of a nva with the body. The presence or absence of knowledge is to be understood as the various modifications of dharma-bhūta-jñāna to which it is subject and this does not affect the svarūpa of jīva which is only its āśraya. Jīvātman does not undergo any transformation in the same way as a lump of clay. It is therefore appropriate to regard it as nirvikāra. The changes which take place in the body, do not affect the jīva, which is its āśraya. Hence, jīva is eternal in nature. In view of it, the theories that *n̄va* lasts as long as the body lasts, that it endures upto the state of dissolution (āpraļaya-sthāyī), that it endures upto the state of total liberation, etc., are all untenable. That body itself is the self, as Carvakas maintain, is also a wrong theory, as will be discussed in the chapter on Cārvāka system.

There are three types of jīvas: (1) those who are caught up in the cycle of births and deaths (anuvṛtta saṃsārī); (2) those who are liberated from bondage (nivṛtta saṃsārī; and (3) those who never had any bondage (saṃsāra-atyanta-abhāvavān). These three categories are named as baddha, mukta, and nitya in Viśiṣṭādvatia. The intrinsic nature of all these jīvas is the same (svarūpam ekaprakāram). If there are differences among the baddha jīvas, it is all due to the influence of the past karma of the respective individual souls. The types of the bodies assumed by the jīvas make the distinction between

human beings, celestial beings, and lower forms of living beings. But as far as their intrinsic nature is concerned, they are the same. In the case of *nityas* and *muktas*, they are differentiated on the basis of the activities they assume out of their own desire in accordance with the will of the *Paramātman*.

The plurality of the jīvas (jīva-nānātva) is to be admitted. For those who do not admit the difference between the ātmans, it would lead to the position that the pleasure and pain experienced by one individual should also be experienced by others. But this is not the case. If it is argued that the differences in respect of the experiences of individuals are due to the differences in the bodies, then the different bodies assumed by some yogis and Saubhari, the Purāṇic person, would have to be different. But it is not so. In the same way, the differences that exist in respect of the sense organs would not offer a solution. The differences that exist among the antaḥkaraṇas or internal sense organs of different individuals, would not offer a solution since they cease to exist with the dissolution of prakṛti and its products at the end of the epoch (kalpānte).

After the jīvas are totally liberated from karma or bondage and attain mukti, there is no return to the mundane existence from that state. As the jīvas are totally free from bondage, there cannot be any difference in their experience of the bliss of Brahman (ānanda-tāratamya), as conceived by Madhvas. The admission of ānanda-tāratamya, according to Vedānta Dešika, is not warranted by the valid pramāṇas (pramāṇa-upapatti-viruddha). The mokṣa proper, is the experience of the bliss of Brahman in its fullest form with all the glory of Brahman as stated by the Taittirīya Upaniṣad (so' snute sarvān kāmān bahmaṇā saha). The theory of Vaiśeṣikas that in the state of mukti, jīva is like a piece of stone without any experience of joy, is also opposed to Scriptural texts.

According to the Sāṅkhyas, the jīvātman who is termed as puruṣa, is neither the doer (kartā) nor the enjoyer (bhoktā) and he does not become either bound or liberated, nor passes through births and deaths. In view of it, there cannot be any differentiation of jīvas as baddhas, mukta, and nityas. Hence, all are muktas. This theory is unsound since it is opposed to

the Sacred texts which teach about the attainment of heavenly bliss (svarga) and mokṣa and the means to be adopted to attain the same.

Kartṛtva cannot be denied for the jīva, as otherwise, the dictates of the Sacred texts to perform certain meritorious deeds and abstaining from evil acts would be rendered meaningless. The Vedāntasūtra clearly states: kartā śāstrārthavattvāt.<sup>8</sup>

There are some objections against the acceptance of the category of jīvas as muktas. The basis for this view is that jīvas after liberation from bondage, become one with Iśvara. as in the case of the rivers entering into the sea become merged in it. This theory is unsound because it directly conflicts with the Scriptural texts which speak of sāmya or equality between jīva and Brahman after liberation. So also states the Gītā: mama sādharmyam āgatāh. This equality or similarity is not in every way but only in respect of certain characteristics. The lump of poison and the piece of gold weighed together and found equal in weight, is not equal in every respect, such as value. The Katha Upanisad offers an illustration of the water in the cup when poured into the pure water in the jug, becomes the same as that of the jug (yathodakam śuddhe śuddhamāsiktam tādrgeva bhavati). 11 In this case, the water in the cup becomes mixed with the water in the jug. It does not imply identity (aikya) in respect of svarūpa, but samslesa (becoming united). In the same way, the illustration of the rivers entering the ocean does not convey the idea that they become lost in the ocean but they exist in it as indistinguishable. The fact that the quantity of water in the jug increases with the addition of water from the cup supports the fact that the cup-water is not lost in the jug-water. Similarly, the water sprinkled (poured) over the molten iron rod is not lost in it, but is present in an imperceptible manner. All these illustrations convey the sense of difference and not identity between jīvātman and Brahman.

The statement of the Sūtrakāra: "jagad-vyāpāra varjam" in respect of muktātmā is intended to convey the idea that the liberated jīvas do not possess the distinguishing characteristics of Brahman. It may be argued that the mukta jīva has acquired the capacity to perform cosmic functions, but it does not perform the same. This would amount to the admission that muktātmā

is the cause of the universe and that it is immanent as Antaryami everywhere. Then the jīva will have to be regarded as sarvaśaññ or Inner controller of all. But such view would be opposed to the Scriptural texts. Hence it is to be admitted that whatever capacity or power the muktatman gains in the state of moksa, is only to the limited extent of performing services to the Lord in accordance with His will.

In the state of mukti, whatever the muktātmā wills to do and also accomplishes, is in accordance with the will of the Lord. Though he is a free individual, not being conditioned by karma (akarma-vasyah), he does not desire for anything other than what is pleasing to the Lord. Whatever he desires to do, it will be fulfilled by the will of Paramatman without any obstruction. In view of this, the satya-sankalpatva of the muktātmā is not affected.

The new status attained by the muktātmā in the form of everlasting experience of bliss of Paramātman is due to the removal of the obstruction (pratibandhaka-nivrtti) in the form of karma, and also the will of God, similar to the manifestation of the luster of the diamond after the removal of the dirt eclipsing it. In the case of nitya-jīvas, those who have never had bondage, their experience of the bliss of Paramatman is due to the nityecchā, that is, permanent will of the Lord.

#### REFERENCES

- 1. See Br. Up., V.7.22 (Mādhyandina version). Ya ātmani tişthan ātmanah antaraḥ, yam ātmā na veda, yasya ātmā śarīram, yo ātmānam antaro yamayati sa ta (tava) ātmā antaryāmī amṛtah.
- 2. See Vedārtha-sangraha.
- 3. See infra, chap. 22, p. 219.
- 4. For fuller implication of the definition, see FVV, chap. 1, pp.49-50.
- 5. See Mund. Up., III.1.9, eșo anurâtmă cetasă veditavyah.
- 6. Br. Up., VI.3.30, na hi vijñātuh vijñāteh viparilopo vidyate. 7. For detailed criticism of Advaita theory of anubhūti, see SD, vāda
- 20. Also see Advaita and Visistadvaita, pp.49-50.
- 9. See Mund. Up., III.1.30, niranjanah paramam samyam upaiti.
- 10. BG, XIV.2.
- 11. Ka. Up., II.1.14.

### The Doctrine of Cosmic Matter (Acit-tattva)

THE ŚVETĀŚVATARA UPANIŞAD which mentions the three I fundamental metaphysical principles describes the acit tattva as bhogya as contrasted to the bhoktā or jīvātman and preritara or the controller because it has neither the capacity to experience (bhoktrtva) nor the capacity to control (prerakatva). It is only the object of experience (bhogya). Acit, also termed as acetana, is defined as that which is devoid of  $j\bar{n}\bar{a}t\bar{r}va$ . The term jñātr means that which is the subject of knowledge. Jnātrtva implies either that which reveals to itself, like jīvasvarūpa or that which manifests itself as "I" (ahamtva). In the absence of these important functions or characteristics, the theory which upholds that mere jñāna-svarūpa is pratyak or that which manifests to itself and also the theory that non-sentient entities such as ahankāra is jīvātman, are untenable as these are opposed to all pramānas. However, in Viśistādvaita, Vedānta, the dharmabhūta-jñāna or the knowledge which is an attribute of the self is also regarded as acetana, even though it is of the nature of knowledge. It is categorized as jñāna because it is not the subject of knowledge, unlike jīvātman. It only reveals the object to the self but it does not know the object. It is also regarded as a dravya because it is subject to modifications or avasthas of jñāna.

Viśiṣṭādvaita acknowledges three kinds of acit dravyas. These are: (1) prakṛti, characterized by the three guṇas—sattva, rajas, and tamas; (2) kāla or time; and (3) Śuddha-sattva or transcendental spiritual realm which is of the nature of pure sattva. These are categorized as acetanas because these do not possess knowledge, unlike cit or jīvātman. The common

characteristic between *prakṛti* and *kāla* is the absence of the quality of śuddha-sattva. The common characteristic of *prakṛti* and śuddha-sattva is the possession of the quality of sattva. What is common to both *kāla* and śuddha-sattva is the absence of the qualities of rajas and tamas. Similalry, the common features between *kāla* and jīvātman is the observe of the three guṇas—sattva, rajas, and tamas.

Prakṛti, also named as triguna, is a dravya or substance which is the āśraya or locus for the three guṇas, viz., sattva, rajas, and tamas. The prakṛti in the form of body affects the knowledge of the baddha jīva by causing in it contraction and expansion and thereby prevents it from obtaining the true knowledge of Paramātman (bhagavat-svarūpa-tirodhāna).

The Advaitins maintain that the true nature of the undifferentiated Brahman, which is only pure consciousness, is eclipsed by ajñāna. This is not a sound theory because it amounts to the destruction of the very svarūpa of Brahman. The Sānkhyas maintain that the three guṇas are dravyas or substances and not qualities (guṇas) and when these are in equilibrium (sāmyāvasthā), it is known as mūla-prakṛti or primordial cosmic matter. This view would conflict with the teaching of the Gītā, which clearly states that sattva, rajas, and tamas are guṇas of prakṛti. The theories which maintain that dharma and dharmī are identical, and the relation between them is one of difference and non-difference, stand opposed to our experience. Though sattva, rajas, and tamas could also be regarded as dravyas, in certain contexts, it would be more appropriate to admit them as guṇas with reference to the prakṛti.

The Vaiśeṣikas do not accept these three guṇas since these are not evident to perception. The Sāṅkhyas, on the contrary, accept it on the basis of inference. Both these views are also opposed to the Scriptural texts (āgamabādha). Similarly, there is no Scriptural proof for the theory of some Advaitins that the three forms of Brahman—sattva, rajas, and tamas represent the reflections of sat, cit, and ānanda in the māyā. The description of sattva, rajas, and tamas as red, white, and black, etc. in the Chāndogya Upaniṣad is to be taken in a figurative sense.

Sattva, rajas, and tamas are the gunas of prakti. These are admitted on the basis of the influences they exert on the

individuals. Sattva is the quality which causes illumination (prakāśa), lightness (lāghava), and happiness (sukha). It enhances the knowledge and happiness in individuals. In case of some individuals, the sattva-guṇa is inherent at the time of birth due to the grace of God in accordance with their extraordinary merit of previous life and makes then develop interest in pursuing the means of attaining mokṣa. There are numerous Purāṇic episodes which reveal how certain individuals, due to the grace of God, are enabled to develop spiritual interest due to their past puṇya-karma.

The quality of rajas causes passion, attachment to things, movement, etc. and induces individuals in activities. It also makes persons indulge in prohibited and undesirable acts and thereby causes bondage.

Tamas is the cause of ignorance, lethargy, and sleepiness. It hinders the progress in our endeavours. All these details are provided in the *Bhagavadgītā* (XVII).

These three guṇas are present in an individual in varying proportion, just as vāta, pitta, kapha (the chemical elements) in one's body and the qualities such as colour, taste, and odour in a substance. They are subject to fluctuations due to different places (pradésa-bheda) and different times (kāla-bheda) which cause either their manifestations or suppressions due to the mutual influence of the guṇas. These variations of guṇas in an individual influence the mental and physical activities. The division of human beings into four classes as Brāhmaṇas, Kṣatriyas, Vaiśyas, and Sūdras as mentioned in the Gītā are due to the presence or absence of these inherent qualities of sattva, rajas, and tamas in different proportion. The classification of the Purāṇas into sāttvika, rājasika, and tāmasika mentioned in the Padmapurāṇa is also ascribed to the influence of the guṇas on the mental traits of their authors.

The statements in the Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad that kāla, svabhāva, niyati, yadṛcchā, prakṛti, and puruṣa are the cause of cosmic creation, represents the prima facie view (pūrvapakṣa). All these are rejected in the latter part of the Upaniṣad and it is affirmed that Īśvara with the association of prakṛti, is the cause of the Universe.

Prakṛti by nature is eternal but it is also constantly changing (nitya satata-vikriyā). But both during the state of dissolution and prior to creation, the guṇas remain in a state of equilibrium, similar to the ocean remaining calm without any waves. At the time of creation, disturbance of the guṇas takes place in respect of a small part of prakṛti as in the case of waves arising in a part of the huge ocean. It is only that portion of prakṛti that undergoes modification. On the basis of such an explanation, we speak of the difference between samaṣṭi or the creation of the aggregate universe and vyaṣṭi or the creation of the variegated universe. In other words there is no total transformation of the triguṇātmaka prakṛti, but only a small part of it undergoes modification, while the rest of it remains undisturbed.

In describing the order of dissolution of prakṛti, Subāla Upaniṣad states: "avyaktam akṣare līyate, akṣaram tamasi līyate, tamaḥ ekī bhavati pare deve" (avyakta is dissolved in akṣara, akṣara becomes tamas, tamas becomes united in Para devatā). This would imply that prior to avyakta (unmanifest prakṛti), there are two states, viz., akṣara and tamas. What are these two states? The term akṣara normally denotes the aggregate of all jīvas, viz., Caturmukha Brahmā in whom all jīvas rest prior to creation (kṣetrajña samaṣṭi). But the samaṣṭi-puruṣa cannot be placed between avyakta and tamas. Hence akṣara in this context is to be taken as prakṛti or non-sentient cosmic matter associated with jīva-samaṣṭi (puruṣa). Tamas which becomes united with Paradevatā, therefore, stands for the sūkṣmāvasthā of both prakṛti and samaṣṭi-puruṣa. There is no other principle higher than tamas, since it finally becomes united with Paramātman.

The theory of Yādavaprakāśa that prakṛti and puruṣa are the very manifestations of Brahman is not tenable because both puruṣa and prakṛti are anādi, as stated in the Gītāl and hence they cannot originate from Brahman. It would also militate against the Scriptural texts speaking of Brahman as nirvikāra.

Sṛṣṭi or creation of a tattva is to be understood in the sense that Brahman as associated with cit and acit in their subtle forms, assumes a different state, that is, Brahman as associated with cit and acit in their manifest forms. The same view is with cit and acit in their manifest forms. The same view is expressed by sage Manu in the following statement: āsīd-idam

tamo bhūtam...so abhidhyāya śarīrāt svāt sisṛkṣuḥ vividhāḥ prajāḥ [All this (the universe) was in the beginning (prior to creation) tamas (unmanifest); He (Paramātman) by His will created all the living beings].

The concept of  $m\bar{a}y\bar{a}$  applied to tamas only signifies that it possesses the power of creating variegated objects (vicitrasnṣṭi-upakaraṇa). It does not mean the illusory principle as conceived by the Advaitin. If it is taken as the illusory principle, then it would conflict with the statement: deva māyeva nirmitā (it was created as deva māyā).

Mahat is the next important evolute arising from the part of prakṛti in which the guṇas are in a state of fluctuation. It is called mahān or mahat-tattva because it is the most important evolute which is greater than all the subsequent evolutes. Some Sānkhyas designate mahān as buddhi (mahān vai buddhilakṣaṇaḥ), because in the functioning of manas, mahat-tattva is of great help for the act of determination or adhyavasāya. For those who ascribe to buddhi the capacity to know (jñātrtva), it would amount to the denial of the sentient jīvātman as a separate entity. Even mahat-tattva is also characterized by the three guṇas: sattva, rajas, and tamas which exist in it in varying proportion. This mahat-tattva and all its other evolutes are different for each individual, after the variegated creation takes place.

The evolute which originates from mahat is known as ahankāra. It is so called because it causes the experience that the body itself is ātman. This ahankāra-tattva is different from the entity denoted by the notion of "I" which is regarded as jīvātman by the Viśiṣṭādvaitin. But the Sānkhyas and the Advaitins regard the evolute named ahankāra itself as the ahamartha or the notion of "I." But this view would be opposed to the pramāṇas which clearly reveal the distinction between what is ātmā and what is not ātmā. Thus, the Upaniṣadic text describing jīva and matter as bhoktā and bhogya draw a clear distinction between jīvātman and the non-sentient cosmic matter. The statement which speaks of the rejection of ahankāra as an undesirable trait, do not refer to the negation of the ātma-tattva, but on the contrary, it advocates to give up the delusion of body as self or the self-conceited feeling of oneself as great.

The ahankāra-tattva, like mahat, is of three kinds due to the fluctuation of the three gunas. These are sāttvika ahankāra, rājasa ahankāra, and tāmasa ahankāra. Sāttvika ahankāra is the cause of the indriyas or the sense organs. Tāmasa ahankāra is the cause of the five tanmātras or subtle elements. Rājasa ahankāra acts as a generating force for both. It also acts as the instrumental cause for the evolution of the indriyas and tanmātras.

From the sāttvika ahankāra originate all the eleven indriyas including manas or mind. The view of Hiranyagarbha (founder of yoga) that the indriyas are the different forms of ahankāra does not conform to the Scriptural texts teaching the origin of indriyas from ahankāra. The Śaiva sect which maintains that the five karmendriyas room the products of rājasa ahankāra is also opposed to the Scriptural and Smṛti texts. It is also not correct to say that karmendriyas come into existence along with the concerned physical bodies at the time of creation, because it stands opposed to the Scriptural text which says that all eleven indriyas originate from ahankāra at the time of creation. The mention of six indriyas only, including manas, as originating from prakṛti, by the Gītā is only illustrative of all eleven indriyas (upalakṣaṇaparam).

Manas is the indriya which serves as an accessory for the functioning of the five sense organs and it is directly instrumental for causing desire and memory. It is also helpful in causing knowledge and a desire to act while karmendriyas are functioning. The theory of Sāṅkhyas which categorizes separately the five jñānendriyas and five karmendriyas and mentions that manas is useful for both, is not sound.

If manas is regarded as a karmendriya because it is either directly or indirectly useful for the activities of the karmendriyas, then even ear (śrotra) and other sense organs are to be admitted as karmendriyas. Manas itself is sometimes named as buddhi, ahankāra and citta on the basis of its threefold functions, viz., determination, attachment to an entity, and thinking. This does not amount to the denial of the existence of mahat-tattva and ahankāra, the two evolutes. The implication of this view is that when an individual performs these three functions, the same manas is named differently as buddhi, ahankāra, and

citta. In view of this, the theory of the Sāṅkhyas that sense organs are thirteen in number and that antaḥkaraṇa or internal organ is of three kinds, stands refuted. Adhyavasāya (determination), kāma (desire), saṅkalpa (will), etc. are actually the various modifications or states (avasthās) of dharma-bhūta-jñāna of the jīva during the state of bondage. But these are regarded as functions of mind insofar as these modifications arise due to the influence of the various sense organs. In the Gītā verse, manas is also included in the category of indriyas (indriyāṇi daśaikaṁ ca). This is justified since manas, like the other indriyas are the products of sāttvika ahaṅkāra.

All the *indriyas*, as pointed out in the *Vedāntasūtra*,<sup>2</sup> are monadic in character (*aṇuvaśca*). As *indriyas* are the modified products of the *ahaṅkāra* (*vikāridravya*), they can assume different dimensions such as big or small in accordance with the dimensions of the respective bodies of the living beings. Some Buddhists admit three types of *indriyas* classified as masculine, feminine, and *jīvendriya* due to different types of functions of the bodies. But this theory is rejected by Vedānta Deśika as imaginary and irrelevant.

The theory that manas is nitya and also vibhu as held by some Vaiśeṣikas, stands opposed to the teaching of the Scriptural texts which categorically state that all the eleven indriyas including manas are the products of sāttvika ahankāra. Similarly, there are other theories about manas held by Bhāṭṭa Mīmāmsakas and some Buddhists, but all these are untenable.

How the *indriyas* which are located in the body are able to grasp or come into contact with objects outside them? This is a question which has engaged all schools of thought and different explanations are offered by them. Without going into the critical examination of these theories Vedānta Dešika states in a general way that the functioning of the *indriyas* with reference to their contact with different kinds of external objects are to be explained in accordance with the nature of the objects and our experience. In the case of the comprehension by the visual organ of subtle objects hidden in crystals, clear water, mirror, etc., the subtle rays radiating from the eyes come into contact with them. If they cannot grasp them, it is due to the hindrance which prevents the entry of the rays of

light into it. In the case of the organ comprehending the odour in the flower which exists far from the organ, the odour itself which travels from the flower through the media of air  $(v\bar{a}yu)$ , reaches the organ.

The followers of the Bhedābheda-vāda maintain the view that from ahankāra tattva combined with the five physical elements, originate the five sense organs as well as the respective karmendriyas and only manas emanates from ahankāra. The Vaiseṣikas, on the other hand, do not accept the five karmendriyas. If the karmendriyas are rejected, then on the same ground, we could as well reject the jñānendriyas.

The mention of lesser number of *indriyas* in some of the Scriptural texts is not intended to deny the existence of other *indriyas*. These have a different purport. The statement that  $\bar{a}k\bar{a}sa$  is to be included in the *indriyas* and that *indriyas* are to be included among the *tanmātras*, are to be taken in the sense of *samsarga*, that is, as being united in them. Otherwise, all these statements would be opposed to the Scriptural teaching which points out that *indriyas* are the products of *sāttvika ahankāra* and that they are all modified effects of the causal substance, viz., *ahankāra tattva*.

All the eleven *indriyas* are different, similar to the five elements, and exist in the individuals separately and as such they are countless. As stated by Manu, these *indriyas* in their subtle form, are implanted by *Īśvara* in the subtle bodies of all the

living beings.

The Sāṅkhyas who also admit the existence of linga-śarīra, the subtle body, believe that it endures upto the end of an epoch (ākalpa-sthāyī) and it comprises the five subtle elements (tanmātra) and eleven subtle indriyas and buddhi (mahat-tattva). When jīva transmigrates through the cycle of births and deaths, these too go along with it. According to Ānandānubhava, an Advaitin who has written a commentary on Nyāya-ratna Dīpāvalī and Iṣṭasiddhi, the linga-śarīra comprises nineteen parts—eleven indriyas, five tanmātras, and the rest three are mahat, ahankāra, and prakrti.


The term  $bh\bar{u}tas$  or physical elements are the substances (dravyas) which serve as the basis  $(\bar{a}\dot{s}raya)$  for the guṇas such as sound, colour, etc., which are objects of the sense organs. These are classified as gross  $(sth\bar{u}la)$  and subtle  $(s\bar{u}ksma)$ .

The subtle ones are named as tanmātras and the gross ones are called bhūtas. This difference between tanmātra and bhūta is drawn on the basis of the variation of the guṇas possessed by them as in the example of sugarcane juice and sugar candy. The variation of guṇas in the tanmātras is not perceptible to us. Even in respect of the gross physical elements, which are perceptible, we cannot know the variation of sattva, rajas, and tamas, which exist in them in different proportion.

There are various theories regarding the order in which the tanmātras evolve, and also how the pañca-bhūtas evolve from the tanmātras. Vedānta Désika critically examines them and sets out the correct theory on the basis of the Scriptural and Smṛti texts. The important deviation from that of the Sāṅkhyas is, all the five tanmātras according to the Sāṅkhyas evolve together out of the tāmasa ahaṅkāra, whereas for Viśiṣṭādvaita, only śabda-tanmātra comes out of tāmasa ahaṅkāra. From śabda-tanmātra arises ākāśa or the gross space. From ākāśa comes sparśa-tanmātra which in turn causes vāyu. From vāyu comes rūpa-tanmātra. From this comes tejas which produces (rasa) tanmātra. Rasa-tanmātra causes jala. From jala comes gandha-tanmātra. From this evolves pṛthivī. (See p. 21, for the order of evolution of the tanmātras and bhūtas as stated in Tattva-muktākalāpa.)

Each element is characterized by a specific quality.  $\bar{A}k\bar{a}\dot{s}a$ possesses the quality of sound only. Air possesses the qualities of sound and touch. Tejas or fire possesses three gunas, viz., sound, touch, and colour. Water is characterized by sound, touch, colour, and taste. Prthivī possesses all the five gunassound, touch, colour, taste, and odour. Since the bhūtas evolve one after another in a successive order starting from ākāśa, qualities inherent in the respective elements are transmitted to the next one. Even the Vaisesikas accept the successive increase of the gunas in the bhutas. According to the theory of Pañcikarana or the admixture of all five elements in a certain proportion, it is possible to admit the presence of different guṇas in the five bhūtas. Though all guṇas are present in the bhūtas in different proportion, each bhūta is named separately as prthivi, ap, tejas, etc., because of the predominance of a particular element and lesser and lesser quantity of the other

elements. For instance *pṛthivī* is so called because of the predominance of the half of *pṛthivī* element and one-eighth quantity of *jala*, *agni*, *vāyu*, and *ākāśa* respectively.



The *trvitkaraṇa* or admixture of the three elements referred to in the *Chāndogya Upaniṣad* is illustrative of the *Pañcīkaraṇa* theory taught in other parts of the Sacred texts. The presence of the *guṇas* of one element in the other elements such as blueness in  $\bar{a}k\bar{a}śa$ , odour and coldness in  $v\bar{a}yu$ , whiteness and blackness in fire, colour and different tastes in water, hotness, etc., in  $prthiv\bar{v}$  are caused on account of the admixture of different elements by the process of  $Pañc\bar{v}$  arana. This is to be admitted on the authority of the Scriptural texts.

Regarding ākāśa or Ether which is the first evolute emanating from śabda-tanmātra, it is described as that which provides

space for other objects (avakāśa-pradānam). It is also defined as that which does not cause obstruction for tactile objects. It is therefore to be taken as a separate tattva. The theories of Cārvāka, Buddhists, and Vaisesikas who maintain that ākāśa does not exist and even if it exists it is beyond our perceptual experience and that it is eternal or vibhu, etc. stand opposed to our experience and also to the Scriptural texts. Some state that ākāśa is the object of all indriyas (sarvendriya pratyaksa vedyam) and it is to be understood in the sense that it can be seen by all the individuals through the visual organ. All the other four elements including vāyu can be comprehended by touch. But Vaisesikas hold that only vāyu can be experienced by touch, whereas that it is a substance is known by means of inference. This is not a correct theory since on the basis of logic, fire also would become an object of inference since its qualities, viz., touch and colour are perceived. But they do not admit it.

With regard to tamas or darkness, there are different theories. One view is that tamas is a conglomeration of the minute particles of earth and the dark blue colour visible to us is tamas. According to another view, tamas or darkness is a separate substance. One other theory is that in the absence of light, there is the appearance of dark colour. All these theories are opposed to our perceptual experience. It would also lead to the fallacy of postulating an unwanted additional factor (kalpanā gaurava).

These five elements, after they are mixed up in different proportions in accordance with the Pañcīkaraṇa theory, undergo various modifications and serve human beings as either objects of enjoyment or means of enjoyment or as places of experience (bhogasthāna). The Jaina theory which admits a primordial cosmic substance named as pudgala, which evolves itself into five elements, sounds good but it suffers from the defect of not accounting an orderly process of evolution at specified points of time as in the case of prakṛti and its evolution. Moreover, it is opposed to the Scriptural texts.

The bodies which are intended for experience of pleasure and pain are of four types in accordance with the four kinds of living beings: *Devas* or celestial beings, human beings, animals,

and inanimate objects (sthāvaras). In some Purāṇas, the last category is divided into two groups as narakāntaka and sthāvarāntaka. But both these states are included in the sthāvara category. The argument that there are no souls in sthavaras to experience anything is also untenable because in that case one can argue that even in the lower form of living beings, there are no souls other than the bodies. Thus, all entities upto the five physical elements are regarded as triguna-draya. since they are modifications of the same prakrti. This is explained on the analogy of the palm-leaf and the ornament made out of it by rolling the same as the earring (patra-tātanka nyāya).

It is stated that the cosmic universe and several other realms called andaja are created by Iśvara through the evolution of prakrti similar to the ocean giving rise to several waves, as part of the Divine Sport. In this connection, a question is raised: whether these come into existence simultaneously, at one time (yugapat) or in succession at different times (krama sṛṣṭi). If it be the latter, it cannot be said that the cosmic universe is the same as prakrti in its manifested form. Hence it is to be admitted that the cosmic universe and all other aṇḍaja are created at the same time through the evolution of prakṛti. This view conforms to the teachings of the Scriptural

and Smrti texts.

The Nirīśvara Mīmāmsakas maintain the view that the creation and also the dissolution of the universe and other andaja (realms) should not take place at the same time as there would be a break for the continuity or the Vedic tradition from a beginningless time and hence there is no need to postulate the evolution and dissolution of prakṛti which is not accessible to perceptual experience. This is not a correct theory as it falls outside the Vedic teachings. Allied to the Mīmāmsakas, the Seśvara Sānkhyas enumerate twenty-five tattvas by adding jīva (puruṣa) to the twenty-four principles. But this view stands negated by several other statements which reckon twenty-six tattvas by adding Iśvara to the twenty-five principles. But in the Mahābhārata (in Śāntiparva), Īśvara is regarded as the twenty-fifth tattva. The implication of it is that though jīva and Paramātman are two separate entities, they are one in the sense that Paramatman is immanent in

jīva and as being inseparably related to jīva, it is counted as the twenty-fifth principle. The relevant verse in the Mahābhārata reads: anyaśca rajan, sa parah tacca anyah pañcavimśakah; tatsthattvāt anupasyanti hy-eka eveti sādhavah. It means: "The twenty-fifth tattva (nvātmā) is different; Paramātman is also different. Nevertheless, since He (Paramatman) is immanent in the jīva, the two as inseparably related, constitute one tattva." The Vedāntasūtra reading as "avasthiteh iti kāśakrtsnah" also signifies the same truth. Even the Scriptural text (Mantrikopanisad) says that *Īśvara* can be regarded either as the twenty-fifth or twenty-sixth tattva (tam sadvimsakam ityāhuh). By adding to prakrti the tamas, which is a different state of prakrti, the total number of tattvas can be counted as twenty-seven. Some reckon twenty-seven tattvas by adding the Antaryamin as a separate entity but this is not appropriate since Antaryamin is not distinct from Paramatman. Some argue that there are only six tattvas on the basis of the Taittiriya passage dealing with the causation of the universe (ātmā, ākāśa, vāyu, agni, āpaḥ, and pṛthivī). But this is opposed to several other Scriptural texts. If in some texts mention is made of a smaller number of tattvas, while in others a larger number is enumerated, we have to take both into consideration to determine the total number of tattvas. There is not much difference when we make two statements, viz., (a) from milk comes cream and from cream comes curd, and (b) from milk we get curd. Similarly, when the Upanisads describe the total number of tattvas in two different ways, there should be no difference in the purport. If such an explanation is not accepted, then in the passage of Chāndogya Upaniṣad dealing with sad-vidyā in which mention is made only of sat or Brahman, tejas, pa, and prthivi, we have to say that there are only four tattvas. This is not a correct theory since, in other passages dealing with the creation of the universe, other tattvas are enumerated. The Śaivāgamas speak of thirty-six tattvas by adding several other tattvas, but it is not accepted by other orthodox schools. Hence this view is to be overlooked, according to Vedanta Deśika.

Vaisesikas admit dik or directions as east, west, etc. as a separate metaphysical category. According to them it is nitya

or eternal and vibhu or all-pervasive. But this cannot be regarded as a separate tattva since there is no mention of it in the enumeration of the tattvas. If there are some statements saying that dik is created (diśah srotrāt), it is to be taken in the same sense as the creation of heaven, antarikṣa, etc. Hence it cannot be treated as a part of the tattvas evolved out of prakṛti. Some maintain the view that dik is recognized on the basis of the division of ākāśa with reference to the movement of the sun from one direction to another. Others (Sānkhyas) believe that the ahankāra-tattva itself evolves into the form of dik. Even if these theories are accepted, still there is need for some other limiting adjuncts (upādhi) by means of which directions have to be recognized.

#### THE THEORY OF KÂLA

So far, the discussion of prakrti, which is one of the three types of acit-tattva in Visiṣṭādvaita, is discussed comprehensively by critically analyzing all other views related to it. Now we come to the discussion of  $k\bar{a}la$  or time which is the second important acit-tattva. It is the substance (dravya) which is characterized by the notion of moments (kṣaṇa), hours, days, months, years, etc. and the notion of past, present, and future and also older and younger, etc. It is nitya or eternal and infinite but it undergoes modifications as moments, days, months, years, etc. Some believe that  $k\bar{a}la$ , though it is eternal, is regarded as divisible into moments, minutes, etc. on the basis of the limiting adjuncts  $(up\bar{a}dhi)$ . Others maintain that  $k\bar{a}la$  and its divisions are created by  $\bar{l}svara$  and hence it is like prakrti, subject to modifications and the moments, minutes, hours, days, etc. are modified forms of  $k\bar{a}la$ .

The view of the Cārvākas that kāla does not exist as separate entity is untenable because kāla is perceptible and its existence is proved by other pramāṇas. On the basis of the statement that there is nothing in the universe as eternal (nityam hi nāsti jagati), it may be argued that kāla also has a beginning and an end. But this would be opposed to the Smṛti text which states that kāla is anādi and ananta (infinite). Besides, it cannot be said that there is a time when kāla did not exist as it would be regarded as self-contradiction.

Some hold the view the  $k\bar{a}la$  in the transcendental spiritual realm ( $nitya\ vibh\bar{u}ti$ ) is eternal, whereas it is non-eternal in the physical world. This is not a correct theory. There cannot be two kinds of  $k\bar{a}la$  as there is no  $pram\bar{a}na$  in support of it. We cannot say that the same  $k\bar{a}la$  can be both nitya and anitya as conceived by Jainas since it would amount to self-contradiction. Nor can it be explained by taking resort to the nature of two separate kinds of realms ( $vibh\bar{u}ti$ -bheda). The only way it can be resolved is to admit that in the cosmic universe we have the changes in terms of day and night whereas in the transcendental world the Supreme Being exists eternally shining like an early morning Sun ( $anap\bar{a}ya\ prabh\bar{a}nvita\ nitya$ - $udita\ \bar{a}ditya$ ). In other words,  $nitya\ vibh\bar{u}ti$  is all the time like daylight, without any shadow of night whereas it is not so in respect of the cosmic universe.

Even in the abode of  $\bar{lsvara}$ , the individual souls perform a variety of services at different times and occasions and this presupposes the operation of  $k\bar{a}la$ , as otherwise it is not possible to explain the sequence of services as earlier and later. There are also statements which say that, in the higher realm, time does not operate (na  $k\bar{a}lah$  tatra vai prabhuh). The  $k\bar{a}la$  which is characterized with moments, minutes, hours, etc., causes modifications in that realm. The eternal Abode is divine, ageless, free from destruction, and unsurpassable. How do we explain all these statements if  $k\bar{a}la$  is not accepted? Vedānta Deśika points out that the implication of all such statements is that the individuals, their activities, and the operation of the events, etc., though not conditioned by time, are controlled by the will of God (Para sankalpa visesa). Hence it cannot be said that  $k\bar{a}la$  does not exist in the transcendental realm.

Kāla is admitted as vibhu or all-pervasive. If this be so, how does it co-exist with Īśvara who is also vibhu? Only two spatial objects can co-exist but two vibhu dravyas cannot come together (anyonya samyoga). This objection is replied to by explaining on the basis of the theory adopted by the Naiyāyikas for whom Īśvara, though He does not possess indriyas, can have direct knowledge of all things. If this is acceptable, in the same way it is possible to admit that two vibhu-dravyas can somehow come together. Īśvara is considered as vyāpaka

or one who pervades everything, whereas all other entities are  $vy\bar{a}pya$  or that which is pervaded by Him. This is plausible on the basis of the relation of  $niyant\bar{a}$  and  $niy\bar{a}mya$  that exists between the two. The statement in the  $Taittir\bar{i}ya$   $N\bar{a}r\bar{a}yana$  Upaniṣad states that  $N\bar{a}r\bar{a}yana$  (Brahman) exists by pervading both within and without (antarbahiśca  $vy\bar{a}pya$   $n\bar{a}r\bar{a}yanah$ ). This statement is applicable only in respect of entities which have both inner and outer space. This is not applicable to entities such as  $k\bar{a}la$  which is vibhu and devoid of outer space.

### THE THEORY OF SUDDHA-SATTVA

Śuddha-sattva is the third important acetana-tattva admitted by Viśistadvaita Vedanta. It is defined as a dravya or substance which is characterized by pure unalloyed sattva (as different from sattva which is one of the three gunas of prakrti) and also free from rajas and tamas (two other qualities of prakṛti). This sattva, unlike the ordinary sattva, does not bind a person with knowledge, pleasure, etc. It constitutes the very Divine body of the Supreme Being, His gunas, His abode, etc. The Paramapada or the divine Abode which is attained by the individuals after they are totally liberated from bondage caused by karma through the observance of upāsanā, is constituted of śuddha-sattva material. In the Vaisnava theology, śuddhasattva is often equated with Paramapada, though it is classified as a dravya characterized by unalloyed sattva. This Abode of Paramātman is described as immeasurable (aparicchedya). It exists beyond the tamas or the cosmic universe as stated in the Scriptural texts (tamasah parastāt). Though it is a transcendental spiritual realm and eternal, how can we regard the products that exist there in the form of castles, towers, lakes, trees, etc. as eternal since such objects are normally subject to changes like decay? It is possible to explain that these are nitya only in a restricted sense, viz., that they endure for a long time (sthirakāla-sthāyī), in the same way as we explain the description of the devas as immortal (amrta), vāyu and antariksa as amrta. But this is not the correct explanation because these entities in the Paramapada are devoid of origin and destruction as in the case of the spiritual realm. Besides,

the Smrti texts describe that the Spiritual realm is sanātana or everlasting and nitya-siddha or ever-existing. Hence it is not appropriate to offer a different explanation on the basis of inferential argument as against strong Scriptural evidence. Therefore, whatever is stated by Scriptural texts as nitya, is to be accepted as such.

### REFERENCES

- 1. See BG, XIII.19: Prakṛtim puruṣam caiva viddhi anādi ubhau api.
- 2. VS, II.4.6.
- 3. See FVV, chap.10, pp. 327-28.
- 4. teṣām tu avayavān sūkṣmān ṣaṇṇamapi amitae dasām, sanniveśya ātmāmātrāstu sarvabhūtāni nirmame.

# The Doctrine of Brahman (Para-tattva)

THIS IS THE third fundamental doctrine of Viśiṣṭādvaita Vedānta. În presenting this doctrine, Vedānta Deśika confines his attention to answering all possible objections and counter theories of other schools of thought including Advaita regarding the essential nature of Brahman. Brahman is the ultimate Reality. It is immanent as the Inner controller of all beings, both cetana and acetana, as stated in the Antaryāmī Brāhmana. At the same time, it is also a transcendental being, not being affected by the defects inherent in the cetanas and acetanas. Though Iśvara is beyond the comprehension of perceptual experience, being a supersensuous entity (atindriya), He is to be known only by means of śāstras or Sacred texts. The existence of such a Supreme Being and also his svarūpa (essential nature), gunas (attributes), and vibhūti (glory) cannot be defined. As stated in the second aphorism of the Vedāntasūtra (Janmādyasya yataḥ) on the basis of the Taittirīya Upaniṣad, Brahman is the sole cause of the universe (nikhila jagadeka kāraņa), that is, it is the cause of creation, sustenance, and dissolution of the universe. Iśvara is the Universal Self (sarva-śarīrī). He is the supporter (ādhāra) of all entities in the universe but He Himself does not need another supporter higher than Him. As stated in the Upanișad, He is self-existent and does not depend on anything else other than Himself (sve-mahimni pratistha). İśvara is also the worthy object of mediation for the aspirants to moksa (manukṣopāsya). He himself is the bestower of mokṣa (mokṣaprada) and He Himself is the Supreme Goal to be attained (muktaprāpya). All these points constitute the distinguishing characteristics of Iśvara (Iśvara-lakṣaṇa) and these have to

be necessarily admitted in order to uphold a perfect theory of the ultimate Reality.

According to Viśiṣṭādvaita, Īśvara is both upādāna-kāraṇa (material cause) and nimitta kāraṇa (instrumental cause) of the universe. As stated in the Upaniṣad, He wills to become the manifold universe (bahusyām prajāyeya). As he creates the universe out of his will (sankalpa), He becomes the instrumental cause, that is, Īśvara as associated with the sankalpa (sankalpa viśiṣṭa) is the nimitta kāraṇa. He is the upādāna kāraṇa or material cause as associated with cit and acit in its unmanifest form (sūkṣma cid-acid-viśiṣṭa).

An objection is raised against the theory that  $\bar{I}\dot{s}vara$  is the Creator of the universe. According to the Upaniṣadic statement, He is only a witness  $(s\bar{a}k\bar{s}\bar{\imath})$ , unattached being, that is indifferent and devoid of all functions  $(s\bar{a}k\bar{s}\bar{\imath}\ cet\bar{a}\ kevalo\ nirguṇa\acute{s}ca)$ . If according to this statement,  $\bar{I}\dot{s}vara$  is devoid of kartrtva or the capacity to do any activities, how can He be regarded as the creator of the universe? Vedānta Deśika answers this objection by clarifying the implication of the concepts of kartrtva,  $ud\bar{a}s\bar{\imath}natva$ , and prerakatva in respect of  $\bar{I}\dot{s}vara$ .

Īśvara is the kartā since He alone creates the universe out of his saṅkalpa without depending on anybody else. He is the preraka since He prompts the individuals to perform acts by grating them the requisite knowledge and desire to perform an act. In respect of non-sentient entities also, He plays the role of preraka insofar as He causes the series of modifications in them and to this extent He is regarded as kartā or the one who causes the changes. The term niyantṛtva implies these two roles in respect of sentient and non-sentient activities. Besides, He is also regarded as praśāsitāra or Ruler in respect of sentient beings through His dictates laid down in the śāstra.

The jīva is also kartā but this kartṛtva is dependent upon Īśvara (parāyatta). Since he is not a sarvajña or omniscient, he needs knowledge to understand what is right or wrong. Since he is also not an omnipotent being, he is to be dependent upon the help and guidance of the Supreme Being. The contention that jīva, being solely dependent upon Īśvara, cannot be subject to the dictates of śāstra, is untenable. If the jīva needs a body, sense organ, past karma, suitable time, and

other factors for doing these activities, there should be no objection to his being dependent on the guidance of *Īśvara* through the *śāstras*. Though God has the power to stop a person from doing an evil deed, He does not do so and approves his action (*anumantā*) in order to allow him to reap the benefits of the past *karma*. Whenever and act cannot be accomplished by his own effort, God plays an accessory role (*sahakāri*) by providing support to him.

In the matter of creating different types of individuals and also providing them the requisite guidance in doing what is good or bad, God does not play the role of being the primary cause (pradhāna kāraṇa) but it is got done in accordance with the past karma of the individuals and to this extent he is indifferent (udāsīna). Since God acts in accordance with the karma of jīvas in giving them the benefits, He escapes the criticism of being partial and cruel (vaisamya nairghanya dosa).

An objection may be raised against the admission of *Īśvara* for the purpose of creation of the universe. What is the purpose of creating the universe by God? If he created the universe either to enjoy the joy of creation of the universe (*tīlārasa*) or to protect the living beings (*jīva-rakṣaṇa*), would it not then conflict with the theory of God as avāpta-samasta-kāma, that is, all his desires are already fulfilled and there would be no need to achieve special benefits? Hence it would not be necessary to admit the existence of *Īśvara*. Alternatively, if *Īśvara* is accepted, it would suffice to postulate that He is only nimitta kāraṇa or instrumental cause of the universe, in the same way as kāla or the need of a specific time for creation.

This is not a sound argument, contends Vedānta Deśika. *Īśvara* is regarded as avāpta-samasta-kāma in the sense that as one who is of the nature of ānanda par excellence is capable of achieving anything desired by Him and He could create the universe as and when needed and also offer protection to the created individuals.

We may admit *Iśwara* for the purpose of the creation of the universe and its protection but would it be justifiable to regard Him as the *upādāna kāraṇa* or material cause? In our ordinary experience, we find, as in the example of the clay and the pot produced out of it, clay serves as the material,

while the potter is instrumental for its production. Some of the Scriptural and Smṛti texts also conveys his idea that *Īśvara* is only the *nimitta kāraṇa* for the creation of the universe, while primordial cosmic matter *prakṛti* is the material cause. If this view is not accepted, it would amount to the modification of Brahman as the universe. In view of it, the Seśvara Sāṅkhya (Yoga), Pāśupata Vaiśeṣika, and other schools (Madhva's Dvaita) only uphold the theory of *Īśvara* as *nimitta kāraṇa*.

Visistādvaita refutes this theory on the authority of the Scriptural and Smrti texts. As stated by Bādarāyana in the Vedāntasūtra, the pratijna or the general statement, viz., that by the knowledge of causal substance, all the products made out of it become known and the illustration of clay and pot in support of it, as stated in the Chāndogya Upaniṣad<sup>2</sup> in connection with the causation of the universe by Brahman, would stand explained if only Brahman is admitted as upādāna kārana. The Upanisad states that Brahman itself desired to become a manifold universe (bahubhavana sankalpa). It provides a few illustrations in support of it. Besides, it explicitly states that Brahman made itself as the universe (tadātmānam svayamkuruta).4 We also find several instances in our common experience in which both upādāna kārana and nimitta kārana as different and also as non-distinct. Both in respect of sentient and non-sentient entities, whenever they undergo changes on their own, they serve as upādāna and also nimitta for the changes taking place.

It is pointed out by Vedānta Deśika that being the material cause of the universe would not be subject to transformation. Nor the defects found in the universe would be applicable to Brahman. This is explained by Rāmānuja on the analogy of the changes occuring in the physical body of an individual such as childhod, youth, old age, etc., which do not affect the Self within. Brahman does not actually undergo any transformation, as in the case of the clay assuming a new form and name as pot (nāmāntara bhajanārha vikāra), by being the upādāna kāraṇa. Upādānatva is of two kinds. An object is conceived as upādāna kāraṇa, when that itself modifies into a different state, as in the instance of the clay and the pot. An entity is also regarded as upādāna kāraṇa, when it serves as the basis for the avasthās or different states it undergoes.

The analogy of a boy growing as a youth, old man, etc., is of this type. In this case the individual self associated with the physical body, is the material cause by virtue of its being the aśraya or serving as substrate for the changes taking place in the body. In the first instance, there is total transformation of the clay (svarūpa vikāra) but it is not so in the second instance. Brahman is ajaḍa dravya, spiritual substance, since it is capable of assuming different states. Prior to the creation of the universe, Brahman is associated with cit and acit in their subtle forms. In the state after creation, it becomes Brahman as associated with cit and acit in their manifest forms. The changes take place in respect of prakṛti which is its śarīra. It becomes upādāna kāraṇa for the universe by its being the ādhāra or basis of prakṛti.

On the basis of this explanation, it is stated that Brahman being the *upādāna kāraṇa* of the universe, its *svarūpa* as *nirvikāra* is not affected. This is also supported by the Smṛti texts. The statement "so abhidhyāya śarīrāt svāt" which means: "Paramātman brings forth from its body, the universe" and the illustration cited by the *Muṇḍaka Upaniṣad* of the spider weaving out its web from its own body (saliva) convey this idea that Brahman itself is the *upādāna kāraṇa* of the universe.

When the Scriptural texts state that *Īśvara* is without a physical body (aśarīra), we have to regard him as aśarīrin. Even if we have to accept a body for Him, it will be like taking on a body like Indra assuming a body for ruling the universe. *Īśvara* can assume a transitory body temporarily out of His sankalpa. With the exception of these cases, would it be appropriate to admit that cit and acit are His śarīra in a primary sense? Hence it is contended that an explanation be offered for the material causality of Brahman on the basis of the soul and body relation, is to be taken in figurative sense (upacāra).

In reply to this objection, Vedānta Deśika points out that the texts which affirm the guṇas, spiritual body, birth, karma etc., and also those which negate the same, are to be understood on the basis of the principle adopted for reconciling the conflict between saguṇa and nirguṇa śrutis. What is intended in such texts negating the body, etc. for Īśvara is that Īśvara is devoid of a body caused by the karma (karmāyatta śarīra). He is devoid

of finite knowledge which would be dependent on the mind and sense organs (kāraṇāyatta jñāna). Hence there should be no conflict between the two statements affirming a body and also negating a body. On the strength of the Scriptural texts which affirm that İśvara is akarma-vaśya or not subject to karma, that He exists eternally at all time without anyone equal to or superior to Him and that He is Sarveśvara, the theories that uphold a series of Rulers as Iśvara or that the muktātmā is Īśvara stand untenable. If we accede to the view that Iśvara assumes transitory bodies, we can as well admit that He possesses an eternal and, spiritual body on the strength of the Scriptural texts.

It is to be noted that in Visistādvaita Vedānta, Īśvara or Brahman as a visista-tattva, that is, as related inseparably to cit and acit, serves as the material cause of the universe. Mere viśesya or the pure undifferentiated Being as conceived by Advaita cannot be the cause of the universe. Even the Advaitin admits that Brahman as associated with the māyā (Upahita Brahma) is the material cause. The acit of prakṛti which actually evolves as the manifold universe, is the śarīra of Brahman in the technical sense, viz., that the former is always and wholly sustained and also controlled by the latter. Hence Brahman undergoes modification not directly, but through the media of prakrti, which is its śarīra. As prakrti is different from Brahman, the changes that take place in prakrti do not affect Brahman which is its āśraya.

As it is well-established by scriptural texts that Brahma-svarūpa is not subject to any change or modification, it cannot be said, on the analogy of the piece of wood in the salt mine, that Brahman, in spite of its association with the cosmic universe, is affected in any way. Similarly, Brahman who is the Ruler of all, is also not subject to the dictates of the sacred texts, unlike the nvas. Though He functions through the body which is assumed out of His sankalpa, He is untouched by the afflictions as in the case of jīvas. As He is Satyasankalpa or one whose desires are fulfilled without any obstruction, there is no scope for Iśvara to experience any affliction due to the non-fulfilment of his effort. There are a few stray statements in the Purāņas which mention that even God is also struck with grief (bhrsam bhavati duḥkhitaḥ) and on the basis of such statements, the view is advanced by some that God is only putting up an appearence of grief in order to delight His devotees and deceive His enemies. It would be a self-contradiction to speak of grief, state of ignorance, etc. for God who is an Omniscient Being during His incarnations. Even though God is connected either directly or indirectly with the objects considered to be defilements. He is not affected in any way by undesirable things and He Himself is capable of warding off the evils of others. Hence He is regarded as amalin or absolutely pure and devoid of all defilements (heya-pratyanīka). This rules out the possibility of God being touched by human afflictions or the defects inherent in the non-sentient entities.

How bondage and liberation is caused by *Īśvara?* God who is the primary cause of the universe also created the variety of living beings associated with variegated bodies, sense organs, and intellect, for serving His own purpose (*sva-sevārtham*), that is, with the good intention to become re-united with Him. Nevertheless, the individuals concerned misuse the opportunities provided to them and go in a wrong direction and get caught up in the cycle of birth and death. Nevertheless, the all-compassionate God who is keen to uplift them from the ocean of bondage always looks forwards for an effort by the individual concerned in the form of ardent request for protection as an excuse for redeeming him from bondage and granting him *mokṣa* or liberation from bondage and enjoyment of everlasting bliss of *Paramātman* from which state there is no return to mundane existence.

The theories which uphold moksa is granted to an individual by the unconditional kṛpa (nirhetuka-kṛpa) of God and His unchecked freedom, are unsound because that would result in the liberation of all souls (sarva mukti) at all times or alternatively partiality (arbitrariness) and cruelty on the part of God. The unchecked freedom of God is useful for the creation of the universe as and when desired by God without any obstruction. Similarly, the unconditional compassion is useful for an easy accessibility to God for seeking protection (vasikarana saukarya).

According to Yādavaprakāśa, Brahman, which is pure Sat, (Sanmātra) comprises three parts: Īśvara, cit, and acit. Īśvara is thus a part of Brahman. According to the Advaitin, Brahman associated with māyā (māyopahita Brahma) is Īsvara. He is conceived as of three forms, viśva, tejasa, and prajñā. Yādavaprakāśa also conceives three forms of Brahman as prāṇamaya, manomaya, and vānmaya. According to these theories, the question of Brahman granting mokṣa to jīva, as accepted by Viśiṣṭādvaita, is considered not relevant.

Vedānta Deśika refutes these theories as they are not supported by any valid pramāna. Similarly, the theory of Yādavaprakāśa which believes that Īśvara, cit, and acit are the parts of Brahman and they originate from Brahman and also dissolve in Brahman is also opposed to the Scriptural texts. Then what is the implication of Śvetāśvatara statement: "Brahma trividham?" Vedānta Deśika replies that his concept is to be interpreted in the sense that the upāsanā on Brahman is of three types: Brahman in its own form, Brahman as related to cit, and Brahman as related to acit.

How about the Upaniṣadic texts which equate Brahman and jagat and also Brahman and jīva? In all these instances, the equation as non-different is to be understood in the sense that Brahman is immanent in all as Antaryāmin and hence Brahman is the entire jagat, on the authority of Antaryāmī Brāhmaṇa which speaks of body-soul relation between Brahman and jīva as well as Brahman and non-sentient entities.

This interpretation is also supported by the Gītā verse:

Sarvagatvāt anantasya sa eva aham avasthitaķ.

Since Paramātman is everywhere including one's self, it is relevant to say that "I am He." In the Scriptural texts which emphatically speak of difference between jīva and Paramātman, which cannot be interpreted in any other way except to accept difference between the two, there is absolute difference in respect of svarūpa of cit, acit, and Īśvara.

In view of it we have to admit that these texts speak of nondifference or unity (aikya) in the sense of viśiṣṭaikya or oneness as viśiṣṭa-tattva. Hence the theories of Advaitin which regard difference between these ontological entities as illusory caused by avidyā and that of Bhedābhedavādin for whom it is one of difference-cum-non-difference, are unsound. It is seen that Brahman as associated with cit and acit which are real entities and undergoes modification as the universe (parināma). This theory which is known as viśiṣṭa-Brahma parināmavāda, is well-established by the Scriptural texts. As against this, there are several other theories of Brahma-parināma. These are briefly mentioned by Vedānta Deśika and summarily rejected as untenable. These are:

- 1. Aniyata-svarūpa pariņāmavāda held by Brahmadatta according to which Brahman is vibhu, and only some part of it undergoes direct transformation as cit, acit, and Īśvara.
- 2. Pratiniyatāmśatraya pariņāmavāda, held by Yādavaprakāśa, according to which Brahman is threefold in nature comprising Īśvara, cit, and acit and its respective parts undergo modification into jīva, Īśvara, and acit.
- 3. Svarūpa-ekadeśa nityopādhi parināmavāda held by Bhāskara, according to which the very Brahman undergoes modification as cit, acit, and Īśvara due to upādhi (avidyā), which is real unlike an Advaita.
- 4. Theory of Sāṅkhya, according to which *prakṛti* itself evolves into the manifest universe.
- 5. The theory of Mādhyamika Buddhists, according to which everything is śūnya or undeterminable and there is no such thing as pariṇāma.
- 6. The theory of Vaibhāṣika and Sautrāntika, according to which everything is momentary (kṣaṇika).

All these theories are untenable as they are opposed to valid pramāṇas.

In order to rule out that Brahman as both upādāna and nimitta kāraṇa of the universe would be subject to change, non-sentience, affliction, etc. by becoming jagat, the Upaniṣad defines that Brahman is satya, jñāna, ananta as well as ānanda. These are the distinguishing characteristics of Brahman that do not denote the svarūpa or only the essential nature of Brahman, as the Advaitin contends. The view maintained by Advaitins that these Upaniṣadic texts emphasize that Brahman is an undifferentiated being (nirviśeṣa) or devoid of all attributes, conflicts not only with the earlier and later statements of the same passage but also with other Scriptural texts.

The fuller implications of the term ananta or "infinite," need to be understood. It implies absence of three kinds of limitation in respect of Brahman: (1) limitation by time, (2) limitation by space, and (3) limitation caused by another entity (trividha-pariccheda). Brahman is not conditioned by space, as is indicated in this statement "yathā sarvagato viṣṇuḥ." It means Paramātman is present in all places and not limited to any particular area only. He is also not conditioned by time. He exists eternally at all times as associated with the spiritual body, as stated in the Smrti text "Śrīvatsavakṣā nityaśrīḥ ajayya śāśvato dhruvaḥ."

Brahman is also not conditioned by any other entity in this universe, because He is equated with the entire universe (jagacca saḥ). The Chāndogya Upaniṣad says: "Sarvam khalu idam brahma." The Smṛti text says that "The entire universe is His body" (jagat sarvam śarīram te). Besides, there is nothing in this universe which is either equal to Him or even greater than him in respect of his guṇas (attributes), vibhūti (glory), and vyāpāras or cosmic functions. Hence, He is not limited by any other thing in this universe (vastu pariccheda rāhitya). Īśvara is regarded as sarva-vyāpī, that is, all-pervasive.

The Taittiriya Upaniṣad states that Nārāyaṇa pervades both within and also outside. How can He pervade in jīvātman, which being a niravaya entity, does not have space within it for pervasion? Similarly, in the case of vibhudravya, there is no space for the purpose of pervasion.

Vedānta Deśika explains that the proper implication of antarvyāpti in respect of niravaya entity is that wherever such an entity exists, it cannot be said that Īśvara is not present. Such entities which are anu or vibhu, are associated with the svarūpa of Īśvara (sambandha mātrameva tayoh bhavet).

The implication of the kāla pariccheda rāhitva needs to be understood. It is not in the sense of saying that God is nitya, that is, He exists all the time. This type of nityatva is common to other dravyas such as prakṛti, kāla, etc., insofar as their svarūpa is nitya, according to Viśiṣṭādvaita. It is not also in the sense of dharma-bhūta jūana being nitya, because this nityatva is also common to the nitya jūvas. Hence absence of kāla-pariccheda with reference to God is to be understood as an exclusive characteristic of Īśvara only.

Vastu pariccheda-rāhitva is also interpreted by some (Advaitins) in the sense of non-existence of a second entity (vastvantarāhhāva) or absolute one entity without a second entity. But such an interpretation stands opposed to our perceptual experience and also Scriptural texts.

The concept of amalatva in respect of  $\bar{I}$ svara is to be understood in the sense that defects normally found in the sentient and non-sentient entities are not applicable to  $\bar{I}$ svara. It can also be interpreted to mean that  $\bar{I}$ svara is capable of warding off

the evils of the devotees who seek His protection.

Brahman and its essential nature as determined by the numerous Upaniṣadic texts, is also endowed with transcendental spiritual body and numerous auspicious attributes. This can be experienced only by those who attain Him through the means of either continuous meditation (upāsanā) in the prescribed manner or through the pathway of total surrender of oneself to Him as the sole protector and goal.

Among the several attributes, the six principal gunas, viz., iñāna, bala, aiśvarya, vīrya, śakti, and tejas, as stated in the Bhāgavata-śāstra, are important as these are present at all times. Many other secondary qualities arising out of these manifest when need arises. All these details are provided in Pāñcarātra Samhitās. Just as Paramātma-svarūpa is nitya, so also is His vigraha. That such a Brahman who is endowed with a spiritual body, gunas, etc., who is the cause of the universe and Sarveśvara is a personal God in the name of Nārāyaṇa. This fact is determined on the basis of the Upaniṣadic texts dealing with the causation of the universe (kārana-vākya), the Smṛti text, Itihāsa, Purāṇas, and Dharmaśāstras. In view of this conclusion, the theories which speak of the other celestial deities such as Brahmā, Rudra, etc. as the Supreme Being are untenable. That Nārāyaṇa alone is the Supreme Goal to be attained is well-established in the adhikarana dealing with the Vedāntasūtra: "param atah setūnmāna sambandha bheda vyapadeśebhyah."5

One other adhikaraņa named Lingabhūyastvādhikaraņa<sup>6</sup> also establishes that Nārāyaņa as the Supreme Deity, is the object all upāsanās (Sarvaparavidyā vedya). The Sāttvika Purāņas reveal beyond doubt that Nārāyaņa is the Supreme Being.

The Tāmasa and Rājasa Purāṇas are not to be relied on to determine this fact. The *upāsanā* on other deities is not of any use for attaining *mokṣa*, since these deities do not possess the power to confer *mokṣa*. Only Viṣṇu or Nārāyaṇa is *mokṣaprada*, as is evident from the Śāstras.

The Supreme Being incarnates Himself in five forms: para, vyūha, vibhava, arcā, and antaryāmī. All these are different manifestations of the same one Being. All the five forms of Paramātman serve as the objects of meditation (śubhāśraya). Of these, the arcā or the manifestation of God in the form of image is accorded greater importance in Vaiṣṇavism because they are easily accessible for offering direct worship. In the state of mukti, God exists in His fullest form manifesting His full glory.

#### REFERENCES

- 1. See Śvet. Up., VI.11.
- 2. Ch. Up., VI.1.2-6.
- 3. VS, I.IV: prakṛtiśca pratijñādraṣṭānta anuparodhāt.
- 4. Tait. Up., II.7.1.
- 5. VS, III.2.30.
- 6. See ibid., III.3.43.

### PART II

## Critical Review of Other Schools

IN THE PRECEDING CHAPTERS, a brief account of the three I fundamental doctrines of Visistadvaita related to cit, acit and Iśvara have been presented comprehensively by answering all possible objections and refuting the counter theories against them. The objective of this presentation is to prove how the philosophical theories advanced by Rāmānuja are not only free from defects, both logical and philosophical, but also that they fully conform to the teachings of the Upanișads as well as Bādarāyaņa's Vedāntasūtras. With this background, Vedanta Desika attempts to review critically all the important philosophical schools of thought that were prevalent at his time-both the non-Vedic schools which do not accept the authority of the Vedas such as Carvaka, Buddhism and Jainism, but also the Vedic schools which accept the authority of the Vedas such as Sāṅkhya, Yoga, Vaiśeṣika, Nyāya, Pūrva-mīmāṁsā, and also other Vedanta schools.

The main purpose of this critical review as explained earlier, is to show how the main tenets of these schools, as compared to Viśiṣṭādvaita, are philosophically untenable and that their teachings are also opposed to the Scriptural and Smṛti texts. Some of the schools, particularly the Cārvāka, Buddhists and Jainas who do not accept the Vedas as the source of authority in respect of Spiritual matters are not supported by the commonly accepted valid pramāṇas such as pratyakṣa, anumāna, and śabda or Revealed Scripture. Even among the āstika schools, most of them with the exception of the Vedānta schools, are opposed to the Upaniṣadic teachings in respect of the major theories advanced by them. Though the school of Advaita is developed

on the basis of the Upaniṣads, it also suffers from logical inconsistencies and stands opposed to the Upaniṣadic texts and the Vedāntasūtras in respect of the main tenets such as the doctrine of māyā, the concept of nirguṇa-brahman and non-difference between jīva and Brahman as is evident from the critical review of this school. In a separate chapter named Samudāyadoṣādhikāra, Vedānta Deśika first mentions a few general criticisms which are applicable to all schools of thought. He then takes up each school separately for a detailed criticism of the main tenets of these schools and exposes their defects.

As stated earlier, the justification for undertaking a critical review is not merely for the purpose of defending one's own system, which is a common practice of the exponents of all systems. More importantly, as explained in the Gītā verse, 1 persons who are not knowledgeable with the correct philosophical teachings imparted by a qualified teacher (ajñah), those who have not developed proper faith in what is taught (asraddhadhānāh) and those who entertain doubts (samsayātmā), cannot hope to make any progress in the spiritual pursuits. In order to avoid such a situation, earnest students of Vedanta seeking spiritual progress are required to be guided in order to prevent them from being entrapped by the wrong theories of other schools which are not well-founded on the authority of the Scriptural texts as well as proper tradition (sat-sampradāya). It is also necessary to refute the systems which do not acknowledge the authority of the Vedas and also those who accept it but misinterpret the same to suit their pre-conceived theories.

There are four kinds of defects from which all these systems generally suffer. These are: (1) Adoption of logical arguments which do not fulfil the requisite logical canons (angarahita tarka) in order to establish one's theory. (2) Even in respect of inferential arguments, the hetu or probans adopted stands opposed to pratyakṣa, which is the basis for anumāna or inference (upajīvya). (3) Formulation of theories which are directly opposed to the teachings of the Vedas which is free from defects (nirdoṣa) because it has come down to us in succession from a beginningless time in the same form. (4) Acceptance as the source of authority, the statements or teachings of human beings, who are likely to be subject to delusion and also have

the intention of deceiving people. These points have been brought out while dealing with the criticism of the respective schools.

Regarding the supreme authoritativeness of the Veda, the first question to be considered is whether it is nitya or eternal as the Vedantins and Mimamsakas claim. The words and the sentences formed out of it are known to be non-permanent. How can Veda which is only a composition of sentences be claimed as eternal? In reply to this objection, it is pointed out that the nityatva of the Veda is to be understood in the sense that at all times, the Vedic statements are recited generation after generation in the same order without any change from time immemorial. Even if the persons who recite them and the letters (varna) which constitute the words and sentences may perish at the end of an epoch with the dissolution of the cosmic universe, yet the eternal and omniscient God, the cretor of the universe, has the memory of the Vedas and He teaches the Vedas to Caturmukha-brahmā soon after the creation of the universe in the same form and order. The latter imparts the same to the sages who in turn teach it to others in the same order. In this sense the eternal character of the Vedas is maintained. In the commentary on the Pūrvamīmāmsāsūtra, Śabaraswāmī (the commentator on Jaimini's sūtras) has advanced the theory of varna-nityatva, that is, the letters are of eternal character. But according to the Vedanta Desika, this theory is advanced by him in order to meet the criticisms of the Buddhists who deny the authority of the Vedas and hence it is not to be taken as his accepted view.

There are other arguments which question the nityatva of the Vedas. Vedānta Deśika examines them critically and rejects them as untenable. One of the arguments is that the Vedas, as they are available to us, are the compositions of particular human beings like any other literary work and hence they cannot be claimed to be nitya. In the Vedas we come across passages which are ascribed to persons such as Yājñavalkya, Viśvāmitra, Vaśiṣṭha, etc. But this arguments is untenable, contends Vedānta Deśika. The important point to be noted in defence of Veda-nityatva is that it is apauruṣeya, that is, it is not ascribed to any author. Even God, according to Vedānta,

is not its author, but He is only a spokesperson of what already exists. We do not have any evidence to prove that it was written by someone at any particular point of time. The Smṛti text says that it is anādinidhāna, beginningless and eternal. It is self-valid or self-established (svataḥ pramāṇa). Such a claim cannot be made by the exponents of the nāstika schools. Their Āgamas or sacred texts which are adopted as the source of authority are the compositions of some individuals and they cannot therefore be nitya and also free from defects.

After making these general criticisms against the other schools of thought, Vedānta Deśika takes up for a detailed critical review, each school separately. The criticisms are confined to the main tenets of these schools which are found defective and which are also at variance with those of Viśiṣṭādvaita Vedānta. The following is the order in which these schools come up for examination.

- 1. Cārvāka
- 2. Buddhism—Mādhyamika, Yogācāra, Sautrāntika, and Vaibhāsika
- 3. Advaita Vedānta
- 4. Jainism
- 5. Bhedābheda Vedānta of Bhāskara and Yādavaprakāśa
- 6. Śabda-brahma-Vivartavāda of Vaiyākaraņa
- 7. Vaiśesika
- 8. Nyāya
- 9. Nirīśvara-mīmāmsā
- 10. Nirīśvara-sāńkhya
- 11. Yoga
- 12. Pāśupata
- 13. Pāñcarātra

The justification for adopting this order by overlooking the chronological order of these schools, we shall however take up the examination of these schools divided into three groups in the following order.

### I. Non-Vedic schools

- 1. Cārvāka
- 2. Buddhism—Mādhyamika, Yogācāra, Sautrāntika, and Vaibhāsika

### 3. Jainism

### II. Vedic schools

- 1. Vaiśesika
- 2. Nyāya
- 3. Nirīśvara-mīmāmsā
- 4. Sānkhya
- 5. Yoga
- 6. Pāśupata
- 7. Pāñcarātra

### III. Vedānta schools

- 1. Śabda-brahma-Vivartavāda of Vaiyākaraņa
- 2. Advaita of Śańkara
- 3. Dvaita Vedānta of Madhva
- 4. Bhedābheda-vedānta of Bhāskara and Yādava
- 5. Svābhāvika-bhedābheda Vedānta of Nimbārka
- 6. Acintya-bhedābheda Vedānta of Caitanya
- 7. Śuddhādvaita of Vallabha
- 8. Śivādvaita schools
- 9. Navya-viśiṣṭādvaita of Swamya-Narāyaṇa

The later schools of Vedānta are not covered in the *Paramata-bhanga*, so this is the reason for following this order and a summary on Vedānta schools.

### VEDĀNTA SCHOOLS

Vedānta which is an important system of Philosophy is developed primarily on the basis of the Upaniṣads and Brahmasūtras of sage Bādarāyaṇa. But within this single system of philosophy several schools of thought, each one designated with different name, have come up based on the same source of authority, viz., the Upaniṣad, Brahmasūtra, and the Bhagavadgītā, due to the different interpretations offered by their exponents on the nature of the Ultimate Reality (Brahman) and also its relation to the individual self (jīvātman) and the universe (jagat). Among the extant schools, the principal ones are the Advaita Vedānta of Śańkara (AD 788), the Viśiṣṭādvaita Vedānta of Rāmānuja (AD 1017) and Dvaita Vedānta of Madhva (AD

1238). Earlier than Śańkara, there were a few schools of thought ascribed to Bhartrhari, Bhartrprapañca and Brahmadatta, as is evident from the references made to them in the works of Śańkara, Yāmuna (a predecessor to Rāmānuja), Rāmānuja and Vedānta Deśika.

Bādarāyana also mentions the names of ancient ācāryas such as Átreya, Asmarathya, Bādari, Audulomi, Jaimini, Kāśakṛtsna, and Kārṣṇājini, in the Brahmasūtras. But it is not kown whether any of these sages had written commentaries on the Vedāntasūtras. Rāmānuja refers to sage Bodhāyana who is stated to be the earliest exponent of the Vedanta and who had also written an elabrorate vrtti or glossary on the Vedāntasūtras as is evident from the statements quoted in his Śrībhāṣya, the commentary on the Vedāntasūtras. Śaṅkara also mentions in his works Upavarsa and Vrttikara as the ancient commentators on Vedāntasūtra. But it is established by Sudarśanasūrī in his glossary on Śrībhāsya that Upāvarsa and Vrttikāra are the same person as Bodhāyana. Rāmānuja also refers to a few pūrvācāryas such as Ţanka, Dramida, Guhadeva, and Bhāruci. We do not have any works contributed by these exponents. Some details about the views expressed by Bhartrhari, a grammarian (vaiyākaraņa) on the theory of Śabda-brahmavivartavāda is available in Vākyapadīya. Similarly some material about Bhartrprapañca, referred to by Sankara in his commentary on Brhadāranyaka Upaniṣad and Surésvara's vārttika is available. He is known to have held the theory Brahma-parināmavāda and Bhedabheda relationship between Brahman and the jivas as well as Brahman and the jagat. Brahmadatta, another Vedāntin, who is stated to have written a commentary on the Vedāntasūtras and who lived later than Bhrtrprapañca, also maintained Brahma-pariņāmavāda and also the origin of the nvas as is evident from references made to these views by Vedānta Deśika.<sup>2</sup> The two doctrines Brahma-vivartavāda and Brahma-pariņāmavāda of Bhartrhari and Bhartrprapañca, respectively, seem to have influenced Sankara's Brahmavivartavāda and the Bhedābhedavāda of Bhāskara and Yādavaprakāśa.

Later than Śańkara and earlier than Rāmānuja, two schools of Vedānta emerged which are named Bhedābhedavāda,

developed by Bhāskara and Yādavaprakāśa. Both have written a commentary on the Brahmasūtras. The Bhāskarabhāṣya is available, whereas Yādavaprakāśa's commentary is lost. But extracts of it have been quoted by Rāmānuja and Sudarsanasūri, the commentator on the Śrībhāṣya as well as Vedānta Deśika. These two schools are regarded as distinct on the basis of different interpretations offered on the nature of relationship between Brahman and jīva as well as Brahman and jagat. Bhāskara maintains that Brahman and jīvas as well as jagat is caused by the limiting adjuncts (upādhi) in the form of avidyā which is a real ontological principle, unlike in Advaita, whereas for Yādavaprakāśa difference is also svābhāvika. The disctinction between these two schools is drawn on the basis of the fact that Yādavaprakāśa's school is characterized as Svābhāvikabhedābhedavāda, whereas Bhāskara school is regarded as Aupādhika-bhedābhedavāda.

A few other schools of Vedānta were developed later than Rāmānuja and Madhva by Nimbārka, followers of Caitanya and Vallabha by adopting a modified form of Bhedābheda. The school of Vedānta advanced by Nimbārka is characterized as Svābhāvika-bhedābhedavāda, whereas the one developed by Caitanya school is known by the name of Acintya-bhedābhedavāda. The Vedānta developed by Vallabhācārya, who follows mostly Madhva, calls his Vedānta as Śuddhādvaita, but it also admits the Bhedābheda relation between Brahman and jīvas.

In the Paramata-bhanga, Vedānta Deśika takes up for critical examination, the Vaiyākaraṇa school of Śabdabrahma-vivartavāda, the Advaita Vedānta of Śankara and the Bhedābhedavāda school of Bhāskara and Yādavaprakāśa.

Regarding Viśiṣṭādvaita Vedānta, he has presented the three fundamental doctrines, viz., cit (jīvātman), acit (cosmic universe), and Īśvara at the very commencement of the Paramata-bhanga since it is not intended for criticism as in the case of other schools of Vedānta. As explained earlier, its objective is to show how these doctrines are philosophically sound by way of answering all possible objections against them.

Vedānta Dešika does not mention Dvaita Vedānta separately nor does he refer to Nimbārka's Bhedābhedavāda, the Acintyabhedavāda of Caitanya, Vallabha's Suddhādvaitavāda and Śivādvaita of Śaiva schools which were developed in the post-Deśika period. But he indicates in a general way, that criticisms pointed out against Bhedābheda of Bhāskara and Yādava would also be applicable to these schools. Regarding Dvaita Vedānta, though it is not included for critical review separately, a few criticisms are expressed gainst some doctrines in the Paramatabhaṅga. As it occupies an important place among the three major schools of Vedānta, it is taken up for examination soon after Advaita. In order to complete the critical review of all Vedānta Schools, we have included in the present book a brief outline of the criticisms against all the later schools of Vedānta including Dvaita insofar as their main doctrines are concerned.

### REFERENCES

- 1. BG, IV.40: ajňah aśraddhadhānāśca samśayātmā vinaśyati.
- 2. See TMK, II.16.

# 4

## Cārvāka School

THIS APPEARS to be the oldest school of thought in the history of Indian philosophy developed in the post-Vedic period, as is evident from the fact that it is criticized by all the other schools including Buddhism. Though there are some stray references to the views of the Cārvākas in the Upaniṣads, it was developed as a system (Darśana) only in the post-Vedic period. Though its founder is stated to be Bṛhaspati, the guru of celestial deities, who taught it to the demons (asuras) to delude them since they did not believe the Vedic way of life leading to a spiritual goal, is it not accepted by other schools and even condemned as an unsound philosophy.

We do not have any literature on this system. Even the Bṛḥaspatisūtras are lost. However, there are a few stray reference to the sūtras and also the theories of the Cārvāka in the treatises of other schools of thought, while refuting their views. From these references, we have reconstructed the Cārvāka philosophy

to some extent.

In the Paramata-bhanga, Vedānta Deśika states in fairly good details, the views of the Cārvākas gathered from various sources. They are called Lokāyatikas or the one whose teachings are widely spread all over the world (lokeṣu āyatam or vistṛtam). The chapter devoted to the criticism of this school is named "Lokāyatika-bhangādhikāra."

According to Cārvāka, pratyakṣa or perception is the only pramāṇa or source of knowledge. Though anumāna or inference may be found to be a valid source of knowledge in a few cases, such as the inferential knowledge of fire on the yonder hill on the basis of the invariable concomitance between fire

and smoke on the hill, as in the instance of the smoke coming from the chimney of the kitchen, it cannot be taken as a valid pramāna in all cases. Even if it is to be admitted as a pramāna. it is possible to regard such stray instances of inferential knowledge as part of pratyakşa. Śabda or verbal testimony, which is the third source of knowledge, is also not accepted by Cārvāka. But we have several instances such as chanting of mantras and the wearing of the yantra or talisman, which confer good results by warding off evils and certain diseases. But these cases could also be explained according to the Carvakas on the basis of our perceptual experience, as in the instances of the magnet having the capacity to attract the iron and the special stones radiating light when sun or moon shines over them. On the basis of these instances, śabda cannot be regarded as a pramāņa. Even if anumāna is taken as a pramāna, as is commonly accepted by all, it cannot reveal what is supersensuous (atīndriya) such as Īśvara, nīva, etc.

### THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE CARVAKA

Coming to their philosophy, Vedānta Dešika quotes the following sūtra of Bṛhaspati which refers to the central doctrine of the Cārvāka: "atha lokāyatam, pṛthivyāpas-tejo vāyur iti tattvam; tebhyaś caitanyam kiṇvādibhyo madaśaktivat." It means: "Now commences Lokāyatamata; the tattvas are earth, water, fire, and air; from the combination of these four arises consciousness, as in the example of the intoxicating quality (in the liquor) arising from the mixture of certain ingredients." Another illustration offered in support of this theory is the red colour produced by chewing together betel leaf, areca nut, and lime. A section of the Cārvākas also admits ākaśa or ether as a separate tattva, besides the four elements.

This school has gained some importance and wider popularity on account of several reasons. It emphasizes the value of the two human goals, viz., acquisition of wealth and enjoyment of sensual pleasures, which are generally desired by all and also attainable by human effort. It conforms to the Kāmaśāstra of Vātsyāyana which teaches the ways and means of enjoying sensual pleasures and steyaśāstra, dealing with the methods to be adopted for earning money by fraudulent means. As

these teachings fall within the scope of our experience, there is no room to question their validity. In view of these facts, the advocacy of the enjoyment of pleasure as long as one lives (yāvajjīvam sukham jīvet) as the primary goal of life has great appeal to all persons. It is therefore considered by the Cārvākas a waste of time, money, and energy to engage oneself in all sorts of rigorous, religious observances by torturing one's body on the false assumption that there is some unknown higher spiritual goal to be attained.

Apart from the body, vital breath, digestive fire (jaṭharāgni), indriyas, and the heart, there does not exists a separate principle known as ātman. Nor is there any truth in the belief that after death one assumes another body. If it were true, one should fear for hell (naraka) and also refrain from causing injury to others. Since there is neither heaven nor hell, which are false assumptions, an individual should enjoy himself in the pleasure of young women (taruṇī), delicious food, good clothes, perfumes, etc., which constitute the heaven (svarga) which is evident to our experience (pratyakṣa svarga). Instead or aspiring for such pleasures, it is foolish to endeavour for something which is unknown to us by observing all kinds of rigorous penances in the form of fasting, etc.

According to the Cārvāka, the body itself is ātman. This fact is evident to us, he argues, as in the case of the experience that "I am fat," "I am lean." The fatness or leanness is the dharma of the body and hence the experience of one's self as "I am fat" arises. If this is negated then in the judgment "agni is usna" (fire is hot) usnatva seen in the fire could also be negated. In the case of the experience "it is my body" (mama śarīra) which implies the difference between the body and one's self denoted by the word mama, it is argued that such statements are to be understood in the same way as the expression "the body of the wooden doll" (silāputraka sarīra) or "head of rāhu" (rāhośsirah). That is, in the expression "the body of wooden doll, though doll and body are different, it means only one entity. In the same way, Rāhu, the mythological person himself represents the head. The expression, rahośsirah (Rāhu's head) gives the impression of difference between the two but in actuality, it is not different. In the same way, 52

the judgment mamasarīra is to be understood in the sense that the body itself is the self.

An objection may be raised: Would it be appropriate to regard what is non-sentient (acetana) as the self or sentient being? To this objection, Carvaka replies that since other than the four physical elements, viz., pṛthivī, ap, tejas, and vāyu, there is no other entity, it is to be admitted that body itself is the self. The Carvakas further argue that by a special combination of these four elements in the body a new product named caitanya or conciseness is generated. There are several instances to prove the possibility of a new product by a special combination of two or more objects. The common illustration, as stated earlier, the intoxicating liquor which is produced by the concoction of certain ingredients. Poison is produced by the combination of different products. So also the herbal liquid known as rasāyana in Āyurveda is brought forth by the mixture of certain herbal products. In all these instances, the generation of a new product is admitted. Another instance which is perceptually known is the production of red colour by the combination of white lime and yellow turmeric powder. The water which does not possess the quality of hardness is found to be hard when the same falls on the ground from the water-bearing clouds as hail stones. The green mango on the tree assumes red and yellow colour and also sweetness over a period of time. The combination of the threads of different colours produces a piece of cloth of variegated colour. All these changes take place in a natural way because of the natural qualities inherent in the respective objects. In the same way, it is possible to account for the variation in the experience of pleasure and pain in one's body and the varied activities for attaining what is desired by the avoidance of what is not desirable.

Even without the admission of caitanya or jñāna as a separate guṇa, it is possible to explain the activities of an individual on the basis of the sense organs which serve as accessory cause, as in the example of the movements or functioning of dolls controlled by a person through the operation of the strings tied to them. Alternatively, it could be explained on the basis of the functioning of the body in a natural way such

as inhalation and exhalation, the movement of the eyelids, similar to the blooming of the lotus flower with the petals spread out. Just as a cut piece of a plant or branch of a tree, when replanted, re-grows on its own accord, there is no need to postulate the presence of a nva as possessing jnana. Those who argue that the assumption of different types and grades of body are due to the previous punya and papa of an individual cannot explain how among the different levels or grades of living beings such as plants, animals, and human beings, one grade is higher than the other. The jīva of a plant does not assume the body of animals, nor the jīvas of animals assume the bodies of human beings. Hence, there cannot be any such things as punya or pāpa. In absence of punya or pāpa, which are claimed to cause bondage, there cannot be moksa or total liberation of an individual from bondage. The cessation or dissolution of body itself is moksa. The statements speaking of the highest bliss as moksa, are mere verbal expressions. Even the different Buddhist schools which uphold the theory sarvaśūnyatva, kṣaṇikatva, or momentary nature of objects, denial of independent existence of external objects, do not accept a permanent entity as ātmā with the dharma of jñātrtva or capacity to know. Hence it is wiser to enjoy oneself in the pleasure that arises one's own effort or on its own accord.

The Carvakas also claim that their system of philosophy is also supported by the Upanisads, unlike the Buddhist theories. In one of the passages of the Chandogya Upanisad,2 it is stated that Prajāpati, the chief of the celestial deities, taught this philosophy to Virocana, the chief of the demons along with Indra, that the body itself seen as reflected in the water is ātmā. Virocana accepted it as truth and he being convinced with this, taught the same in turn to his associates. This teaching is therefore claimed as the Upanisad of the asuras (demons) on the authority of the Vedas. As this philosophy was promulgated by no less a person than Brhaspati, the guru of the celestial deities, it enjoys the distinction of being the religion of the devaguru. Even a few orthodox sages upheld this theory, as is evident from the dialogue of the sage Jābāli in the assembly by Rāma as narrated in the Rāmāyaṇa.3 In the Mahābhārata also there is a reference by name to Lokayatikas who are

stated to be present along with the exponents of other schools<sup>4</sup> in an assembly held in the hermitage of sage Kanva. All those persons who crave for wealth and sensual pleasure as the goal of life, unmindful dharma, are the followers of Cārvāka philosophy. Apart from showing respect to a superior person such as a king who may be regarded as God, there is no need to offer worship in the form of religious deeds to an unknown God. Thus, the Cārvāka philosophy is established on the basis of pratyakṣa pramāṇa and logical arguments (tarka) and should also be acceptable to other schools. Hence, it is claimed as a sound philosophy.

#### CRITICISM OF THE CARVAKA THEORIES

The first and foremost criticism of the Carvaka school is directed to the non-acceptance of the valid pramanas other than pratyaksa. In order to establish sound theories of any school of thought, it is necessary to admit valid pramanas in support of them (mānādhīnomeyasiddhi). Knowledge arises not only on the basis of pratyaksa but also anumāna (inference) and āgama (verbal testimony). The knowledge derived from inference and verbal testimony is not invalid, since it is not contradicted by any other pramana. Besides, such knowledge obtained through anumāna and āgama is not of doubtful character. If pratyakṣa is admitted as a valid source of knowledge, anumana and āgama are also to be accepted as valid sources of knowledge. Otherwise, it is possible to deny the validity of even perception. It may be argued that only a few theories proved by anumana and agama appear to be valid, whereas what is revealed by perception is always found to be valid. But this argument, Vedānta Deśika contends, is equally applicable to perceptual knowledge. The cognition of a snake in the rope, which is perceptual, is not valid as it is negated by another cognition that it is not a snake.

Even the Cārvākas, who deny the validity of anumāna as a source of knowledge, do acknowledge the fact that hunger is overcome by eating the food and on that basis seek the food when one is hungry. Similarly, verbal testimony is also accorded some validity. Thus, for instance, a person who has come to know through a reliable person that wealth is hidden in the ground at a distant place, endeavours to obtain it by special

effort and is even prepared to spend money to unearth it. If one does not trust the words of the person who tells the availability of wealth, he would not make any effort to secure it. It is generally seen that persons who accept with faith the statements of reliable individuals, follows their teachings. It is also found that astrology which predicts the future events which are not seen or known, is accepted as beneficial. Similarly, the mantra-sāstra is found useful to ward off evils which are yet to occur at a later period. In the same way, one has to believe the statements of the Sacred texts which speak of the attainment of bliss or mokṣa in a higher realm. If a higher realm exists and if one believes in it and follows the prescribed sādhana, he is sure to be benefited. Even if such a realm does not exist, the pursuit of religious way of life does not cause any harm to him.

Vedānta Deśika further contends that it is not correct to regard anumāna and āgama as part of pratyakṣa, as Cārvāka maintains, because knowledge also arises during the nonfunctioning of the external sense organs on the basis of the memory of a past event or the memory of objects seen in the past. Mind is a common accessory cause (instrument) for all types of knowledge and hence what is remembered through the mind cannot be considered as perception proper.

The Cārvākas claim that Nītiśāstra and Kāmaśāstra which teach the ways and means of acquisition of wealth and the satiation of sensual pleasures respectively support the Cārvāka philosophy which upholds pleasures as the goal of life. This is far from the truth. Nītiśāstra does not permit the acquisition of wealth as opposed to dharma. Similarly, the money acquired by using force is permitted only in the case of the Kṣatriyas for the purpose of giving it away in charity to the pious persons (sādhus). Similarly, the teachings of Kāmaśāstra regarding the various ways of indulging in sensual pleasures are permitted within the limit of the Dharmaśāstra.

The Cārvākas criticize the rigid orthodox way of life in accordance with one's varṇa or caste and āśramas or stages of life as laid down by the Sacred texts by condemning the very caste system as Brāhmaṇas, etc. on the ground that among the human beings the distinction in the form of Brāhmaṇas,

etc., is not perceptible. Vedānta Deśika refutes this view because the caste system has been in vogue from time immemorial. As explained in the Gītā, it is created by God on the basis of the guṇas—sattva, rajas, and tamas inherent in the body.<sup>5</sup> Even if it is totally wiped out due to the admixture of different races and castes, it will be recreated as and when the next evolution of the universe takes place.

It cannot be said that the Vedic orthodox way of life which demands rigorous religious observances are mere conventional customs created by some orthodox people for selfish purposes, because it has come down to us from time immemorial, through generation after generation. What is well-established by unbroken tradition cannot be questioned.

## THE PHYSICAL BODY IS NOT ATMAN

After criticizing the theory of pratyaksa as the only source of pramāna and the non-admission of anumāna and āgama as pramāna, Vedānta Deśika refutes the main doctrine of Cārvāka that the physical body is the atman or individual self. The judgment "This is my body" clearly conveys the idea that the body constituted of the combination of five physical elements consisting of legs, arms, etc. is distinct from the notion "I" (self). The physical components are perceptible to the eyes and other sense organs. In the absence of the functioning of the sense organs, the body is not seen. The ātman is always of unchanging nature unlike the physical body, and it experiences pleasure and pain all over the body. It manifests itself as "I" (aham) and that itself is not seen by the sense organs. An individual who has controlled his mind after fully arresting the functions of all the sense organs is able to visualize the ātman during the state of samādhi or trance. If one does not directly see this difference between the self and the body and gets the experience, that "I am fat" (sthulo' ham), it is due to the fact that the body and the soul are so inseparably related, like the heated iron rod appearing as red, that the dharma or characteristic of the body is super-imposed on the self just as the redness which is the property of fire is imposed on the iron rod. Just as the cognition of the flame of a lamp is the same (jvālaikya) stands sublated by the inferential argument that it is constantly changing being dependent on the supply of oil and the burning of the wick, in the same way the judgment "it is my body" stands sublated when it is realized that body and self are two separate entities with distinct characters. In the judgment mama ātmān or "my body," "myself" denoting ātmā refers to the nature ātman, whereas body refers to a different entity as in the example "my house." House is not the self and it is different from the self. In the same way, body is not the self. The example of the wooden doll is not comparable to the judgment "my śarīra." The doll is lifeless, whereas body related to the soul is not so.

### ÄKĀŚA AS THE FIFTH ELEMENT CANNOT BE DENIED

The theory that apart from the four physical elements, viz., pṛthivī, ap, tejas, and vāyu, there is no other tattva or reality is most unsound, for the reason that on the basis of other pramāņas other tattvas such as ākāśa are proven to exist. In the matter of non-sensuous and spiritual entities such as self, which are beyond the scope of the sense perception, we have to admit them since they are capable of being known by other pramānas. Though they are not visually perceived, their existence cannot be questioned since they could be comprehended by other sources of knowledge. If these are not admitted purely on the limited basis that they are not directly perceived, then even the four physical elements admitted by the Carvakas as tattvas, could be denied by adopting the logic of Madhyamikas for whom no real entity exists. If on the basis of mere nonperception of an object without acknowledging the principle of what is capable of knowing (yogya) and what is not capable of being apprehended (ayogya), the existence of non-perceptible object is denied, it would amount to a ridiculous theory. As Udayana, the author of Nyāyakusumāñjali jokingly points out, it would be similar to a Carvaka who has gone out of his house on an errand, and who does not see on the way his wife and children and other possessions, starts weeping by beating the chest that they are dead or lost (grhādbahir-gatah cārvākah soras-tadam śokavikalo vikrośet).

# CONSCIOUSNESS IS NOT GENERATED BY THE COMBINATION OF THE PHYSICAL ELEMENTS

The Cārvāka maintains the theory that caitanya or consciousness is a new principle which emerges out of the combination of the four physical elements of which the body is constituted. similar to the emergence of the intoxicating equality out of the admixture of certain ingredients. This is also untenable. The question is raised, whether this consciousness is present in each of the four elements or only in the combination of the four (samudāya). If it is present in each part of the body. then each part should possess caitanya or consciousness. If it is so, it would amount to saying that there are several \(\bar{n}vas\) in the same body. In that case, conflict among the different  $\bar{n}vas$ would be inevitable as in the case of the several rulers ruling the same kingdom and consequently there would be no unity of purpose and action. Further, if jīva exists in each part of the body, with the removal of any one of the limbs, its experience cannot be re-colleted by another as there is no transmission of the experience from one limb to the other.

In order to overcome the above difficulty, it may be argued that consciousness  $(\tilde{n}va)$  is present in the aggregate of the parts. This view is also untenable. If caitanya is not found in the parts, it would not be present in the aggregate of the parts. A quality which does not exist in the parts cannot be present in the aggregate of the parts. Besides the physical body being an aggregate of several limbs is non-sentient in character, like a pot and as such it cannot possess caitanya. The illustration of the emergence of the intoxicating element out of the mingling of certain ingredients does not serve the purpose of supporting the Cārvāka theory. The element that produces the intoxicating quality is present in the ingredients in a potential form and it therefore causes the emergence of a new property. In the case of the physical body, there is no evidence to show that consciousness is present in each of the physical parts of body.6

In all the other instances cited by the Cārvākas in support of their theory such as the hardness of the water falling from the clouds in the form of hail stones, the transformation of the green colour of mango into red and yellow, the rasāyana

(Ayurvedic herbal liquid) made out of the boiling of the different herbal juices, the cloth of variegated colour woven from the threads of different colour, these changes which take place are evident to our experience and these arise out of the natural process of change from that which already exists in a potential and different form. These do not support the theory that a new product emerges out of the combination of the parts or ingredients. On the basis of these instances, it cannot be said that by the combination of the different parts of the body, a new product such as caitanya or jīva arises.

The Cārvākas who do not admit the causal relationship between cause and effect cannot uphold the theory that caitanya is caused by the combination of the limbs of the physical body constituted of four elements. That is, those who do not accept the principle that every effect must have a cause, cannot prove that caitanya emerges from the combination of the four elements. The illustration cited by Cārvāka, viz., the sharpness or crookedness of thorns in support of the production of an effect without a cause does not prove this theory (ahetuka utpatti). Even in such instances, some causal factor is involved. If that is not perceptible, it is to be assumed that some unforeseen factor influences the growth of sharpness or crookedness in the thorns.

The Cārvākas do not admit the theory of causality. By adopting a dialectic<sup>7</sup> they contend that it is difficult to determine the nature of kāraṇa or what is accepted as a causal factor. The arguments advanced by them to refute the commonly accepted relation between cause and effect untenable, when these are subjected to logical analysis. In view of it, the thesis maintained by Cārvāka, viz., that caitanya is caused by the combination of four elements, involves self-contradiction and stands opposed to one's own activities for achieving the same goal or purpose.

It may be argued that it is possible to explain all mental functions by the instruments of knowledge such as mind and sense organs (caitanya sāmagrī) and that there is no need to admit caitanya or a sentient principle as jīva separately. But this view stands opposed to our experience. Our experience is the form, "I know this object." This experience implies a subject, an object and that act of knowing the object. Just as

the object such as the pot seen cannot be denied, the knowing by the subject also cannot be denied. It is not possible to explain the mental activities by the mere instruments of inana without the presence of caitanya which activates them. Even in the cases of the wooden dolls, which are found to prattle words, it is not without the influence of a sentient being. Such activities by non-sentient entities can be accounted for either through the power of their being possessed by spirits or through the will of God who is the Supreme Deity to be worshipped by all and also the bestower of the boons. All activities need to be initiated and regulated by an intelligent being (caitanya-mūla). The illustrations of the blooming of the petals of the lotus flower and the exhalation and inhalations of living beings do not substantiate the Cārvāka theory of spontaneous activity without the control of a sentient being. Even in these instances, it is also controlled by Paramātman. If a branch of a tree which is cut and replanted grows, it is due to the fact that another  $\bar{p}va$  abides in it. Since  $\bar{p}vas$  are infinite in number, it is always possible that if one jīva leaves the body, another nva becomes associated with it.

The gradations of jīvas due to the assumption of different types of bodies from the lowest form such as plants, trees, germs, insects, reptiles, animals, human beings, celestial beings etc., is due to the variations in respect of the sins and merits accumulated from the series of several previous births. Such an explanation cannot be offered by those who subscribe to the theory that body itself is self, because with the physical death, continuation of life is inconceivable. When it is established that jīvātman is an eternal, spiritual principle and, distinct from bodily experiences pleasure and pain in accordance with one's punya and pāpa, the mere enjoyment of sensual pleasure in one's lifetime as the goal of life as conceived by Cārvāka, is not sustainable. Nor the cessation of one's life of limited duration is mokṣa.

It may be argued that it is superfluous to postulate the concept of *dharma* and *adharma* to account for the existence of *sukha* and *duḥkha* when it is possible to explain all events in one's life on the basis of certain known factors. Or it may be said that just as what is stated in the Āgamas (Sacred texts)

which is eternal, cannot be negated by the other pramāṇas, in the same way that what is postulated to explain a phenomena is not to be questioned. But both these arguments stand rejected since perception alone cannot be the final authority in respect of spiritual matters.

The caitanya or consciousness which is located in a part of the body cannot also be claimed as jñātṛ or knowing self because this is not proved by pratyakṣa which is the only pramāṇa for the Cārvākas. We sometimes say that a tree in which flowers are seen only in a single branch, is a beautiful tree full of flowers. Citing a few examples, a philosophical theory cannot be conclusively established. If this be possible, then any rival school of thought can advance its own theories and claim that it is sounder than those admitted by others. To overcome all these objections it may be argued that caitanya that is present in a part of the subtle body (sūkṣma-eka-deśa), is jīva. But such a theory when subjected to further scrutiny stands untenable since it cannot be proved by logical arguments. Hence one has to take resort to śāstra or sacred text as the only source of authority for providing the existence of jīva.

## Prāṇa is also not the Jīvātmā

The arguments advanced to refute the theory that the physical body itself is the jīva, equally holds good in respect of prāna or vital breath, being regarded as jīva. The prana-vāyu functions in fivefold form under the name of prāna, apāna, vyāna, udāna, and samana and this combinations of the five junctions constitute an aggregate of physical parts. Such an aggregate being similar to the aggregate of different limbs of the physical body, it cannot become the jīva. Some yogis who have acquired some supernatural powers by the control of breath are found to perform extraodinary feats such as standing on the water in a lake (jala stambhana), walking on burning coal, etc. and on the basis of this, it is believed that prana itself is the jīva. But Vedanta Desika points out that these are were delusions caused by super-natural powers. Prāņa itself is not jīvātman, even though jīva is associated with prāṇa which is an accessory to it. In the Upanisad it is clearly stated that prana along with sense organs is caused by Paramatman (etasmāt jāyate prāņo' manaḥ sarvendriyāṇi ca).<sup>8</sup> As a created entity, it cannot be eternal, unlike jīvātman. We always speak as "my prāṇa," implying distinction between the self and prāṇa and not in the form "I am prāṇa."

### **INDRIYAS ALSO CANNOT BE JĪVA**

For the same reason, even *indriyas*—the sense organs, cannot be claimed to be *jīva*. There are five sense organs, each having a specific function. Either each *indriya* with specific function of the combination of all with different functions cannot constitute *jīva* proper. *Indriyas* are only the instruments of knowledge for the *jīva* but they themselves are not the knower of what is seen or heard. If *indriya* itself is the knower then with the loss of one *indriya* such as eyes, what is seen cannot be recollected or experienced by another *indriya*. The *jīva* is therefore to be admitted as different from the *indriya*.

In the same way, the five cognitive organs cannot be jīvātman. As regards the mind (manas)—the inner sense organ, it is only the instrument for recollection by jīva what is experienced earlier by other sense organs.

## Mere Jñāna cannot be Jīvātman

Some Carvakas maintain the theory that jñana or knowledge itself is the jīvātmā as is evident from the experience "I know" (jānāmi). This experience which arises in the mind is itself jīvātmā and there is no need to postulate any other entity as jīva. Even this theory is untenable. Such a jñāna is either momentary in character (kṣaṇika), as Buddhists claim, or it is of enduring nature (anuvitta). In either case, it is not possible to account for recollection of what is seen or experienced earlier, since it cannot be the jnātā or knower as distinct from jñāna which alone can recollect or recognize what is seen earlier by mere jñāna. The Cārvākas do admit that during the state of deep sleep knowledge is not present, whereas during the state of consciousness, knowledge persists. It is not possible to explain the persistence of knowledge without admitting an eternal atma as the basis of knowledge. Those Cārvākas who admit that jūāna is itself ātmā, cannot claim that jñāna is the repository of the samskāra or impressions of earlier experiences. If, on the other hand, the heart in the central part of the body is regarded as both the  $j\bar{n}\bar{a}na$  and also the locus for all the  $sa\bar{m}sk\bar{a}ras$ , it amounts to the formulation of a peculiar theory. It would be more appropriate to subscribe to the theory which is sanctioned by the Sacred texts which are flawless. The theory that  $j\bar{n}\bar{a}na$  itself is  $\bar{a}tm\bar{a}$  is opposed to our experience which arises in the form that "I"  $(\bar{a}tm\bar{a})$ , as the knower, possess the knowledge. Otherwise, with the destruction of knowledge, even  $\bar{a}tman$  is destroyed. If, with the death of the body, the  $j\bar{v}v\bar{a}tman$  also ceases to exist, then on the same principle, it would follow that during susupti, according to the Cārvākas,  $\bar{a}tm\bar{a}$  ceases to exist. But it is not so, because after awakening from deep sleep, one feels happy and desires to get such a joy.

## Jīvātman is an Eternal Spiritual Entity

After criticizing all the defective views of the Cārvākas regarding the  $j\bar{\imath}va$ , Vedānta Deśika presents the correct and acceptable theories about  $j\bar{\imath}v\bar{a}tman$  with the support of the pramāṇas. It is to be admitted that  $\bar{a}tman$  is an eternal spiritual entity as distinct from the body. This is proved not only on the basis of the perceptual experience but also on the strength of the authoritative Scriptural texts. As Naiyāyikas explain the instinctive behaviour of a newly born infant and the possibility of recollection of the events of the past by some individuals, also support the theory of continuity of the  $j\bar{\imath}vas$ , through several lives. Theories such as " $j\bar{\imath}v\bar{a}tman$  endures till the end of one's life  $(deh\bar{\imath}vadhi)$  or till the end of the dissolution of the universe  $(prajay\bar{a}vadhi)$  or till the attainment of liberation from the cycle of births and deaths  $(moks\bar{\imath}avadhi)$ " are all opposed to the Scriptural teachings.

That with the death of the body,  $\bar{a}tm\bar{a}$  also ceases to exist is the most unsound theory. This is similar to the view that during the state of susputi the  $\bar{a}tman$  is dissolved. But this is contrary to our experience. The same  $\bar{j}iv\bar{a}tman$  which experienced susputi continues to function soon after waking from sleep. This is well-established by the author of the Vedāntasūtrareading as "sa eva tu karma anusmṛti śabda vidhibhyaḥ." On the same

basis, the jīvātman does not cease to exist with the death of the body but is reborn by assuming another body.

There are a few stray statements in the Upaniṣads which give the impression, prima facie, that jīvātman ceases to exist with the death of a person. Thus, in the Taittirīya Āraṇyaka it is stated: "who knows what exists and what does not exist in the higher transcendental realm (paraloka)." Another text Bṛhadāraṇyaka says: "na pretya saṃjña asti—One who is dead does not possess consciousness." In the preceding statement, it is pointed out that ātmā which is of the nature of knowledge (vijñānamaya) raises from this body along with the five elements and perishes like the elements. 11 Even in our empirical usage, we only say that an individual is born and the same dies. Taking all these statements, it is contended that jīvātman exists as long as the body lasts and it also ends with the death of that body.

Vedanta Desika refutes these arguments as unsustainable. If, on the basis of the Scriptural texts, one advances the theory that ātman is not eternal, then the same Scriptural texts teach that ātman is eternal (nityo nityānām cetanah cetanānām) and on the strength of these texts, it is to be admitted that  $\bar{n}v\bar{a}tman$ continues to exist passing from one body to another (sarīra paramparā). The Bhagavadgītā also reiterated the same by citing the illustration of how a person throws away the wormcut coat and puts on another new one. It repeatedly emphasizes the eternality (nityatva) of jīvātman as against the non-permanent body. The scrupulous observance of the prescribed Vedic deeds by men of wisdom for the attainment of higher spiritual goal would be of no value if atman is not eternal. The birth of  $j\bar{\imath}va$  is only associated with a body and its death is separation from the body. It does not perish with the death of the body but assumes a different form by assuming another body.

## Jīvātman does not become One with Paramātman

The view that  $\bar{j}v\bar{a}tman$  endures till the end of the pralaya or dissolution of the universe is also unsound. This theory advanced on the basis of a statement in the  $Visnupur\bar{a}na$  which states that both prakṛti which has manifest and unmanifest forms and also the puruṣa ( $\bar{j}v\bar{a}tman$ ) are dissolved in Paramātman during dissolution of the universe. 12

This theory is untenable because of the following reasons. First, it is opposed to Smrti text which states, that both prakṛti and purusa are without a beginning. 13 What does not have a beginning does not have an end. Besides, the same Gītā text says that jīva is neither born nor it dies (na jāyate na mriyate va vipaścit). The implication of anaditva is that there is a continuous series of births and deaths and for the jīva like, the continuous flow of the water of the river (pravāha nityatā). If we accept the birth and death to the jīva, then İśvara would be subjected to the criticism of partiality and cruelty since He would be destroying the jīvas without any consideration to the punya and papa acquired by them. Besides, the Smrti text says that karma, in the form of the results of the good and bad deeds, cannot be eradicated even in several kalbas, without experiencing them (na abhuktam ksīyate karma kalpakoti śatairapi). This statement confirms the fact that jīvātmā endures through several kalpas or epochs. Further, if jīva ceases to exist at the end of an epoch, then the jīva born in the next kalpa, would not be able to reap benefit of the karmas done in the previous kalpa. Also, it would acquire karma which is not done by it (akṛtābhyagama kṛtavipraṇāśaḥ). In view of all these considerations, the laya of jīva and prakṛti in Paramātman in the state of pralaya, is to be taken in the sense that jīva and prakṛti exist in Paramātman in an unmanifested form, and in indistinguishable manner, similar to the water which is absorbed by the heated iron rod.

The ancient school of Vedānta expounded by Brahmadatta (which is not extant) and Bhāskara, according to which jīvas during the states of creation are created and during pralaya they are destroyed. These theories are also untenable as they are opposed to the Scriptural teachings which emphasize the eternality of jīva. The details of these criticisms will be considered later in the section dealing with the critical review of Vedānta schools. According to the Upaniṣads, the jīvas are devoid of birth or origin (aja) and also eternal (nitya). They are not subject to either creation or destruction at any period.

The theory that jīvas exist or endure by assuming several births until they are totally liberated from bondage (āmokṣasthāyī) is also unsound. According to this view, there are two kinds

of pralaya or dissolution, viz., nitya naimitika pralaya and ātyantika pralaya. The nitya pralaya takes place, as described in the Viṣṇupurāṇa, at the end of each day of Caturmukha Brahmā, which is measured in terms of one thousand human yugas. The naimitika pralaya takes place at the end of the kalpa or epoch of Brahmā (kalpānto). Prākṛta pralaya occurs after a certain a duration of Brahmā's rule, while the ātyantika pralaya or total dissolution happens when Caturmukha Brahmā attains mokṣa after several yugas. When once total pralaya takes place, the jīvātmans are also dissolved in Paramātman. On basis of these details, it is maintained that jīvas exist until they attain mokṣa (āmokṣasthāyī) which by implication means that jīvas cease to exist soon after their being merged into Brahman.

This theory is also untenable because the Scriptural texts speak of the difference between Brahman and the mukta jīvas even in the state of mokṣa. The description of mokṣa in terms of sāmya or equality between Brahman and jīvas, sādharmya, or enjoying a status similar to that of Paramātman, do not support the view of absolute identity with Brahman. Besides, the Upaniṣads categorically state that jīvas enjoy the ānanda or glory of Paramātman in the state of mukti, In view of these, the description of ātyantika pralaya is to be understood in the sense that when once jīvas attain mokṣa, they are totally liberated from karma and that there is no possibility of the jīvas returning to mundane existence (punarāvṛttī) and that the muktas enjoy the blissful Brahman fully in a transcendental realm. Hence the view that dissolution of ātman is mokṣa amounts to the acceptance of the Cārvāka philosophy.

By way of concluding, Vedānta Deśika states that it is appropriate to admit the ātma-tattva, or the doctrine of jīvātman as a reality as distinct from the physical body, which is well-established by the Sacred texts and which is also evident to our experience. Once should follow the prescribed way of life for overcoming the afflictions in life and also attaining eternal happiness in a higher realm. The Cārvākas defend their philosophy on the assumption that it was taught by Prajāpati, the chief of the celestial deities in the Chāndogya Upaniṣad and also by Bṛhaspati, the preceptor of the celestial deities (devaguru). But these teachings were intended to delude the

demons (asuras). The reference to statements made by sage Jābāli, at the assembly of Lord Rāma in the Rāmāyaṇa, were not intended to support the theory of Cārvākas, as is clarified by Lord Rāma himself. The presence of some Lokāyatikas in the yāga performed by sage Kaṇva mentioned in the Mahābhārata, along with other sages, do not imply that they were the followers of the Cārvāka philosophy but, on the contrary, those were the persons well-qualified to refute the arguments of the Cārvākas. Hence it cannot be claimed that Cārvāka philosophy has the support of the Vedas and also of the orthodox Vedic scholars. The Cārvāka philosophy, teaching sensual pleasure as the goal of life, which may appeal as proper knowledge to foolish people, is not acceptable to men of wisdom.

#### REFERENCES

- 1. See PMB, chap. 6.
- 2. See Ch. Up., VIII.8.7.
- 3. Rāmāyaņa, Ayodhyākāṇḍa.
- 4. Mahābhārata, Ādiparva: nānāśāstrārtha mukhyaiśca suśrāva svanamiritam, lokāyatika mukhyaiśca samantād abhinaditam.
- 5. See BG, IV.13: cāturvarnyam mayā srstam guņa karma vibhāgašah; tasya kartārampi mām viddhi....
- 6. See Sarvārthasiddhi on TMK, II.1. See also Yāmuna's Ātmasiddhi, p. 8.
- 7. For details of the dialectic, see TMK, I.32. Also FVV, chap.1, p. 54.
- 8. See Muṇḍ. Up., II.1.3.
- 9. VS, III.2.9.
- 10. Tait. Āra., VI.1: ko hy tad veda yadyamuşmin loke asti vā na vā.
- 11. Br. Up., II.4.2: Vijñāna-ghana eva etebhyo-bhūtebhyaḥ samutthāya tānyeva anuvinasyati.
- 12. V.P.: Prakṛtirya mayā ākhyātā vyaktā-vyaktarūpiņī; puruṣaścāpyubhau etau līyete Paramātmani.
- 13. BG: prakṛtim puruṣam caiva viddhi anādi ubhau api.

## 5

## Buddhism

A FTER THE REFUTATION of Cārvāka, Vedānta Dešika takes up Buddhism for critical examination which is the second important non-Vedic school of thought. Even chronologically it appears to have come into existence later than Cārvāka since there are critical references to Cārvāka teachings in the Buddhist treatises. According to Vedānta Dešika, the justification for taking up Buddhism soon after Cārvāka is that, unlike Cārvāka, it admits vijnāna in the form of metal ideas. It also advocates a religion of its own and believes in the concept of the attainment of a higher goal in the name of nirvāṇa by the pursuit of a rigorous ethical and religious discipline. Though Buddhism does not accept the Vedas, it owes its authority to the teachings of the Buddha who is regarded as sarvajña or the omniscient Being.

Buddhism, as a religion, which is acknowledged as one of the world religions, does not come up for criticism. Vedānta Dešika, like all other critics hailing from orthodox schools, confines his attention to the criticism of the important philosophical and epistemological doctrines of Buddhism which are considered to be untenable, apart from their being totally

opposed to the Upanisadic teachings.

Buddhism, as a system of philosophy, is also not uniformly the same. In the course of its development during a long period spreading through several centuries since the advent of Buddha, it has undergone several modifications, giving rise to different schools of thought, each one presenting distinctive doctrines. Four major of thought are generally acknowledged as important. These are named as Vaibhāṣika, Sautrāntika, Yogācāra, and Mādhyamika. 1

The Vaibhāṣika and Sautrāntika admit to the existence of external objects. The Yogācāra denies the existence of external objects. The Mādhyamika, on the contrary, maintains that both internal ideas and external objects are śūnya or void in the sense that they are of indeterminable character. All the schools except Mādhyamika maintain that everything in the universe is of momentary nature (kṣaṇika), that it does not exist for more than an instant.

These teachings, though conflicting, are considered to have been based on the sayings of the Buddha, who is omniscient and hence are regarded as authoritative. According to the Buddhist tradition, Buddha taught the following four principles: (1) Sarvam ksanikam ksanikam; (2) duhkham duhkkam; (3) svalakşanam svalakşanam; and (4) sūnyam sūnyam.2 According to Vedanta Deśika, Buddha advocated the following four doctrines: (1) kṣaṇa-bhangaḥ, that is, everything in the universe is momentary in nature; (2) pratyaksārtha-bhangah, that is, the objects of perception do not actually exist; (3) bāhyārthabhangah, that is, the external objects do not exist apart from knowledge; and (4) dharma-dharmi-bhāva-bhangah, that is, apart from attributes (dharmas), there is no separate substance (dharmī) as such. On the basis of these basic teachings, the four schools have developed their main doctrines. As will be seen later, the first one is accepted by all except Mādhyamika. The second theory is developed by Sautrantika for whom external objects are inferred. The third one is embraced by Yogācāra for whom external objects are the projections of internal ideas. The fourth one is accepted both by Vaibhāṣika and Sautrāntika for whom svalaksana or the bare unrelated being seen in the initial stage of perception is real, whereas what is perceived later as qualified (savikalpaka) is false.

Vedānta Dešika confines his attention to the critical examination of these doctrines. He deals with each school separately. As explained in the introduction to the Mādhyamika-bhangādhikāra, Mādhyamika is accorded highest priority because it advocates śūnyavāda or that everything in the universe is void which amounts to non-existence and marks the climax of Buddha's

teachings (sugatamata-kāṣṭha). He is regarded as worse than Cārvāka since he does neither accept even pratyakṣa as a pramāṇa nor the existence of external objects. The Yogācāra makes a concession to this extreme view of Mādhyamika by admitting the existence of vijñāna in the form of series of ideas. The Sautrāntika goes a step further and concedes both thoughts and external objects though the latter is to be inferred on the basis of the cognition of the objects. The Vaibhāṣika is far more accommodative since he admits both internal knowledge and the existence of external objects. But all the schools of Buddhism except Mādhyamika uphold the theory that all things in the universe are of momentary character (kṣaṇika).

### 1. MADHYAMIKA SCHOOL OF BUDDHISM

Mādhyamika is first taken up for examination. Its central philosophy is summed up in the following verse which is quoted by Vedānta Deśika:

na san-nāsan-nasad-asan-nācā'py-anubhayātmikam catuşkoţi-vinirmuktam tattvam mādhyamikam viduḥ; buddhyā vivicyamānānām svabhävo nāvadhāryate ato nirabhilapyas-te nis-svabhāvaśca darśitaḥ.

It neither 'is' nor 'is not' 'both is and is not' nor 'neither is nor is not.' It is outside the four alternatives that are regarded tattvam by the

Mādhyamikas.

Even by closer examination, the nature of the object cannot be determined. Hence the nature of the objects is indescribable and is found to be void.

In other words, excludes all conceivable predicates including that of non-existence and the ultimate is accordingly to be viewed as beyond all conception. It is therefore indeterminable.

If this be the main thesis of the Mādhyamika, then the experience we get in the form "I know this" which involves three factors, viz., the knower  $(aha\dot{m})$ , the object known  $(j\tilde{n}eya)$ , and the process of knowing  $(j\tilde{n}\bar{a}na)$  cannot be explained in any manner. That is, the nature of the objects in the universe is indeterminable, then there would be no difference between the waking experience and the dream experience. They would become almost non-existent (tuccha) similar to the sky-flower.

If this be acceptable, our endeavours for attaining higher spiritual goals as heaven, mokṣa, etc. would be of no value. All human endeavours for achieving other human goals would be futile. According to such a philosophy, mokṣa would amount to the realizaton of mere voidness (śūnyatāpatti) in respect

of all our experiences.

After making general criticisms against the Mādhyamikas, Vedānta Deśika criticizes their views in greater detail. The first and foremost criticism of this school is that their teachings do not have the support of the valid *pramāṇas*. The claim that these theories are the outcomes of the teachings of the omniscient Buddha, is questionable because one who is omniscient cannot present conflicting theories. There are no well-defined criteria to determine that among the conflicting theories, which one is the correct and final one.

It is wrong to maintain that tattva or what is regarded as reality or an object has a real existence outside the four possible logical alternatives, viz., na sat, na asat, na sadasat, na tadubhayātmikam. An object can be defined in all four ways from different standpoints. Thus, for instance, a pot exists in a particular place but the same does not exist in another place. It can be regarded as both existence and non-existence and also different from being both existence and non-existence from different stand points. All these facts are evident to our experience. If we say that an object exists and does not exist in the same place and at the same time, it involves a selfcontradiction. If, on the contrary, we conceive that an object exists and also does not exist at the same time in different forms, it would amount to the admission of the Anekantavāda or manifold nature of the object, advocated by the Jainas. Hence the contention of the Madhyamikas that an object is indescribable in any manner is untenable.

The Mādhyamikas adopt a different argument to prove the non-existence (abhāva) of an object. Every object, prior to its production, does not exist. This is regarded as its prior non-existence (prāgbhāva). It does not also exist after it is destroyed. This is known as its posterior non-existence (pradhvamsābhāva). What does not exist earlier and later, cannot be considered to exist between there two states.

This argument is logically untenable. The prior non-existence of an object ceases to exist as soon as the object is produced. If the concept of non-existence itself is not acceptable on the ground that it is indeterminable (nirupākhya), then even the causal factors which produce the object would have to be treated as indeterminable. Again, if an object comes into existence, it would also have an end or destruction (vināśa). If an object, whose nature is indeterminable (nirupākhya) according to the Mādhyamika, does not have either an origin or destruction, it would become eternal. But it is not so. Hence both prāgbhāva and pradhvamsabhāva are to be admitted as positive concepts in the sense of two different states of an object.

In view of this explanation, abhāva, as a logical concept, is not indeterminable or mere non-existence as Mādhyamika says. It only means non-existence of an object. An object has both prior non-existence (prāgbhāva) before it is caused and pradhvamsābhāva after it is destroyed, because that which is produced is also subject to destruction, resulting in its pra-

dhvamsābhāva.

Hence what comes between prāgbhāva and pradhvamsābhāva does exist during the period of its existence (svakāla-sattva).

In this connection, Vedanta Desika clarifies the logical concept of abhāva and bhāva. According to Viśistādvaita, both bhāva and abhāva are positive concepts representing different states of a substance. According to Nyāya-Vaiśesika, these are different logical categories. It is not therefore correct to say that abhāva

is nirupākhya or nis-svabhāva (indeterminable).

An object, prior to its production, is asat or non-existent, and in that state it is nis-svabhāva. After its production, it is regarded as possessing sattā or existence, that is to say, it assumes a new character. It is asked: what is the nature of the new character assumed by the asat? The non-existence (abhāva) of an object which we speak of on the basis of pramāņa is not nis-svabhāva or devoid of any intrinsic nature as the Mādhyamika assumes. This abhāva is also not the svarūpa of the object which becomes manifest after its production. If it is different from the object that is produced, then it is asked what is its nature? This question, Vedanta Desika argues, is

irrelevant because it arises only if it is established that abhāva, in some form or the other, exists prior to kārya. All that can be said is that prior to the origin of the object, the object we see with its nature did not exist prior to its production. It is therefore not relevant to ask what the nature of the abhāva was, prior to its production. This is explained by an illustration. After knowing Devadatta, a person with his characteristics, one can ask where he exists or lives. This question is relevant only when one has known Devadatta, but not in the absence of any knowledge about him. Similarly, if we have the knowledge of the pot in the state prior to its production, then it is possible to ask what the nature of its non-existence was.

There are a few other arguments which are of dialectical nature advanced by Vedānta Deśika to refute the theory of Mādhyamika in defence of non-existence. The main point of criticism is that it is impossible to conceive absolute nonexistence. The terms such as śūnya, tuccha, etc. which appear to mean total negation (sarva-śūnya) do not imply non-existence. Negation (nisedha) necessarily presupposes its counter-correlate. It does not imply total non-existence at any time or at any place. When we say that an object does not exist, it only means that it exists at some other place or at some other time, but not that it is totally non-existent like the sky-flower. Absolute non-existence (sarvathā-śūnyatva) is logically untenable. As stated by Vedanta Deśika in the Adhikarana-sārāvalī, it is purely a speculative theory without having any support of the pramanas (amānataḥ, sveṣṭā-vāda). Bādarāyāṇa also points out in the Vedāntasūtra that the doctrine of Mādhyamika is totally untenable (sarvathā anupapatteśca).3

## 2. YOGĀCĀRA SCHOOL OF BUDDHISM

Unlike the Mādhyamika, who denies the existence of everything, Yogacāra admits, as if it is an improvement to the Mādhyamika Buddhist philosophy, the existence of vijñāna in the form of a series of mental ideas. His doctrine is therefore titled vijñānavāda. He also admits, unlike the Cārvāka, a concept of causality (kārya-kāraṇabhāva). The central theory of Yogācāra is summed up in the following verse quoted by Vedānta Deśika:

avibhāgo hi buddyātmā viparyāsita darśanaiḥ, grāhya grahaka samvitti bhedavāniva lakṣyate.

Knowledge is of one form without any distinction between knowledge and its object. The distinction between the object of experience (grāhya) and the knower who cognizes it (grāhaka) is all due to illusion.

In support of this view, the following argument is advanced: "sahopalambha niyamāt abhedo nīlataddhiyoḥ—There is no distinction between the cognition and the object cognized because there is an invariable connection between the two."

According to the Yogācāra, there is no external object from knowledge. The variegated experience of the object takes place due to the influence of the vāsanās or innate mental ideas which are variegated. There is no need for the objects to qualify the knowledge as of a different nature. The series of cognitions themselves are influenced by the samskāras caused by earlier cognitions from as beginningless time.

This theory comes up for a severe criticism from all the realistic schools of thought which admit knowledge as distinct from the external objects. It is opposed to our perceptual experience. It cannot also be established by anumāna or logical arguments.

Vedānta Dešika points out that the Yogācāra cannot uphold the theory of causal relation, that is, the proper relation of cause to effect. According to Yogācāra, all things are of momentary nature (ksanika). That is, an object exists only for a moment and in the next moment, it ceases to exist in the same form. What exists for a moment cannot serve as the cause of what is produced in the next moment. Besides, what is considered to be real is only the bare being, technically termed as svalakṣaṇa and not that which is qualified with attributes. If everything is of momentary existence and what is considered as an effect is a bare being (svalakṣaṇa) then there cannot be a relation between the two since they are of different nature. If any two entities can have a causal relation, then it would amount to saying that the presence of a donkey is related to smoke on the hill. All earlier moments would be the cause of all later moments. It is not possible to adopt an inferential argument since there is no relation between the entities to formulate a

logical concomitance between one entity and another, as in the case of smoke on the hill with the fire. Even in respect of a series of ideas as one continuous process, there is no determining factor to establish a correlation between the earlier event and the later one, without the admission of a permanent self as the cognizer (jñātā). The illustration of the white cotton which is coloured with redness cited in support of the view that at the same time samskara becomes qualified, does not serve the purpose, since there is nothing which endures for more than a moment.

The theory of Yogācāra that other than jñāna, nothing else exists, is untenable because jñāna as a continuous series of ideas is only momentary and it is not everlasting or nitya as Advaitin maintains. What is momentary implies that either in its earlier state (moment) or in its later state (moment), it does not exist in the same form. Following the logic of Mādhyamika, what is non-existent prior to it and also nonexistent subsequent to it, also becomes non-existent. Yogācāra does not also accept that jñāna is qualified with some attributes. Whatever is qualified (savikalpa) is of the nature of illusion. According to Yogācāra, only svalaksana or bare being without

any characteristics is true knowledge.

The theory that the external object other than knowledge does not really exist, is also wrong. Though knowledge may be self-revealing, it needs some other means or another knowledge to reveal its nature as momentary (kṣaṇika). To say that knowledge itself is the external object involves selfcontradiction. If another series of knowledge (jñāna-santati) can reveal that the knowledge of the present series is momentary and that it is part of the previous momentary jñāna and also that of the subsequent moment, then the individual should be aware that it is a separate series and also truly exists. It is not known then even the difference drawn between the teacher and the taught and also between the exponent of the theory and its opponent cannot be explained. If this be not possible, then the Yogācāra, like Mādhyamika, cannot prove his own theory.

The central theory of Yogācāra is that there is no difference between knowledge (jñāna) and the external object (grāhya). This is the most unsound theory because it is generally accepted by all schools, as is also evident to our experience that the knowledge of an object which arises in the form "I know this" (idam aham jānāmi) involves three factors; the knower denoted by aham the object denoted by idam, and the process of knowing denoted by jānāmi. If this is not admitted, the statement of the Yogācāra "grāhya grāhaka samvitti bhedavāniva laksyate," which means that it appears that there is difference between grāhya or the object, the knower (grāhaka), and the knowledge (samvit), does not stand. It presupposes all the three factors. When an object can exist independent of knowledge and knowledge also exists as an attribute of the knower, it follows that inana is related to an object on one side and the subject on the other. Hence it is wrong to deny both the object and the subject who knows it. If this theory, which is accepted by all, is rejected, then even the existence of  $j\bar{n}\bar{a}na$ as the only reality, stands refuted by applying the Mādhyamika logic.

It is argued in defence of the Yogācāra theory denying the external objects, that even Vedāntins do not accept the theory of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, according to which, avayavī or the conglomeration of avayavas or parts is not real on the ground that paramāṇus which are infinitesimal partless supra-reals and also non-perceptible, cannot combine together since they are partless. Vedāntins should not therefore object to the theory of the Yogācāra denying the existence of external objects. Vedānta Dešika controverts the argument by explaining that according to Viśiṣṭādvaita, paramāṇus are the smallest particles and they are perceptible. The combination of these particles constitute a gross object and this is established by cognition.

The jīvātman, which is either monadic in size, as Visiṣṭādvaitins maintain or all-pervasive as Naiyāyikas hold, manifests itself as "I" (aham) and hence it is undeniable. If ātman is admitted as a real entity, the object experienced by it is also real.

It cannot be said that  $j\tilde{n}\bar{a}na$  or knowledge and  $j\tilde{n}eya$  or the external object are identical because the two are cognized together (sahopalambha). This view conflicts with one's own stand. Besides, all our activities are initiated after we see object as different from  $j\tilde{n}\bar{a}na$ . If  $j\tilde{n}\bar{a}na$  and  $j\tilde{n}eya$  are regarded

as identical, then it would not be possible to make any distinction between the right cognition and the wrong cognition. Then one has to take resort to either śūnyavāda which admits that knowledge and the objects seen do not really exist, or to Jaina's saptabhangī according to which an object exists and also does not exist at the same time.

On the analogy of objects seen in the dream state, it is not possible to deny the existence of objects in the waking state, because it is opposed to our common experience. We always experience that object is different from  $j\bar{n}\bar{a}na$ . What does not exist cannot be comprehended. Even in the case of dream objects, they exist in the state of dream according to the Viśiṣṭādvaitin, as these are created by  $\bar{I}$ śvara to be experienced by a  $j\bar{i}va$ . Even if objects do not exist in the dream state, they do exist in some other place and at some other time and they are not therefore totally non-existent.

It cannot also be argued that the object exists without any specific intrinsic character (nis-svabhāva) because the same is experienced differently by different individuals as in the example of a beautiful damsel seen by an ascetic, a lover, and a dog. Then, even the very jāāna which is admitted as really existing would have to be treated as non-existent (nis-svabhāva) because it is also regarded by others in different ways such as satya, tuccha, jaḍa, svayamprakāśa, kṣaṇika, and nitya. An object assumes different characters in terms of linga or gender, number, dimension (parimāna), etc. because of the limiting or conditioning factors (sopādhika). If this is not admitted, it is not possible to regard the same jāāna as prior or posterior, as kārya and kāraṇa, as nīlākāra (blue) and pītākāra (yellow). Such a position leads to the Mādhyamika theory of śūnya.

The Yogācāra, who does not accept the existence of the external objects, attempts, to explain the nature of character of knowledge in the form of a series of ideas on the basis of the influence of the variegated vāsanās or the innate tendencies inherent in the previous series of ideas and not with reference to the nature of the external objects. Even the explanation is not logically sustainable. Vijnāna, for the Buddhists, is kṣanika, that is, it changes every moment. In the series of cognitions,

when the earlier cognition ceases to exists, the  $v\bar{a}san\bar{a}$  associated with it is also erased and as such it cannot influence the next momentary cognition. If the series of cognitions is admitted as one continuous cognition, it may be possible to account for the continuation of  $v\bar{a}san\bar{a}$  and its influence on cognition. Alternatively, the reality of the external objects has to be admitted to account for diversity of experience. Neither is accepted by the Vijnanavadin and his theory of vijnana is therefore untenable.

Bādarāyaņa sums up the criticisms against the Yogācāra doctrine in the following three sūtras:

 Na abhāva upalabdheḥ.<sup>4</sup> It cannot be said that external objects do not exist, because these are cognized by the individual self through the process of knowing.

2. Vaidharmyācca na svapnādivāt.<sup>5</sup> On the basis of the objects perceived in the dream, it cannot be said that objects do not exist, because there is difference between the dream experience and waking state.

3. Na bhāvo anupalabdheh. 6 Knowledge as devoid of content is not proved to exist. That is, all knowledge is related to

an object and also to a subject.

Thus, it is concluded by Vedānta Deśika, that the doctrine of Yogācāra upholding only jūāna as real and that the external object is illusory, is not sustainable.

### 3. SAUTRĀNTIKA SCHOOL OF BUDDHISM

As compared to the Yogācāra who denies the existence of external objects, Sautrāntika goes a step further by admitting the existence of external objects in addition to jñāna or knowledge. But the object is not directly perceived but it is to be inferred on the basis of the knowledge having the content in the form of an object. This is a peculiar epistemological theory developed by Sautrāntika and it is subjected to severe criticism. The criticism is mainly directed to prove that the arguments adopted by the Sautrāntika regarding the existence of an external object though it is not directly perceived, are untenable.

The external object admitted by Sautrāntika is not regarded as the avayavī or the combination of several parts, as Naiyāyikas believe. What is conceived as avayavasangātha or combination

of avayavas is treated by him as non-existent (avastu). The avayava is the combination of the paramanus or subtle particles which are devoid of parts (niramsa). If paramanus conceived by him are partless, its combination to form an aggregate whole is also rejected. The idea of the paramāņus becoming a conglomeration is therefore a mere delusion. On further analysis of the paramāņus, it turns out to be a non-existent entity. Only if paramanus come together, it is possible to speak of the smallest dimension, biggest dimension, and dimension of middle size (madhyama parimāna). Paramānus do not possess the dharma of paramanutva. Hence the combination of paramanus in any form is not possible. Even ākāśa which is all-pervasive is not accepted by Sautrantika. It is another name for spatial absence (avaranabhavah). It amounts to saying that it does not exist as a separate entity. If these are the views held by Sautrāntika, even the external object which does not exist for him, cannot be inferred. Unless the external object is seen, its inference on the basis of having seen the object by perception cannot be proved. Either it is to be admitted as Vaibhāṣika says, that the collection of paramāņus (paramāņuspuñjaka) is perceptible or as the realists say that objects are always directly perceived by knowledge. There is no other way of proving its existence only on the basis of inference. It cannot be said that objects experienced in the long past or objects to be experienced in the long future leave their impression on the mind by means of which objects of the present are inferred. Just as we infer objects seen in the past by memory, it is not possible to explain on the basis of the inference that an object of the present also exists. There is not one instance which can be cited in support of the view that the existence of an object is inferred.

The denial of ākāśa or ethereal space as a real entity, which is so obvious to our perceptual experience, is the most unsound theory. It should be possible for the Sautrāntika to accept it on the basis of inference in the same way as the existence of an external object is admitted on the basis of inference. Instead, it is totally wrong to negate it as a non-entity (tuccha). If an entity which is cognizable is regarded as tuccha, then even the external objects would have to be treated as tuccha or

non-existent by adopting the Mādhyamika logic. If ākāśa is regarded as āvaraṇabhāva, that is, absence of spatial relation, then it is not even possible to include it in the three types of abhāva accepted by Naiyāyikas and others such as prāgbhāva (prior non-existence), pradhvamsābhāva (posterior non-existence), and anyonyābhāva (mutual non-existence or difference) since all these concepts presuppose the existence of an object.

In the absence of ākāśa as a real entity, Sautrāntika cannot speak of either its prior existence or posterior existence. Even the concept of mid-space with reference to which we speak of an object being nearer or farther, is inconceivable. All these criticisms are implied in the Vedāntašutra reading as: "ākāśe ca aviśeṣāt." It means that it is not correct to say that ākāśa does not exist (tucchata) because it is perceptible as in the case of other objects (aviśeṣāt).

It is generally believed that the differences existing in the external objects cause the differences in respect of their knowledge. But the Sautrantika explains the variegated nature of knowledge (jñāna-vaicitrya) on the basis of the variations in the nature of the objects (artha-vaicitrya). This view is untenable because the invariable concomitance (vyāpti) between object and knowledge cannot be established by the Sautrantika since the two-object and knowledge-are not present at the same time in any given moment. The object is momentary and so also the knowledge which cognizes. it. The knowledge which has grasped a particular object ceases to exist in the next moment. Similarly, the object which is cognized by a knowledge at a particular moment, also ceases to exist. Unless it is proved that there is an invariable concomitance between knowledge and object, it is not possible to say that knowledge cognizes objects and thus it becomes variegated depending on the differences of the objects. If the nature of knowledge itself is conceived as variegated and on that basis it is inferred that objects are different, then there would be a need for another knowledge to comprehend that particular knowledge which is variegated. To escape all these difficulties, the Sautrantika has to admit, as in the case of Yogācāra, that jñāna in the form of a series of mental ideas itself is variegated due to the influence of previous vāsanās or innate tendencies and each

series of  $j\bar{n}\bar{a}na$  influences the next series. This would amount to the admission of the Yogācāra theory according to which external objects as such do not exist, and that  $j\bar{n}\bar{a}na$  itself projects as objects. This would defeat the stand adopted by Sautrāntika that external objects which are inferred on the basis of knowledge exist. Then there would be no difference between the dream experienced in which objects do not really exist and waking experience in which objects though exist, are to be denied, Such a theory is most unsound epistemologically, since there is difference between the waking state and the dream state as stated in the  $Ved\bar{a}ntas\bar{u}tra$  ( $vaidharmy\bar{a}cca$  na  $svapn\bar{a}divat$ ).

The Sautrāntika defends his theory that external objects exist, though it is to be inferred, by stating that an object, when cognized, transfers its ākāra or form to the knowledge and on the basis of such a knowledge which is characterized by the object, the object is inferred (jñānakāra-arpaṇam). Even this explanation is untenable, contends Vedānta Deśika. The external object does not possess a separate characteristic other than its svarūpa, to be transferred to knowledge. Even if it is admitted that it has a characteristic, how does it move out of the object in which it inheres? The svarūpa of the being momentary, does not persist for another moment for transferring it to the knowledge.

Both knowledge and object are without qualities (nir-dharmaka), according to Sautrāntika. How can the ākāra of the object be transferred to the knowledge? It may be said that the ākāra of the object is reflected in the knowledge which is pure (svaccha). Even this explanation does not hold good since, according to the accepted theory of reflection of one object in another, it is necessary that the two should exist at the same time (samānakāla) and the entity in which it is reflected, as in the case of a mirror, should be tainted for the reflection to take place (rūpavattva). The reflection cannot be explained on the analogy of the heated red iron piece or the heap of black gram in which black colour is mixed, because such a combination of internal knowledge with the external object is not conceivable. It cannot also be explained on the basis of the illustration of a red colour being generated by the

combination of white lime with yellow turmeric powder, because according to the Sautrāntika, what is earlier and what is later cannot come together (samsarga) since each has a momentary existence. In order to offer a satisfactory explanation of ākāra samarpaṇa, one has to admit that an external object with its form is perceptible or that the series of knowledge are influenced by the vāsanās. Hence the doctrine of Sautrāntika that external objects are inferred, though they do not really exist, cannot be proved.

The author of the *Vedāntasūtra* has summed up the criticism in the following *sūtra*: "nā-sato adṛṣṭavāt." It means: "When the object does not exist, the transfer of its dharma (ākāra) cannot take place since such a possibility is not perceived anywhere."

### 4. VAIBHĀŞIKA SCHOOL OF BUDDHISM

In order to overcome the defects pointed out in the theories advanced by the schools of Mādhyamika, Yogācāra, and Sautrāntika, this school admits both  $j\bar{n}\bar{a}na$  and external objects which are perceptible. But both these are momentary in character. It does not accept  $j\bar{n}\bar{a}t\bar{a}$  or knower as a separate entity. Even this modified doctrine is considered defective and it is therefore open for criticism.

Like the Naiyāyikas, the Vaibhāşikas also admit paramāņus which are partless, imperceptible, and infinitesimal reals. All the entities, both the external objects and the internal sense organs including mind and body, are the conglomeration of these paramāņus. Though the paramāņus are not perceptible, the combination of these paramāņus, technically named as punja, can become the object of perception. The question is asked: How do these paramāņus which are momentary in character, combine themselves into an aggregate entity? The Vaibhāṣika does not admit any causal factors of enduring nature which can bring them together. There is also no valid pramana to prove the existence of the aggregates of paramanus. According to Vaibhāṣika, the nirvikalpaka pratyakṣa which is the first stage of perception reveals the indeterminate and momentary character of the paramānus and these paramānus established in nirvikalpaka become the object of perception (savikalpaka) as aggregates. This view is questioned by Vedanta Desika. What is claimed to

be seen in nirvikalpaka cannot itself serve a pramana for what is seen in the savikalpaka perception. But what is revealed in the stage of savikalpaka does not also exist as an enduring entity and hence it cannot be treated as real.

The Vaibhāṣika also does not admit that vikalpa or what is seen in the stage of savikalpaka pratyaksa is valid. If this is the case, even nirvikalpaka perception cannot be regarded as a valid pramana. On the basis of inference, it is not possible to establish that all savikalpaka pratyakşa is invalid, since the inference adopted for this purpose suffers from logical fallacy. If the knowledge derived from savikalpaka pratyaksa is invalid, then what is taught in the Buddhist treatises which are also of the nature of vikalpa-jñāna, would also become invalid. As in the case of Mādhyamika, Vaibhāṣika also does not believe in any valid pramana to prove his doctrines. In the absence of pramanas, there would be no distinction between the true theory and the false theory. Even if the knowledge of the aggregate is regarded as false and what appears as aggregate is due to the influence of the vāsanās, the external object which is admitted to exist, cannot be considered as perceivable.

The relation of jñāna to jñeya or the object of perception cannot also be established unless it is admitted that the object really exists. If both jñāna and jñeya do not exist at the same time and endure for more than a moment, there cannot be any relation between the two. The jñana which cognizes the object at a particular moment ceases to exist. The Vaibhāṣika argues that the previous momentary jñāna which cognizes the object, transfers the ākāra of the object to the next momentary  $j\tilde{n}\tilde{a}na$ . The next momentary  $j\tilde{n}\tilde{a}na$  grasps what is cognized by an earlier  $j \tilde{n} \tilde{a} n a$ . But this explanation is against the generally accepted theory that jñāna only cognizes what is actually present at the time of cognition.

The Vaibhāṣika along with the Yogācāra and Sautrāntika, upholds the theory that all entities are of momentary character (kṣaṇika). This view is opposed to the theory of pratyabhijñā or recognition of an object which is the same as seen earlier.

The Buddhists adopt the following syllogistic arguments in support of the momentary character of an object. "Whatever exists, that is momentary; just as a series of water particles

(jalandhara) or the continuous flow of the flame of the lamp. In the instance of the flame, we get the idea that it is the same flame that endures, though each moment the flame changes depending on the supply of oil and burning of the wick. In the same way, it should be possible to say that the series of jñāna, though being momentary is one. So also in respect of the objects, which are constantly changing, we get the illusion of it being the same one object. This arguments is untenable because in the case of the flame it is obvious to our experience that it cannot be one and the same since we know that the constant supply of oil causes the burning of the flame continuosly. If all things are momentary and since there is no cognizer to recognize that there is similarity between the earlier event and the latter, there is no scope to say that it is the case of pratyabhijñā or recognition of the earlier and the latter as the same. Similarly, the individual who has earned punya and pāpa cannot be the recipient of the effect of the good or bad deeds. It would then lead to the position that someone else reaps the effects of punya and papa.

It may be said that whatever is done in one series of acts, the fruit of it also becomes applicable to the same series, as in the case of the red colour present in the seed appearing in the cotton grown out of it (kārpāse raktatā yathā). But this argument with the illustration cited does not hold good. What is true in the case of objects which endure for some time does not hold good for things which are constantly changing. Things which are totally destructible without any residue cannot

have continuous endurance.

The Buddhists believe in the theory of niranvaya-vināśa or the total destruction without any residue. In support of this, they cite the example of the flame of the lamp, which when extinguished, does not leave any residue. But this kind of destruction does not apply to objects such as pot. A pot when destroyed does not totally disappear. It exists in some other form as broken pieces of pot. This is called sānvaya-vināśa, as contrasted to niranvaya-vināśa. On the basis of this, it is more appropriate to accept sānvaya-vināśa even in respect of the flame of a lamp. When the flame gradually diminishes and is extinguished, the rays radiating from it spread widely and they gradually become invisible.

The following syllogistic argument is advanced in support of this theory. Destruction does not need a cause because it inevitably takes place (dhvamsah hetu-nirapekṣaḥ; dhruva bhāvitvāt).

This syllogism, according to Vedanta Deśika, suffers from logical fallacies. The hetu "dhruva bhāvitvāt," when subjected to logical analysis, is found to be faulty. 10 The sādhya or probandum (hetu-nirapeksa) is not admitted by the critic. It should be acceptable to both the disputants but Visistadvaitin does not admit niranvaya-vināśa. For him, the objects, even after destruction, continue to exist in some other form. As already pointed out, even in the case of the disappearance of the lamp-flame, the subtle elements of light dwindle and spread themselves all over and become invisible. Even if it is considered that in this one instance there is total destruction, it is not possible to assert on the basis of this one example that all physical objects undergo similar destruction, as it is not warranted by our experience.

In order to escape all the criticisms against momentariness (sarva-kṣaṇikavāda), a small section of the Vaibhāṣikas, as stated by Vedānta Deśika, holds the theory that there is one tattva which is real. In support of it, he quotes the following statement mentioned in Pāli language, which is claimed to have been taught by the Buddha himself: "atyihi bhikko akadayam, jahanatthi edassya jantuno sattam; mānasa sunnāvatthā nam sampajjayi." It means: "It is acceptable to the mendicant Buddha that it is desirable to accept one real entity; otherwise if an entity perishes every moment, there would be liberation for

ātman every moment."

The source of this quotation cited by Vedanta Desika is not given. It is claimed to have been said by some disciples of Buddha as taught to them. Whatever may be the credibility of this view, it would not conform to the main teachings of Buddhism. If this is admitted, then the central doctrines of Buddhism such as everything is kṣaṇika and vikalpa or what is cognized in the savikalpaka-pratyaksa is false, etc. cannot be defended. Even if it is accepted as a possible view held by the Buddha, it is not possible on the basis of it, to defend the

ksanikavāda.

The following syllogistic argument is adopted to prove it. "The things in the universe are momentary because they exist for a moment, as for example the absolute instant (kṣaṇa). (idam vigītam jagad kṣaṇikam, meyatvāt or sattvāt, kṣaṇopādhivat).

The syllogism suffers from logical fallacies. <sup>11</sup> What is sought to be proved stands negated by perceptual experience. The absolute instant (kṣaṇa) which is cited as an illustration, is non-existent. It is not accepted as strictly momentary by the Viśiṣṭādvaitin. The word kṣaṇa means for Viśiṣṭādvaitin, the conglomeration of various causal factors which have been operative in producing the effect (kārya-śūnya sāmagrīkṣaṇaḥ). Thus the word kṣaṇa is applicable even to what is permanent. It is not therefore possible to prove by any means that everything is momentary. Vedānta Deśika therefore concludes that it is necessary to admit that all entities are essentially of permanent character (svarūpataḥ nitya) and that only the modifications they assume are of varying nature.

#### REFERENCES

- 1. These four schools are divided into two classes as Hīnāyāna who are realistic and Mahāyāna who are idealistic. Vibhāṣa is the commentary on the Abhidhamma books and those who accept it as authority are called Vaibhāṣikas. The Sautrāntikas are those who believe that Buddha taught Abhidhamma doctrines only in certain sūtras and recognized the authority of these sūtras. Yogācāra is so designated since the followers of this school practiced yoga as part of the religious discipline. The Mādhyamikas are those who are stated to have followed the middle course (madhyamamārga).
- 2. PMB. See commentary on Mādhyamika-bhangādhikāra, p.87.
- 3. VS, II.2.30.
- 4. Ibid., II.2.27.
- 5. Ibid., II.2.28.
- 6. Ibid., II.2.29.
- 7. Ibid., II.2.23.
- 8. Ibid., II.2.28.
- 9. Ibid., II.2.25.
- 10. See TMK, I.20; also see FVV, chap. 6, pp. 68-69.
- 11. Ibid., I.36; ibid, p. 7.

## Jainism

Jainism is the next important non-Vedic school which comes up for critical examination since the philosophical doctrines as well as the religious practices advocated by it are opposed to the Vedānta philosophy established on the basis of the Upaniṣads and the Vedāntasūtra. Some of their theories and, in particular, the saptabhaṅgivāda or the doctrine of sevenfold description of all entities, are also logically untenable. All the later schools such as Nyāya, Vaiśeṣika, Mīmāmsā, and Advaita have also criticized the Jaina philosophy.

Vedānta Deśika, at the outset, explains how such an unsound philosophy gained popularity and survived over centuries as a living religion. Like Buddhism, the Jainas do not accept the Vedas as a source of authority but they claim that a person named Arhan who founded Jainism was a sarvajña or an omniscient being and whatever was taught by him, as in the case of the Buddha, is to be taken as authoritative. Unlike the Buddha, he categorizes the ultimate ontological entities in a different manner. So also the religious observances. He rejects the Buddhist doctrine of momentaryness but adopts the doctrine of sevenfold description of the nature of all objects and thereby creates the impression that the teachings of Arhan are sounder than that of Buddha.

Vedānta Deśika further points out that in order to impress on the people that he is omniscient, he presents the knowledge of the movement of the planets, stars, and other astrological details which are not normally understood by others. Unlike in Buddhism, he does not deny the existence of external objects. Besides, the remedial measures suggested by Arhan and his followers to ward off evils through the recitation of certain mantras are found to be very efficacious. The followers of this religion are thus made to believe that Arhan is an omniscient being and hence all his philosophical teachings should also be accepted as authoritative. He himself claimed that he is a sarvajña so that the followers of his religion should accept his teachings without questioning them. Since he lays great emphasis on satya or truthfulness and vairāgya or non-attachment of worldly objects as the ethical ideals, people are made to believe that Arhan is free from raga or passion and dvesa or hatred towards others and that his teachings are therefore most authoritative. The doctrines advocated by him are also claimed to be in conformity with our experience and logical principles. Hence the philosophy of the Jainas is claimed to be useful for people who aspire for worldly prosperity and also the attainment of a higher spiritual goal.

The first criticism levelled against Jainism is that the denial of authority to the Vedas is not appropriate because these contain eternal truths and also are not ascribed to any human author and as such they are free from defects. These points are brought out in detail in the Samudāya-dosādhikāra.¹ By departing from the fundamental concepts outlined in the Vedas, the Jainas adopt their own novel categories such as jīva, ajīva, āsrava, bandha, and ārjava which are named as pañca-āstikāyas. Even the religious way of life in the name of tapas advocated by them does not have any practical value but, on the contrary, some of their religious practices involve the torture of the physical body.

The astrological teachings advanced by them do not have new features other than what are already enunciated in the ancient Indian Astrology. There are five branches of ancient Indian Astrology and of these the Jainas have attempted to develop one branch in greater detail and claim to have promulgated new science of planetary movements.

The claim made that the mantras formulated by the combination of certain syllables and letters and that these are efficacious to yield amazingly good results is intended to attract laymen and create in them a faith that Arhan is omniscient.

Vedānta Dešika points out that similar claims are also made by some Buddhists and, on that basis, the Buddha is also regarded as sarvajña. If the Buddha is sarvajña, how can the Jainas claim that only Arhan is sarvajña? If both are sarvajñas, then the doctrines of these two schools should not be radically different. If either of them is a sarvajña, then how to disprove the claim of the other? If Arhan is claimed to be a sarvajña because he advocated the vairāgya and ahimsā dharma, then the same was also taught by the Buddha. In fact ahimsā dharma advocated by the Buddha is a better type since Buddhist monks do not practise the torture of one's body in the name of tapas or penance like Jaina monks do by plucking each hair of the head by hand instead of shaving the head with a razor.<sup>2</sup>

In the guise of the upholders of the theory of compassion (kāruņikatva), the Jainas regard the killing of an animal for the purpose of yaga or fire sacrifice as prescribed in the Vedas, as adharma and hence Vedas are not supposed to be accepted as authoritative. Then how do they justify the torture of the body by plucking the hairs of the head by hand and defeating the opponents by adopting wrong arguments in debates and thereby wounding the feelings of the rivals (paravādī)? If such acts are treated as acts of dharma, how would they be justified to regard the killing of an animal for a specific fire sacrifice, the destruction of enemies in the war for the sake of defence of one's country, and the commitment of suicides by jumping into rivers or jumping from the top of a hill on specific occasions, as adharma? In fact it is established in the Sacred texts that the killing of an animal for the purpose of sacrifice is for the special benefit of that animal and hence it does not amount to cruelty, just as the surgery performed on an individual is for the benefit of his good health. The punishment caused to individuals who have indulged in theft or murder is not therefore prohibited.

4

Vedānta Deśika advances a few other arguments in defence of certain rituals prescribed by the Vedas for the purpose of killing an enemy. In all these cases it is contended that these are laid down in certain special circumstances and hence they should not be taken as cases intended for causing injury.

The most important criticism against Jainism is directed towards the enumeration of the tattvas or the metaphysical concepts in a wrong way. According to the Jainas there are only two categories of tattvas, viz., dravyas or substances and paryāyas or its modifications or modes (avasthās) which are the same as guṇas or attributes. Other than these two, there are no other tattvas. This is not a correct theory since there are eternal substances such as Īśvara, jīva, etc. Such eternal substances possess dharmas which are also eternal and these are not subject to changes. All these are established by valid pramāṇas. This objection cannot be overcome by merely classifying the guṇas into two types, viz., those which exist as part of the substance and those which are accidental (āgantuka). The exclusion of Īśvara among the eternal dravyas stands opposed to Scriptural texts which are nitya and free from defects.

The Jainas have admitted six dravyas. These are: (1)  $j\bar{\imath}va$  or the individual self; (2) pudgala or matter; (3) dharma or the principle of motion; (4) adharma or the principle of rest; (5)  $k\bar{a}la$  or time; and (6)  $\bar{a}k\bar{a}sa$  or ether. Each one of these tattvas is defective.

Regarding the doctrine of jīva, the Jainas conceive it as of the size of the body it occupies. Vedānta Deśika points out that this is the most unsound theory of jīva. One of the reasons advanced by the Jainas for maintaining such a theory is that whenever a person is injured in the leg, he feels the pain in the head. In order to explain such an experience, it is not necessary to conceive that jīva is pervasive of the entire body, contends Vedānta Deśika. Such a phenomenon can be explained even by accepting jīva as monadic in size (anu) because experience of pain and pleasure takes place through jñāna of jīva which is all-pervasive. That jīva assumes the size of the body it enters into, would amount to the admission of different dimensions for the jīva. But this theory is directly opposed to the Scriptural texts which affirm that jīva is anu and nirvikāra or devoid of modification. Further, when the jīvas attain the state of mukti after liberation, they are devoid of bodies and there is no criteria to determine what kind of body the jīva assumes in that state.

According to the Jainas, jīvas, after liberation from bondage, keep moving upward continuously (nityordhva-gamana). They also believe that certain jīvas move upward and enter a transcendental realm called alokākāśa. In either theory the mukta jīva cannot be regarded as having a dimension. That they can assume a body of a particular size is not philosophically a sound theory.

Regarding dharma and adharma, these two concepts are understood in Jainism in a different way. They denote the principle of motion and rest respectively. They are regarded as jagad-vyāpi or pervasive in the entire universe. The question is asked: Whether they are by their very nature (svarūpeṇa) pervasive or by being subtle in nature (anu) but inherent in all things and in all places similar to the oil in the oil seeds. In either case, dharma and adharma being eternal (nitya), they cannot be regarded as either objects to be acquired by human effort or as common features of all individuals. It can be said that specific modifications or qualities of dharma and adharma are to be acquired by concerned individuals. But in that case dharma and adharma are to be restricted to the concerned individuals and they cannot be universal qualities. Then it would follow that dharma and adharma are nothing other than the observance of prescribed acts and abstaining from the prohibited acts and that these are to be secured by the grace of the concerned deities who are the bestowers of the benefits. If this theory is accepted, then the theory advocated by the Jainas that specific pudgalas (conglomerations of several atoms) constitute the punya and pāpa, is not tenable.

Regarding pudgala, the postulation of this concept as a separate dravya is also untenable, contends Vedānta Dešika. The term pudgala, according to the Jainas, means the conglomeration of several atoms to constitute a sizeable whole (comparable to the prakṛti of the Sāṅkhyas) which, consisting of the qualities of śabda, sparśa, rūpa, rasa, and gandha, undergoes modifications into five elements, viz., pṛthivī, ap, vāyu, agni, and ākāśa each possessing certain specific guṇas. The existence of such a dravya and also its modification into elements cannot be proved by perception. It cannot be taken as postulate conceived for the purpose of explaining the modification of

pudgala into elements. If it be a mere postulate for providing certain explanation of evolution into, it is not possible to account for an orderly evolution. *Prakṛti* is accepted by the Vedāntins to explain an orderly evolution on the strength of the Upaniṣadic teachings. It is not so for the Jainas.

Kāla or time which is the fifth dravya, is acknowledged by the Jainas as a separate dravya. This theory is also defective. Kāla as a substance is generally admitted in order to explain that an object existed in the past, or it exists at present or it will come into existence in the future. If according to the Iainas  $k\bar{a}la$  is monadic in nature  $(anu-svar\bar{u}pa)$ , it is to be conceived either as of shortest duration or as all-pervasive (sarva-vyāpi) like the ākāśa and also subtle. Only in that case it is possible to determine the existence of an object in terms of  $k\bar{a}la$ . It may be possible to do so by means of anus admitted by them or through their modifications. Then there would be no need to admit kāla as a separate dravya. If orthodox Vedic schools accept kāla, they do so on the authority of the Vedas and other allied treatises and hence its acceptance as a dravya is fully justified. The Digambara sects of Jainas seek the authority of their Agamas in support of the concept of time. Even then it cannot be proved that it is a separate tattva.

Ākāśa is the sixth dravya admitted by the Jainas. It is regarded by them as nitya, spatially infinite (ananta pradeśa) and also all-pervasive (sarva-vyāpi). But this view is opposed to the Scriptural texts which speak of the origin for ākāśa like other physical elements. The Jainas seek to establish it on the basis of inference and other logical arguments. The anumāna adopted for the purpose suffers from logical defects.

### DOCTRINE OF SAPTABHANGI

Coming to the central doctrine of Jainism, viz., the doctrine of Saptabhangī or the indeterminable character of the nature of all the six dravyas and also their modifications, Vedānta Dešika rejects it as the most unsound theory which is riddled with contradictions. On the basis of the concept of Bhedābheda or difference cum non-difference, the Jainas formulate seven alternatives with regard to the nature of an object. These are: (1) syādasti (maybe, it exists); (2) syād nāsti (maybe, it

does not exist); (3) syād asti ca nāsti ca (maybe it exists and it does not exit); (4) syād-avyaktavyam (may be it is indescribable); (5) syādasti ca avyaktavyam (maybe that it exists and it is indescribable); (6) syād nāsti ca avyaktavyam (maybe, that it does not exist and it is indescribable); and (7) syād asti ca nāsti ca avyaktavyam (maybe, that it exists and does not exist and is indescribable).

Vedānta Deśika points out that the first five alternatives are somewhat similar to the five alternatives advanced by the Mādhyamikas and on that basis they conclude that the nature of an object is tuccha or absolutely indescribable. By the permutation and combination of the five alternatives of Mādhyamika the Jainas add up two more alternatives and come to the conclusion that it is impossible to describe the nature of an object in any specific manner. Even though the Jainas do not use the word tuccha or non-existence as the nature of an object, it ultimately ends up in the theory of tuccha since the nature of an object cannot be specifically stated. It is possible to evolve more than seven alternatives by adding up a few more by the permutation and combination of asti, nāsti, asti-nāsti, etc. The major defect of the presentation of the theory of the Saptabhangi which is applicable to all entities and also their qualities (paryāyas) is that it is not possible to develop a sound positive theory regarding the nature of an object. Further, there would be no scope to make a distinction between one's own theory (svapaksa) and the theory of an opponent. Nor can the Jainas defend their own theory (sadhana) and refute the theory of an opponent (dūṣaṇa). It is possible to reconcile the opposition between existence and non-existence of an object with reference to different times and different places (kālādi-upādhibheda) as other schools do. Then it cannot be claimed that anekantavada is the unique theory of the Jainas.

The adherence to the theory that everything in the universe is of manifold nature would end up in complete chaos in the classification of the *tattvas* and so also the observance of the religious practices in a prescribed order. The statement that the entire universe is of the nature of the multiform (*anekānta*) as in the case of divine beings such as Vināyaka (the deity with the combination of a human body and the trunk of an

elephant) and Narasimha (one of the incarnations of Vișnu with human body and the head of a lion) do not serve the purpose of proving the anekānta theory. 4 The combination of two forms to constitute one being does not involve any contradiction as in the case of the combination of rice grains with grains of barley (yava). Anekānta concept in such a sense. viz., having different forms which are not contradictory is acceptable to Visistadvaitins also. It cannot be argued that all things are of manifold nature, because they exist, as in the case of para and apara jāti (sarvam anekāntam, satvāt, parāpara jātyādivat). This inferential argument does not support the Jaina thesis that all things are of manifold nature. One and the same object can be regarded as big or small when compared or contrasted to another object of a different nature. For example the prthivi (the element of earth) is large (para) as compared to pot, and the same pṛthivī is smaller when compared to the substance (dravya). Same is the case with regard to the objects such as human beings as father and son, older and younger, etc. But this is not the case with regard to the Jaina's view of an object possessing different nature since he does not speak of its different nature with reference to what is contrary to it (pratiyogibheda-nirvāha).

If it is argued that Saptabhangi is confined to the concepts of amsi or the whole and amsa or its parts, as well as dravyas and paryayas or the guṇas which inhere in dravyas, the question is raised whether this difference between amsa and amsī is due to their own nature or due to the limiting conditions (sopādhika). The answers provided contradict his own accepted doctrine. If all entities (dravya) by nature possess parts (svābhāvika amsa), then he will have to admit parts even in respect of anus. But there would be no separate anu to determine the difference between the astikāyas or that which exists and has parts (kāya). The jīvas which are similar to other pudgala dravyas would become a whole unit comprising internal parts. Such a theory would be as ridiculous as the theory of jīva held by Cārvākas. If unity or oneness is the svābhāvika-dharma and therefore ātman is one entity, then bheda also being svābhāvika, ātmans would be different in nature. Even ātman, according to anekāntavāda is different and also non-different. In the

95

same way, the other theories of Jainas relating to the avasthās of jīva, the composition of jagat (jagat-samsthāna), the difference in respect of devatās, the offer of worship to them are all riddled with contradictions. Keeping all this in mind, the author of the Vedāntasūtra sums up the criticism in one sūtranaikasmin asambhavāt.<sup>5</sup> It means that the doctrine of the Jainas is not sound, because in the same one entity two mutually opposed dharmas cannot co-exist.

#### REFERENCES

- 1. See PMB, chap.6. See also pp. 52-53.
- 2. The incident cited by Vedanta Desika was perhaps an ancient practice and it is not known whether it is still observed in modern times.
- 3. The classification of tattvas as dravyas and paryāyas is adopted by the ancient Jaina works. But the latter Jaina works classify tattvas under two categories, viz., jīva and ajīva and under ajīva, all the five dravyas other than jīva are included. PMB, chap. 6. See also pp. 156-57.
- 4. Anekānta jagat sarvam heramba-narasimhavat— Jaina-bhangādhikāra quoted by Vedānta Deśika in ibid.
- 5. VS, II.2.31.

# 7

# Vaiśesika School

MONG THE VEDIC SCHOOLS (āstika Daršanas), Vedānta Dešika takes up the Vaiśeṣika school founded by sage Kaṇāda first for consideration, though chronologically it came into existence later than Sānkhya and Yoga. The reason for this, as explained by Vedanta Desika is that some of the doctrines developed by Kaṇāda such as the denial of apauruṣeyatva for the Vedas, non-acceptance of primordial cosmic matter (prakrti), admission of asatkāryavāda, the acceptance of avayavī as distinct from the aggregate of avayavas, and the postulation of additional metaphysical categories, etc., are somewhat on the lines of the theories of the non-Vedic schools such as the Carvaka (Guru-mata), Buddhist (Sugata-mata), and the Jainas (Jinamata). This observation made by Vedanta Desika, which reflects the criticisms offered against the Vaisesikas is supported by Aty-smṛti which states: kaṇāda-śākya-pāṣaṇḍaih-trayīdharmo-vilopitah; tridandadhāriņo pūrvam visņunā raksitā travī. It means: "The Vedic dharma was spoiled (adversely affected) by Kaṇāda (Vaiśeșika), Śākya (Buddhists), and Pāsandis (Pāśupatas); Vișnu taking the avatāra of Dattātreya holding the tridanda, restored it." Prima facie this may sound as a strong criticism against Kaṇāda, because at the very commencement of the Vaiseșika-sūtras he declares that he would present an exposition of dharma which is the means to attain the Spiritual Goal.1 But actually he deviates from his declared premise and devotes all his attention to the discussion of the six metaphysical categories, viz., dravya, guna, karma, sāmānya, višeṣa, and samavāya.2 Though incidentally he briefly discusses a few points about dharma, the Kaṇāda-sūtras mainly deal with the nature of the six categories (sat-padārthas). Hence the following remark is made jokingly by others about Kaṇāda-mata: Dharmam vyākhyātu-kāmasya sat-padārthopavarṇanam; sāgaram gantu-kāmasya himavat-gamanopamam—"One who is desirous of expounding dharma, presents the details of six padārthas; this is similar to an individual who wishes to go to the ocean, proceeds towards the Himalayas."

After making these general observations about the Vaiseșika school, Vedānta Desika proceeds to examine critically the main theories of Vaiseșikas—the metaphysical categories including the concept of abhāva, the doctrine of jīva and the doctrine of *Īśvara*. He first takes up abhāva or non-existence.

#### THE CONCEPT OF ABHĀVA

The Vaiśeṣikas admit abhāva or non-existence as a separate category as different from bhāva or existence (bhāva atirikta abhāva). This is not a sound theory, contends Vedānta Deśika, for the following reasons. In the first place, it is not possible to comprehend it as an entity by perception, just as we see clearly the existence of an object. The existence of an object in a particular place or at a particular time is bhāva, which is a positive concept. Similarly, the absence or non-existence of an object in a particular place or time can be regarded as abhāva. That is, a different state of bhāva itself is abhāva. It is also a positive concept. Other than that, it is not necessary to admit abhāva as a separate category, bhāvāntara-abhāva.

The Vaiśeṣikas conceive four types of abhāva: (a) prāgbhāva or prior non-existence of an object, a state prior to the production of an object such as a pot; (b) pradhvamsābhāva or prior posterial non-existence or a state after the destruction of an object; (c) atyantābhāva or absolute non-existence, that is, total negation as for instance bare ground with no jar on it; and (d) anyonyābhāva or mutual non-existence, that is, difference between two objects, as for example, jar is not cloth. In case of prāgbhāva and pradhvamsābhāva the Vaiśeṣika themselves of prāgbhāva and pradhvamsābhāva the Vaiśeṣika themselves admit that these are bhāva-rūpa or positive concepts. In the same way, abhāva can also be regarded as a different state of bhāva (bhāvāntara) and not a separate category (padārtha). bhāva (bhāvāntara) and not a separate category (padārtha)

at some other time or in some other form. Abhāva is thus a determining characteristic of an object with reference to time, space, and condition.<sup>3</sup>

#### THE CONCEPT OF SAMAVĀYA

The Vaisesikas have admitted the concept of samavāya as a separate category (padārtha) to explain the relation of inherence that obtains between two separate entities which are invariably connected (ayuta-siddha). The ayuta-siddha entities are avayava (parts) and avayavī (whole), guņa (attribute) and guņī (substance), kriyā (activity) and that which causes it, jāti (generic character) and vyakti (object), and lastly, viśesa (a special quality) that subsists in eternal substances (nitya-dravyas) such as paramānus, souls, etc. Such a relation is regarded nitya or eternal and one (eka), that is, it is a common feature of all inseparable entities. Samavāya conceived as a relation of inherence (sambandha) relates the two relata (sambandhī). It does not require another relation to relate it with the two relata. If another principle is needed to relate the samavāya with the relata, it would lead to infinite regress. It is therefore regarded as svapara-nirvāhaka or capable of relating itself to relatives without requiring another principle to relate it to the relata. This is similar to the illustration of light which reveals the objects but the light itself does not require another light to reveal it.

This theory is subjected to severe criticism. When two entities such as substance and its attributes are inseparably related, there is no need to conceive a separate concept of relation such as samavāya and in order to avoid the fallacy of infinite regress, to ascribe to it the capacity of relating itself to the relata without any third factor. In other words, the postulation of the concept of samavāya as a separate relation other than the two relata which are already connected by their very nature, is superfluous. When it is well-known that the two ayuta-siddha entities are already connected together invariably, there is no need to adopt a third category in the name of samavāya to account for their relation. The Višiṣṭādvaitin therefore uses the expression apṛthak-siddha which implies that the two entities are inseparably related as in the case of lotus and its blueness.

When such an entity can give rise to the awareness that it is related (visista pratyaya-viṣayatvam), there is no need to postulate a separate concept of samavāya to account for their relationship. If samavāya as a separate concept of sambandha is admitted to explain the relationship between two invariably connected relatives, the fallacy of infinite regress is unavoidable. The principle of explanation adopted as svaparanirvāhaka is an additional superfluous postulate.

The admission of samavāya as nitya and eka also leads to problems. If it is nitya, then the relata with which it is connected would also have to be nitya. But it is not so in respect of dravya and its gunas where the relation of inherence exists, since the gunas are impermanent by nature. Gunas come into existence only after the dravya is produced. Only when substance and its attribute come into existence, samavāya relation is to be conceived and as such it has an origin (janma) and it cannot be regarded as nitya. If it is argued that the nature of the relation is determined after knowing the nature of visesana or attribute and viścsya or that in which it inheres, then there would be no need to conceive samavāya as the relation that exists between the relata. The viśesana and viśesya by their very nature can also reveal that they are related together, because samavāya as relation, cannot itself determine what is ādhāra (supporter) and what is adheya (that which is supported).

## THE CONCEPT OF VISESA

The Vaiśeṣikas admit a separate category named viśeṣa or individually as a special quality that subsists in eternal objects in order to distinguish one eternal object from another ( $vy\bar{a}vrtti-pratipatti$ ). It is the differences of ultimate objects which are otherwise alike. The ultimate objects which are supposed to possess the quality of viśeṣa are atoms (paramānus), souls ( $\bar{a}tmans$ ), time ( $k\bar{a}la$ ), space (dik), ether ( $\bar{a}k\bar{a}\acute{s}a$ ), and mind (manas).

Vedānta Deśika criticizes this theory. The viśeṣa is not separate quality subsisting objects. The very objects themselves serve the purpose of distinguishing one from the other and it is not therefore necessary to postulate a separate concept for this purpose. It should be possible to distinguish the objects

on the basis of temporal as well as spatial factors or with reference to the distinguishing characteristics they possess.

Taking the case of the muktātmās or the liberated jīvas which are omniscient, they are all alike insofar they all enjoy equally the bhoga or bliss of Brahman (atyanta-sāmya). Nevertheless, it is possible to distinguish between them on the basis of the functions they perform in the state of mukti (vyāpāra-bheda). This is determined on the authority of the Sacred texts. Their individuality could also be established on the basis of the types of karma with which they were associated prior to liberation (pūrvopādhi). It may be asked as to how we come to know this. The answer is, as explained by Vedānta Deśika, that the yogis or those who possess supernormal perception could apprehend such distinctions.<sup>5</sup>

The above explanation is in accordance with the theory muktātmā accepted by Viśiṣṭādvaita Vedānta. According to the Vaiśeṣikas, muktātmā is totally devoid of all experience similar to a piece of stone (pāṣāṇa-kalpa). There is no other basis to distinguish between one liberated jīva and another. Hence it would be necessary to admit viśeṣa as a special quality inherent

in each jīva.

Against this argument Vedānta Dešika points out that such a theory advanced by the Vaišesikas on the basis of anumāna is untenable since it is opposed to the Scriptural texts which affirm that jūāna as a dharma of jīva is nitya and exists even in the state of mokṣa.<sup>6</sup>

The Vaisesikas have felt the need to admit the visesa as a separate quality in order to account for the distinction between the paramāņus which are the cause of the universe. According to Visistādvaita Vedānta, Brahman as associated with cit and acit in their subtle form, is the cause of the universe. The paramāņus cannot serve as the cause of the universe, since the combination of partless subtle paramāņus is inconceivable. The need of postulating visesa as a special quality of paramāņus does not therefore arise. Nor is it justified.

The Vaiśeṣikas have admitted anyonyābhāva as a separate concept which stands for mutual difference between two objects and hence there is no need to postulate viśeṣa as a quality. If it is argued that anyonyābhāva between two objects of the same

kind (samāna-rūpa) cannot serve the purpose of distinguishing one from the other, it is replied that the concept of pṛthaktva or separateness accepted by them as a separate quality can serve the purpose of knowing the difference between two objects of the same nature.

#### THE CONCEPT OF SAMANYA

Sāmānya is another independent category admitted by the Vaisesika. It refers to the feature or property common to two or more things. Thus when we see several cows, we get the notion that they are all the same. This characteristic common to all (anugata-dharma), is called samanya. The same is also known as jāti or generic character. Gotva or cowness which is a feature common to all cows is the jāti, also known as sāmānya. It exists in the three types of padārthas, viz., dravya, guna, and karma. Thought it exists in all the three, it is an independent category (padārtha). It is one, eternal, of and subsists in many. There are gradations of sāmānya. Sattā or existence is the highest universal (para jāti) since it belongs to the largest number of entities. The others which are known as apara-jāti, follow it in a descending order as dravyatva (as substance), prthivitva (as element of earth), and ghatatva (as a pot) each one covering lesser number of entities.

Vedānta Deśika criticizes this theory. Though the concept of jāti, which is the same as sāmānya, is acceptable to the Viśiṣṭādvaitin, it is not regarded as an independent category (padārtha) as one and ubiquitous. According to Viśiṣṭādvaita, jāti is the asādhāraṇa-dharma or the unique characteristic of an object. It is the specific structure of the object (samsthāna-višeṣa), as for example, the dewlap in the case of the cow. Apart from this there is no separate entity as jāti, as Vaišeṣikas believe.

The admission of  $j\bar{a}ti$  as a separate dharma than the structure of the object leads to certain difficulties. According to the Vaiśeṣikas, the physical structure of the object  $(\bar{a}krti)$  is the revealer (abhivyanjaka) of  $j\bar{a}ti$ .  $\bar{A}krti$  itself is a common character found in all kinds of materials and as such it would constitute  $j\bar{a}ti$ . Then the question arises whether there is something which would reveal this  $j\bar{a}ti$  in the form of  $\bar{a}krti$ . If the reply is

in the affirmative, it would lead to the fallacy of infinite regress. To overcome this difficulty if it is said that  $\bar{a}krti$  does not require another  $\bar{a}krti$  to reveal it but on the contrary it reveals itself as well as the  $j\bar{a}ti$ , then why accept  $j\bar{a}ti$  as a separate dharma in order to account for similarity  $(s\bar{a}dr\dot{s}ya)$ ? It may be argues that the principal structure of the subject  $(\bar{a}krti)$  being different from each other cannot constitute a common character of all objects as  $j\bar{a}ti$  but nevertheless it can serve the purpose of revealing the  $j\bar{a}ti$ . It that be the case, it would follow that the special structure of the object (which is the very  $\bar{a}krti$ ) can give rise to the notion of similarity and as such there would be need to admit  $s\bar{a}m\bar{a}nya$  as a separate dharma. In other words, the very structure of the object which is common to all objects can cause the anugata-vyavahāra or the notion of generality and it is not therefore necessary to conceive a separate entity such as  $s\bar{a}m\bar{a}nya$ .

### THE CONCEPT OF KARMA

Karma or action in the form of movement is regarded by the Vaisesikas as a separate category (padārtha). According to this school there are five kinds of movement: (1) upward movement (utkṣepaṇa), (2) downward movement (apakṣepaṇa), (3) contraction (ākuñcana), (4) expansion (prasaraṇa), and (5) movement in general such as going forward or backward (gamana). All kinds of movement (karma) belong to dravya (substance) and cause the things to move. Their relation to the dravya is similar to that of guṇas to the guṇī. Though karma is not perceptible, it is proved by means of inference.

This theory is refuted as unsound. According to Vedānta Deśika, karma is that which causes in us the awareness that the object is moving. In other words it is movement itself (calana). While he agrees with the Vaiśeṣika with regard to the general nature of karma, he questions the soundness of its classification into five kinds. There is no justification criterion on the basis of which such a classification could be maintained. Whatever is the cause of the karma as conceived by the Vaiśeṣika, the same may be acceptable to explain the movement of an object from one place to another. The assumption of an additional factor as karma besides the movement of an object from one place to another is superfluous.

### THE THEORY OF GUNAS

The Vaisesikas have enumerated twenty-four guṇas or attributes. These are rūpa (colour), rasa (taste), gandha (odour), sparša (touch), sankhyā (number), parimāna (dimension), prthaktva (separateness), samyoga (conjunction), vibhāga (disjunction), para (prior), apara (posteriority), buddhi (jñāna), sukha (pleasure), duḥkha (pain), icchā (desire), dveṣa (hatred), and prayatna (effort). These seventeen gunas are mentioned by Kanāda in the sūtra. To these are added the following eight guņas by Praśastapāda, the commentator on the sūtras: gurutva (heaviness), dravatva (liquidity), sneha (lubricity), samskāra (latent impression), adrsta (unseen potency), dharma and adharma (merit and demerit). Each one of this is examined in the Tattva-muktākalāpa and proved to be defective.8 The major criticism against the enumeration of twenty-four gunas is the omission of the three fundamental gunas of prakrti, viz., sattva, rajas, and tamas which are established on the basis of Scriptural and Smrti texts. The other criticism is that many of these gunas are superfluous and there is no need or justification to regard them as separate qualities. Regarding buddhi or knowledge it cannot be a guna but it is a substance (dravya) inseparably related to the individual self according to Viśiṣṭādvaita. The five mental qualities, viz., icchā, dveṣa, sukha, duhkha, and prayatna cannot be qualities of the self but are different states of the dharma-bhūta-jñāna or attributive knowledge of the jīvātman. If sukha and duḥkha are regarded as separate qualities of the self, then we have to know what causes sukha and duhkha in an individual. If the causes of such experiences are the very mental disposition of an individual, then it would be sounder to admit that the very mental states or the states of jñāna (according to Viśiṣṭādvaita) are the sukha and duḥkha. It is therefore superfluous to postulate that these are the qualities of the self.

## THE THEORY OF DRAVYA

Coming to the theory of dravya or substance which, according to the Vaisesikas, serves as the basis (āśraya) for the guṇas, is also defective. This is of nine kinds. These are: pṛthivī (earth),

ap (water), tejas (fire), vāyu (air), ākāśa (ether), kāla (time), dik (direction), ātmā (self), and manas (mind). Vedānta Dešika points out that this classification of dravyas in neither rational nor in conformity to the Sacred texts (upapatti śāstra-viruddham). According to the Scriptural and Smṛti texts, the five elements are the evolutes of prakṛti. The first four elements, according to the Vaiśeṣikas are the aggregates of paramānus which are conceived by the Vaiśeṣikas. Ākāśa, the fifth element is regarded as nitya and also vibhu. Manas is also the combination of the paramānus, which are regarded as nitya. Even this view is opposed to the Scriptural texts. The inferential arguments adopted to prove these theories also suffer from logical fallacy.

With regard to the physical elements, the Vaisesikas maintain the view that other than ākāśa, these elements exist in two forms: as avayava or individual parts consisting of the combination of paramānus and also as avayavī or aggregate of the individual parts which are also constituted of atoms. The postulation of avayavī as distinct from avayava is considered necessary by the Vaisesikas because there is difference between cause (kāraṇa) and effect (kārya) on the basis of several factors such as name, number, function, shape and difference in respect of knowledge. 10 This is an unsound theory, contends Vedanta Deśika, as it is opposed to our perceptual experience and also opposed to the Scriptural texts. What is regarded as kārya or effect such as a piece of cloth is not different from the threads which serve as the cause. The effect is a modified state of the cause, like the pot made out of clay. The text of Chāndogya Upaniṣad dealing with the causation of the universe cites the example of the lump of clay and the products made out of it and states: "vācārambhaṇam vikāro nāmadheyam mṛttiketyeva satyam,"11 which implies that the effects such as the clay products, though they bear different names and forms for purposes of empirical transactions, are the same as clay. The illustration of the scroll of palm leaf and an earring made out of it by just rolling it into shape of an earring makes it clear that the cause and effect are the two states (avasthas) of the same substance. 12 Hence it is not correct to hold the theory that avayavī is something distinct from avayava.

In the same way it is wrong to conceive that dik or directions such as east, west, north, south, etc., is one all-pervasive and eternal substance. Such a theory cannot be established by means of inference since the syllogistic argument adopted for the purpose is fallacious. The Scriptural texts do not mention dik as a separate tattva. The  $\bar{a}k\bar{a}\hat{s}a$  or the sky itself with the help of the  $up\bar{a}dhis$  such as the position of the sun can account for the different directional relations such as east and west.

### THE NATURE OF JIVATMAN

Regarding the nature of jīvātman which is different from Īśvara, the Vaisesikas maintain the view that it is jada or non-sentient in the sense that it is not self-luminous. This view is opposed to the well-established theory that ātman is self-luminous. Similarly the theory that *nvātman* is vibhu or all-pervasive is also wrong since the Scriptural texts and the Vedāntasūtra affirm that ātmā is anu. 13 Besides it is opposed to the teaching of the Vedanta which speak of utkranti or exit of the jīva from the body and its movement to the higher realms. What is vibhu cannot have movement. Since it is possible for the jīvātman to experience pleasure and pain in different distant places through the body with which it is associated wherever an individual goes, it is not necessary to ascribe vibhutva to it. It is not necessary for the jīva to be actually present in a distant place for the purpose of enjoying the fortune that may arise there. It can reap the reward wherever it exists through the grace of God who is the bestower of the fruits of good deeds in accordance with the previous punya of an individual.

# THE THEORY OF ĪŚVARA

This also suffers from some defects. The Vaiseṣikas admit for  $\bar{l}$ śvara the possession of the attributes of  $j\bar{n}$ āna or knowledge,  $cik\bar{i}rṣ\bar{a}$  or desire and prayatna or capacity to act or function. Some admit only two attributes, viz.,  $j\bar{n}$ āna and prayatna. These attributes are ever present in Him (nitya). These serve as accessory causes for the operation of the adrṣtaof the individuals. If such a view is accepted, then the unchecked freedom  $(sv\bar{a}tantrya)$  that  $\bar{l}$ śvara enjoys has no significance. In that  $(sv\bar{a}tantrya)$  that  $\bar{l}$ śvara enjoys has no significance in that  $(sv\bar{a}tantrya)$  that  $\bar{l}$ śvara would also be subject to the criticism of possessing limited power and capacity (alpaśaktah).

So far some of the major theories of the Vaiseşika have been criticized. There are other minor matters such as (1) Pākaja-prakriyā or that new qualities arise in the physical objects due to their association with fire, (2) Dvyanukādi-prakriyā, that is, the formation of dvyanuka or the combination of two single atoms, (3) Dvi-pṛthaktvādi-prakriyā, that is, pṛthaktva or separateness as a different category and it is similar to sankhyā or number, (4) Vibhāgaja-vibhāgādi prakriyā, that is, separateness as a quality caused by two entities. These are all untenable as in the case of other theories, when subjected to logical analysis.

Vedānta Deśika thus concludes that the Vaiśesika teachings on tattvas have become a subject of ridicule by others. 14 The author of the Vedāntasūtra has summed up the criticisms in the sūtra: "aparigrahācca atyanta anapekṣā." It is of no value since their teachings are not acceptable to the exponents of the orthodox

schools.

#### REFERENCES

- 1. See Vaišesikasūtra: athāto dharmam vyākhyāsyāmah; yato abhyudaya niśreyasa siddhih sa dharmāh; tadvacanāt āmnayasya prāmānyam.
- 2. The concept of abhāva or non-existence was added to these six as a separate category (padārtha) at a later period.
- 3. See TMK, V.129: daśā-deśa-kālādi-bhedāt yah svabhāvam niyamayati sah abhāvah.
- 4. See Vaiśesikasūtra: nityadravya vrttayo anantāh.
- 5. See TMK, V.125.
- 6. See Br. Up.: Avināśi vā are ayamātmā anucchittidharmah. Also Br. Up., VI.3.30: na vijnātuh vijnāteh viparilopo vidyate.
- 7. See TMK, V.118.
- 8. See FVV. chap. 11, pp. 353-67.
- 9. See Vaišesikasūtra: pṛthivyāpastejovāyurākāśam kālo digātmā mana iti nava dravyāni.
- 10. For details, see FVV, pp. 59-60.
- 11. Ch. Up., VI.1.4.
- 12. See for details, FVV, pp. 59-60.
- 13. See Mund. Up., III.1.9: Eșo anurâtmă celasă veditavyah.
- 14. See above, n.1.

# Nyāya School

AFTER CRITICALLY EXAMINING the Vaisesika Darsana of Kaṇāda, Vedānta Deśika takes up for consideration separately, the Nyāya Darsana founded by sage Akṣapāda also known as Gautama. Though both ancient and modern scholars on Indian Philosophy treat these two schools as one since most of the doctrines developed by them are alike, they are regarded by Vedānta Deśika as two separate schools founded by two separate authors Kaṇāda and Gautama, respectively. Chronologically also, Nyāya Darsana is later then Vaiseṣika Darsana.

Nyāya, unlike the Vaisesika school, enjoys the distinction of being included among the fourteen branches of learning called vidyāsthānas which serve as supplemental treatises for acquiring spiritual knowledge. Thus states the Yājñavalkyasmṛti; Purāna-nyāyamīmāmsā-dharmaśāstrānga-miśritah; vedāh sthānāni vidyāyā dharmasya caturdaśa. Manusmṛti also mentions it in a more explicit way: Angāni vedāh catvāro mīmāmsā nyāyavistarah; purāņam dharma śāstram ca vidyā hyetāh caturdaśa. That is, the four Vedas, its six auxiliaries—Śikṣā, Vyākarana, Chandas, Nirukta, Jyotișa, and Kalpa; Mīmāmsā, Nyāyavistara, Purāņa, and Dharmaśāstra constitute the fourteen vidyāsthānas or the branches of learning which are useful to acquire spiritual knowledge. In view of this, the question arises whether it would be appropriate to criticize the Nyāyaśāstra. If this is refuted then all other branches of learning would also be open to similar criticism.

Further, unlike the exponent of the non-Vedic schools whose teachings are unacceptable since they are not based on valid pramāṇas, Akṣapāda, a reputed sage compiled the Nyāyasūtras

which are commented by no less a sage then Vātsyāyana. It would not therefore be proper to criticize what is taught in the Nyāyasūtras and the learned commentary on it, even though what is said by the later commentators such as Udyotakara and Vācaspati Miśra are overlooked.

In reply to this objection, Vedanta Desika clarifies at the outset that it is not our intention to criticize the Nyāya Darśana which is one of the fourteen vidyāsthānas. Nor do we question the authoritativeness of sage Vātsyāyana's commentary. If there are any statements or teachings of Gautama which appear to be in conflict with Vedic teachings, these could be explained or interpreted wherever possible in such a way as to overcome the apparent conflict. For this purpose we would also adopt the principles of interpretation laid down in the Virodha-adhikara of Purvamimamsa. If there is total opposition, then the teaching is to be ignored. In view of these explanations, Vedānta Deśika adopts for this chapter dealing with Nyāya school, the title "Nyāyavistara-virodha-nistārādhikāra." That is, the chapter devoted to remove the conflicting views found in the Nyāyadarsana of Gautama. He avoids the word bhanga employed in respect of the Vaisesika school to emphasise that Nyāyadarśana as such is acceptable to Viśistādvaita.

There are three ways in which the sūtras of Akṣapāda are to be treated so as to avoid the opposition of his teachings with those of Vedānta. In the first place, an attempt is to be made to interpret all the sūtras of Akṣapāda in such as way as they would conform to the teachings of Vedānta. If some of the sūtras cannot be interpreted to fit with the views of Vedānta, these are to be ignored. If it becomes necessary to interpret some of these sūtras in favour of the theories held by Vaiśeṣikas, as contended by later commentators on Nyāyasūtras, then these have to be rejected totally as unacceptable as in the case of the Vaiśeṣika theories.

Vedānta Dešika points out that it is not true that Gautama follows the teachings of the Vaišeṣikas in all matters, since there is no valid proof in support of it. Thus for instance, the Vaišeṣikasūtra at the very commencement states that the investigation into the metaphysical categories, viz., dravya,

guṇa, karma, sāmānya, viśeṣa, and samavāya are useful (conducive) to attain the higher spiritual goal. This teaching is ignored by Gautama since knowledge of the metaphysical categories is not a direct means to mokṣa.

According to Vedānta Deśika the school founded by the Vaiśeṣikas is different from the school developed by Gautama. The Vaiśeṣika school maintains that Āgama or Scripture is not a separate pramāṇa but it is a part of anumāna, whereas in the Nyāya school, it is recognized as a separate pramāṇa. Similarly for Gautama, vāyu is the object of perception (vāyuḥ pratyakṣa eva), whereas it is not so for the Vaiśeṣika. When it is found that there is difference of opinion in respect of certain theory, what is to done is to re-examine the theory in accordance with the accepted pramāṇas and adopt a modified theory. This is the reason for advancing two differing views by the two commentators such as Nyāyabhūṣaṇakāra and Udayana on the same commentary of Gautama.

In the case of the theories which are developed by some of the exponents of Vedānta on the basis of the theories of Vaiśeṣikas, these have to be re-examined and accepted by eliminating the defects found in them. This is explained on the analogy of accepting a piece of impure gold after testing its purity by melting it in fire and eliminating the alloy mixed in it. The Nyāyaśāstra which is one of the fourteen vidyāsthānas is therefore to be accepted by adopting one of the following methods: If a particular theory of the Nyāya school is found defective, it is to be substituted by a modified theory as in the example of kuśa, a specific type of grass (used for religious observances), if not available, a substitute of it (another brand of grass) is to be accepted (kuśa-kāśāvalambana).

If any of the theories of Gautama are found totally opposed to that of Vedānta, these have to be rejected. Alternatively it would be better to rewrite the *Nyāyaśāstra* to conform to the *Vedāntaśāstra*, as is done by Nāthamuni who is the forerunner of Viśiṣṭādvaita, by writing a separate treatise under the title *Nyāyatattva* (which is not extant). A similar attempt is made by Vedānta Deśika who has contributed an independent treatise named *Nyāyapariśuddhi* in which the Nyāya theories are modified.

Thus the Nyāyaśāstra is to be accepted since it is one of the fourteen vidyāsthānas. In the opinion of Vedānta Deśika this is a better course of action than following the theories of Buddhism and Jainism which are totally unsound.

There are however a few doctrines which are not acceptable to the Vedānta. These are: (1) The paramānus are the source of the universe. (2) Īśvara is only the instrumental cause. (3) Vedas are taught by Īśvara which means they are not apauruṣeya. (4) Mokṣa is the state of existence of jīva totally devoid of experience of sukha or duḥkha similar to a piece of stone (pāṣāṇa-kalpa). All these are totally opposed to Vedānta. Vedānta Deśika points out that even in respect of these doctrines, the followers of Akṣapāda themselves have attempted to present modified views to conform to the Vedānta doctrines. In the same way it would be appropriate to accept the Nyāya Darśana after modifying its theories, wherever necessary, to conform to the Vedānta doctrines. The Nyāyapariśuddhi written by Vedānta Deśika contains the details of how this is accomplished.

#### REFERENCES

1. See Vaišeşikasūtra: Dharma-višeşa-prasūtāt dravya-guņa-karma-sāmānyavišeşa-samavāyānām padārthānām sādharmya vaidharmyābhyām tattvajñāna nisśreyasam.

# Nirīśvaramīmāmsā School

IN THE PARAMATA-BHANGA, this school comes up for consideration lacksquare soon after the review to the Nyāya Darsana. The reason for this is that Mīmāmsā school also, like Nyāya is included among the fourteen vidyāsthānas or the branches of learning useful for the acquisition of spiritual knowledge. The Mīmāmsāśāstra is primarily concerned with the interpretation of the Vedas by making use of the logical principles developed by Nyāya Darśana. According to tradition it constitutes one single śāstra since the scope of its study covers the entire Vedas. It comprises three parts. The first part is named as Karmakanda consisting of twelve adhyāyas which deal with the nature and manner of performing the various rituals. This is generally acknowledged as Pürvamīmāmsā on which Jaimini has formulated the sūtras. The second part is known as Devatākānda consisting of four adhyāyas which deals with the nature and status of celestial deities referred to in the Vedas. It is also called Sankarşanakanda named after its author, Sankarşana. The work is not extant but however there are references made to it in other works. The third part of the Mīmāmsāśāstra is the Brahmasūtra of Bādarāyana consisting of four adhyāyas. The three parts constitute one single treatise, as is evident from the authoritative statement of an ancient commentator on the Vedāntasūtra, Bodhāyana, also known as Vṛttikāra. 1 Vedānta Desika has established this fact with sufficient arguments in the Satadūṣaṇī and Adhikaraṇasārāvaļī.2

Though Mīmāmsā is one śāstra comprising three parts, the Advaita Vedānta of Śańkara has accorded greater importance to the part dealing with Brahman on the basis of the premise

that there is opposition between Karmakanda dealing with rituals, and Brahmakanda dealing with the knowledge of Brahman. The performance of rituals, the propitiation of deities, the grant of boons by them, etc., are therefore considered as imaginary caused by illusion (bhrānti-parikalpita). This view adopted by Sankara is considered as a wrong theory regarding Mīmāmsāśāstra and it is therefore refuted in the chapter dealing with Advaita. 3 On the contrary, another extreme theory is developed by the Pūrvamīmāmsā of Jaimini according to which Karmakānda or the ritualistic part of the Vedas is of greater importance than the Brahmakanda dealing with the study of Brahman covered in the Upanisads. It is this part of the Mīmāmsāsāstra, popularly known as Pūrvamīmāmsā as interpreted by the commentators, in particular by Kumārila Bhatta, that comes up for critical examination. As will be pointed out later the Pūrvamīmāmsā represented by Kumārila which does not accept Īśvara, is regarded as Nirīśvaramīmāmsā. Hence this chapter in Paramata-bhanga is designated as Nirīśvaramīmāmsakanirākarana.

In his critical review of the Mīmāmsā of Jaimini, Vedānta Deśika, as in the case of the Nyāya school, does not criticize openly any of their theories. On the other hand, he adopts a compromising attitude and attempts to reconcile the conflicting theories of Pūrvamīmāmsā with those of Vedānta. Presumably this kind of treatment is adopted for two reasons. First, the Pūrvamīmāmsā of Jaimini is an integral part of Mīmāmsāśāstra as a single treatise dealing with the interpretation of the entire Vedas—both the ritualistic part and the Vedānta part. Secondly, it is acknowledged as one of the fourteen vidyāsthānas.

As well established both by Rāmānuja and Vedānta Deśika, there is no opposition between Pūrvamīmāmsā and the Uttaramīmāmsā (Vedānta). In fact, Pūrvamīmāmsā and in particular, the principles of interpretation laid down by Jaimini are very useful for the study of Vedānta. As Vedānta Deśika points out, there is also no difference of opinion between Jaimini and Bādarāyaṇa. There are several Vedāntasūtras which Jaimini in by name, is quoted as the supporter of the view of Bādarāyaṇa. In fact, according to the Mahābhārata, Jaimini is a disciple of Vyāsa.

113

Against this background, Vedānta Desika selects a few important theories advanced by Jaimini as developed by the commentators and re-examines them dispassionately with a view to comprising Pūrvamīmāmsā with Vedānta. He first takes up the theory of Iśvara or the Supreme Being which is the central doctrine of the Vedanta. Though Jaimini himself does not discuss the theory of Iśvara in the Mīmāmsāsūtras, his commentators raise the question whether or not Iśvara is to be admitted, other than the karma or ritualistic sacrifices which are capable of giving the desired fruits. The following statement which refers to the question of Iśvara, is quoted by Vedānta Deśika: Anumānam nirastam, neśvarah. If it means that the inferential argument (anumana) adopted by the Naiyayika is rejected and not Iśvara as established by the Scriptural texts, then this view of the Mīmāmsaka is acceptable, since it does not stand opposed to the Vedanta theory. If, on the contrary, the statement is devoted to deny the very existence of *Īśvara* and also the celestial deities as well as their functions as recipients of havis (what is offered in the homa), then it could be interpreted to imply the importance of karma as the cause of the benefits to be derived. Such a view can be tolerated since it does not deny Iśvara. If, on the other hand, the denial of existence of Iśvara is their conlusive theory (siddhānta), then the Mīmāmsakas have to be treated on par with Cārvākas who also do not admit İśvara.

Though Jaimini himself does not openly deny the existence of *Īśvara* in his *sūtras*, a few *adhikaraṇas* or topical sections of the *Mīmāṁsāsūtras* such as Śabdādhikaraṇa, Arthavādādhikaraṇa, Devatādhikaraṇa, and Apūrvādhikaraṇa contain statements made by the commentators to interpret the *sūtras*, which do not conform to the views of the Vedāntin. Thus, for instance, in the Śabdādhikaraṇa dealing with the question of *nityatva* or eternal character of the Vedas, the commentators adopt the argument that Vedas are *nitya* because the *varṇas* or letters are also eternal. But this is not acceptable to the Vedāntin. Similarly, in the Arthavādādhikaraṇa dealing with the glorificatory Vedic statements, it is argued that only Vedic statements which enjoin the performance of a *yāga* or some other ritualistic deeds are purportful, whereas the statements which deal with

an existent as in the case of the Upanisadic texts which speak of Brahman, an existent, are not purportful. According to the Mīmāmsakas these texts have to be taken as glorificatory statements (arthavāda) relating to what is enjoined. Vedānta Deśika points out that these views, even though appear to be in conflict with the Vedanta theories, can be interpreted in such a way so as to overcome the apparent conflict.

In the opinion of Vedānta Deśika, Jaimini himself would not have intended to express views as opposed to Vedanta. As pointed out earlier, Jaimini is referred to by Bādarāyana in several sūtras of Vedānta as supporting what is taught by him. This demonstrates that Jaimini admits Brahman as the Supreme Reality (brahma-vişaya-abhyupagama). If on certain minor matters there are some differences of opinion, it can be ignored since the two treatises Pūrva- and Uttara-mīmāmsā constitute one single śāstra (śāstraikatva), as stated by sage Bodhāyana.

The Vedic statements are of three kinds—vidhi or injunctions, mantra or hymns and arthavādas or glorificatory statements. With regard to mantras and arthavadas, if there are conflicting views, these could be ignored and accepted as valid on the basis of the Vedic statements being self-valid (svatah prāmānya),

so far as they are not opposed to our experience.

However, in the Apūrvādhikaraņa, the Mīmāmsakas mention the concept of apūrva or potency as generated by the performance of rituals which is supposed to confer the desired fruits at the appropriate time instead of admitting that the ritualistic deeds themselves have the power to confer the benefits. The postulation of apūrva is unwarranted since it violates the Scriptural texts (śruta hāna) or imagining a media which is not warranted by Śruti (aśruta-kalpanā).

There are a few other wrong theories which are adopted by the Mīmāmsakas following the Jainas and Vaisesikas such as bheda and abheda, avayava and avayavī, the relation of samavāya and the doctrine of paramanus as the cause of the universe. These are open to criticisms as in the case of Jaina and Vaisesika doctrines which are already refuted in the chapters dealing with Jainism, Vaiśesika, and Bhedabhedavada.

To avoid criticisms against these theories, the best course to be adopted is to admit the classification of the metaphysical categories as dravya and adravya as formulated by Viśiṣṭādvaita. They should also accept the ontological theory of Viśiṣṭādvaita viz., that performance of karma or the prescribed ritual is for the pleasure of the Supreme Being who is the Antaryāmin of all beings as taught in the Vedānta. If instead of it, they foolishly stick to the conflicting views of the commentators such as Śabara, Prabhākara, and Kumārila, they would land themselves in a blind alley. The ways and means of reinterpreting the views of the commentators on Jaimini sūtras to overcome the conflicts with Vedānta have been fully explained in the treatise titled Seśvaramīmāmsā contributed by Vedānta Deśika.

#### REFERENCES

- 1. See RB, I.1.1: samhitametat śārīrakam jaiminīyena sodasakasaņena iti śāstraikatva siddhih.
- 2. See SD, vāda 3: ekaśāstra samarthana vāda. Also see, The Philosophy or Viśiṣṭādvaita—A Study based on AS.
- 3. See *PMB*, chap. 11.
- 4. See VS, I.1.2-32; 2.29; 4.18; III.4.40.
- 5. This statement is found in Bhavanātha's Nayaviveka.

## 10

## Sānkhya School

Though among the Vedic orthodox schools Sānkhya is chronologically the earliest, it is taken up for critical examination by Vedānta Dešika soon after Nirīśvaramīmāmsā. The reason for this is that one school of Pūrvamīmāmsā expounded by Prabhākara who accepts the authority of the Vedas and claims to interpret the Vedic texts, denies the importance of *Īśvara*, who is the very essence of all Vedas and also the Lord of the devatās or the celestial deities. In the same way, the founders of Sānkhya school accept the authority of the Vedas but deny altogether, the existence of *Īśvara*, who is the central doctrine of the Vedas, and admit only two ontological principles, viz., prakṛti and puruṣa. This school which is designated as Nirīśvara-Sānkhya is considered as worse than Nirīśvaramīmāmsā and therfore it is refuted.

The central doctrine of Sānkhya is summed up in the following verse of the Sānkhyakārikā:

mūla prakṛtir-avikṛtih mahadādyāḥ prakṛti-vikṛtiḥ sapta; şoḍaṣakaśca; vikārāḥ na prakṛtiḥ na vikṛtiḥ puruṣaḥ.  $^1$ 

The primordial cosmic matter is uncaused and from it evolve seven vikṛtis or the evolutes such as mahat which serve as the causes of sixteen other evolutes; puruṣa or the self is neither caused by any other principle nor does it serve as the cause of anything else.

The evolutes of prakrti referred to here are mahat, buddhi, ahankāra, the eleven indriyas including manas and five tanmātras (subtle elements) as well as the five gross elements (pañcabhūtas), thus making a total of twenty-four principles. Puruṣa

which is distinct from *prakṛṭi* is the twenty-fifth principle. According to the Sāṅkhya, proper knowledge of the *prakṛṭi* and its evolutes in their manifest and unmanifest forms serve as the means to the realization of the Self which is known as *kaivalya*, the Supreme Goal (ātma-kaivalya-sādhana).

Coming to the details of the theory of prakṛti, the Sānkhyas maintain that prakṛti is constituted of three substances or components (dravyas) named sattva, rajas, and tamas, which are eternal and vibhu in character. Sattva stands for whatever is fine and light (lāghava and prakāśa) and it causes happiness (sukha). Rajas represents whatever is active and is the cause of suffering (duḥkha). Tamas is what is heavy (gurutva) and is responsible for ignorance (moha). These are also called guṇas not in the sense of qualities but as components which forge a chain (like a rope) for binding the self. When these guṇas remain in the state of equilibrium (sāmyāvasthā), it is known as prakṛti. When the equilibrium is disturbed prakṛti undergoes evolution.

The admission of three guṇas as substances (dravyas) is defective, contends Vedānta Deśika. First, this view stands opposed to the teaching of the Gītā, which clearly states that these are guṇas or qualities. Prakṛti is generally regarded as one substance characterized by three qualities. But if it is conceived as a tattva containing three components, it becomes four. Besides, if these guṇas are vibhu or omnipresent (sarvagata) at all times, there cannot be any state of equilibrium (sāmyāvasthā) and also the state of disturbance (vaiṣamyāvasthā). In the absence of these two states, creation and dissolution of the universe cannot take place.

### THE THEORY OF CAUSE AND EFFECT

After criticizing the basic theory of Sāṅkhya that prakṛti is constituted of three substances, Vedānta Deśika refutes the Sāṅkhya theory of cause and effect. According to the Sāṅkhyas the effect  $(k\bar{a}rya)$  is already existent in the cause in a latent form. What is potentially existent is made manifest as effect by the causal operation. The main reason for maintaining this view is what does not exist (asat) cannot be produced, as in the example of the oil which cannot be produced from

the sand but only from oil seeds in which it is present. The effect is therefore pre-existent in the cause. Hence this theory of causality is called Satkāryavāda, as against the Asatkāryavāda held by the Naiyāyikas, for whom effect is a new product different from the cause.

This theory is subjected to criticism. Though Viśistādvaita also subscribes to the theory of Satkaryavada in a modified form. Vedanta Deśika does not agree with the Sankhya explanation which is defective. It is not necessary that the effect should be pre-existent in the cause. The effect is a modified state of the causal substance, as in the case of the pot produced from the clay. The appropriate causal factors bring into existence the particular effect even without the effect being present in the cause in a latent form. This is evident to our perceptual experience. What is unmanifest becomes manifest. Other than this explanation, it is wrong to assume that the effect actually exists in the cause in an unmanifest form, as in the solitary instance of the presence of oil in oil seeds. The evolutes mahat, buddhi, ahankara, etc., do not actually exist in prakrti in an unmanifest form as in the case of the turtle whose legs, head etc., when withdrawn by it, exist inside its body covered with the shell. This view is opposed to the teachings of the Upanisads. The Upanisads explain the creation of the element of water from the fire as a modification of the element of fire itself into water (agni avasthe ca salile). When the causal state undergoes modification it assumes the state of kārya or effect. In connection with the causation of the universe by Brahman, the Upanișad cites the illustration of the seed and the huge nyagrodha tree. But this does not apply that the nyagrodha tree exists in a potential form in the seed but on the other hand, it conveys that the seed contains in it a subtle substance which can grow as a tree.

If Satkāryavāda as conceived by the Sānkhyas is accepted, it would involve some difficulty. According to the Sānkhyas the effect is latent in the causal substance and what is latent is only made manifest (abhivyakti) at a particular time by the causal factors. If the causal substance such as prakṛti is nitya, then the manifestation of what is latent should also take place all the time. It is not possible to say that abhivyakti takes place

at a particular point of time. If it is argued that abhivyakti takes place only at a particular time by the causal agents, then it would need another operating agent to make it manifest at that particular time and in that way it would lead to an infinite regress. To avoid this difficulty it may be argued that what is latent is not made manifest for which an operating agent is needed, but it is produced (utpatti). Even then the problem is not overcome because utpatti to take place would need another utpatti and in that way it would lead to an infinite regress. The only solution to overcome these difficulties is to admit as Viśistādvaitins do, that the modification that takes place in respect of the causal substance is the production (utpatti) or abhivyakti of the effect. In other words, the effect is a passing state of the causal substance (agantuka-dharma). The basic substance (the lump of clay) continues to be the same even if it assumes the form of two halves. The pot when broken assumed the form of potsherd. Thus the effect is a modified state of the cause. The cause and effect are two different states of the same substance. It is not necessary as Sānkhyas postulate, that effect is pre-existent in the cause in a potential form.

If the theory of cause and effect is rejected by adopting the dialectial arguments as is done by the Cārvākas and Mādhyamikas, then it would stand opposed to the accepted pramāṇas and involve contradiction of one's own teachings (sarva-pramāṇa-virodha svavacana-virodha).

### THE THEORY OF PARINAMA OF PRAKETI

After criticizing the theory of cause and effect as conceived by the Sāṅkhyas, Vedānta Deśika examines whether prakṛti, a non-sentient can undergo modification (pariṇāma) without the aid or direction of a sentient being (cetana). The Sāṅkhyas who adopt the Pariṇāmavāda, admit this possibility and in support of it cite several instances such as the milk changing itself into curd, water particles becoming hailstones, etc. Not only a non-sentient can undergo modification independently but it can also transform itself into variety of different modifications (visadṛśa pariṇāma) and also modifications of similar nature (sadṛśa pariṇāma). The water poured out of the clouds assumes

different forms such as sweetness, saltishness, sourness, bitterness, etc. when absorbed by coconuts, lemons and other kinds of fruits respectively. Again *prakṛti*, during each evolution in different epochs, evolves itself into the same kind of evolutes (sadṛśa-pariṇāma).

Vedānta Dešika refutes these arguments. In all cases cited by the Sāṅkhyas, there is the role of *Paramātman* who has endowed to all the entities, both sentient and non-sentient, sattā or existance, sthiti or continuance and pravṛtti or the capacity to function, as is evident from the Upaniṣadic teachings. 4

It cannot be said that the mere presence of the sentient being—the self, which is devoid of the sankalpa or the will to control the event, can cause the evolution as in the example of the conversion of the grass consumed by the cow into milk. On the same analogy the presence of the puruṣa by the side of prakṛti without the operation of its will, can make the prakṛti evolve itself into the manifold universe. The grass consumed by the bullock, in which also the intelligent jīva is present, is not converted into milk. If be said that special formation or structure of the physical body of the cow is responsible for the conversion of the grass into milk, then it would amount to the admission of the Cārvāka theory that the special combination of the components of the body itself causes the emergence of caitanya.

The Sāṅkhyas attempt to defend the theory of evolution of prakṛti on the analogy of the movement of the blind person with the help of a lame person. The blind is enabled to move with the help of the lame person who can guide by telling the direction to go. In the same way, with the mere association or presence of the intelligent puruṣa, the prakṛti though it is non-sentient, can evolve itself into the universe.

Even this explanation is unsatisfactory, contends Vedānta Deśika. In the case of the blind and lame persons, the lame person is capable of giving proper directions and the blind person possesses the capacity to listen and act accordingly. But in the case of puruṣa and prakṛṭi of Sāṅkhyas, both do not possess jāāṭṛṭva and karṭṛṭva or the capacity to function. If it be said that mere association of prakṛṭi and puruṣa can

cause evolution, then the two being vibhu or all-pervasive, are associated together all the time (sannidhi-nitya).

The purpose of the evolution of the *prakṛti*, according to the Sāṅkhyas is to cause bondage and liberation for *puruṣa*. But his view stands contradicted by their own admission of *puruṣa* as *nitya-mukta* or ever liberated and *nitya-nirlepa* or untouched by any afflictions at all times.

The Sānkhyas admit prakṛti as a tattva on the basis of inference (anumāna). What is proved only by means of inference without the support of the Scriptural authority can be open to criticisms. To meet these objections, if they seek the support of the Scriptural texts, they could as well admit Īśvara which is well established in the Upaniṣads. If Īśvara is rejected because the concept of Īśvara also suffers from defects then they could as well reject the theory of prakṛti as Vaiśeṣikas have done, by adopting wrong logical arguments.

### THE EVOLUTES OF PRAKETI

Vedānta Deśika criticizes the theory of evolutes and in particular the mahat-tattva as conceived by the Sānkhyas. The mahat-tattva which is the first evolute of prakṛti and which is also named as buddhi-tattva<sup>6</sup> comprises three functions. These are: (1) puruṣoparāga, (2) viṣayoparāga, and (3) vyāpārāveśa. It becomes puruṣoparāga when mahat, which represents buddhi or intellect, falsely imagines itself as the puruṣa or the self which is reflected in it like the reflection of the face in the mirror. When the mahat (buddhi) flows out through the sense organs and assumes the form of the external objects it is regarded as viṣayoparāga. When the buddhi wills to do an act after it becomes the ego or the empirical self and also gets into contact with the objects, it is regarded as vyāpārāveśa. Thus the mahat-tattva has three functions and in view of this, it is regarded as threefold in nature.

According to the Sānkhyas, the mahat-tattva is also the repository of eight predispositions (bhāvas) or instinctive tendencies. These are: (1) dharma or merit, (2) jnāna or knowledge, (3) vairāgya or non-attachment, (4) aiśvarya or super-normal powers, (5) adharma or demerit, (6) ajnāna or ignorance, (7) avairāgya or attachment, and (8) anaiśvarya or impotence. The first

four are the qualities of the sāttvika-mahat and the other four belong to the tāmasa-mahat. Adhyavasāya or the capacity to take a decision is the characteristic feature of sāttvika-mahat. Hence it is also designated as buddhi or intellect. The five cognitive sense organs (jñānendriyas) serve as aids to the sāttvika-mahat to perceive directly the five sense data such as śabda, sparśa, rūpa, rasa, and gandha. Manas or mind subserves the buddhi in recollecting the objects and events experienced in the past (smṛti) and performing other mental functions such as cintā or repeated reflection, tarka or reasoning and samśaya or entertaining doubts.

Ahankāra or ego which is another function of buddhi, which stands as the empirical self since Śānkhyas do not admit a separate jīva in each person other than the transcendental puruṣa, serves the purpose of causing attachment (abhimāna) to the body. It also causes notions of spatial differences as near and farther, forward and backward, etc., and also the notions of time such as present, past and future in respect of an individual.

All these theories advanced by the Sānkhyas are untenable, contends Vedānta Deśika for the following reasons. Buddhi is a non-sentient entity being an evolute of non-sentient prakṛti and hence it cannot be either the bodhā or the subject of knowledge or the bhoktā or the subject of experience. If these two functions are attributed to non-sentient buddhi, then there would be no need to admit separately the jīvātmans. Besides, it would go against their own these viz., that antaḥkaraṇa or the internal sense organ (mind) is of three kinds (antaḥkaraṇam trividham). These are buddhi, ahankāra and manas. Buddhi is included among the threefold functions of antaḥkaraṇa. The mental functions such as abhimāna or developing the sense of attachment, ālocanā, or the thinking processes, etc., cannot therefore be attributed to the non-sentient buddhi. These are the functions of jñāna which is the attribute of the jīvātman.

The mahat-tattva is of three kinds: sāttvika mahān, rājasa-mahān and tāmasa-mahān. We have already explained the functions of sāttvika-mahān and set aside the views of Sānkhya designated as prāna which functions by developing on vāyu. The five karmendriyas subserve it.

This theory of Sānkhyas is also untenable as it is opposed to the valid pramāṇas. It is also logically unsound. The Vedāntasūtra states that vāyu is not prāṇa (na vāyukriye pṛthag-upadeśāt).

It is maintained by the Sānkhyas that the  $t\bar{a}masa-mah\bar{a}n$  is re-garded as  $k\bar{a}la$  or time. The moments, hours, days, etc., are its modifications. Time is measured in terms of moments, days, etc., on the basis of the movements of the sun  $(s\bar{u}rya-gati)$ .

This theory is also defective because it is stated in the Smṛti texts that kāla is anādi or beginningless and ananta or infinite. If this theory advanced by Sāṅkhyas is accepted, then it would follow that prior to mahat-tattva, time did not exist and consequently there would be no dissolution and creation of the universe.

### THE THEORY OF ATMAN

According to the Sānkhyas, the antaḥkaraṇa or internal sense organ is itself the subject of knowledge (jñāta) and not the self (puruṣa) which is devoid of all functions (nirvikāra). The reason for this is that if jñātṛtva is attributed to puruṣa or the self, it would be subject to modification, whereas ātman is nirvikāra or devoid of modifications. This theory is directly opposed to the Upaniṣadic texts according to which puruṣa or jīvātman is boddhā or knower. The expressions found in the Upaniṣads such as vijñāna-ghana-eva meaning that ātman is constituted of knowledge only, nirguṇa or devoid of attributes, niṣkriya or devoid of all functions, nirvikāra or devoid of modifications, etc., bear different import as explained in the chapter or Advaita Vedānta.

Further the notion of "I" denoted by the term aham which is the true self according to Visistadvaita, is not identical with the ahankāra tattva which is an evolute of prakṛti. That ahamartha or the notion of "I" is the true self is well established with adequate arguments by Rāmānuja in the Śrībhāsya and also in other works of Vedānta Desika. For those who deny kartṛtva and bhoktṛtva for the self on the ground that it is kuṭastha or unchangeable, the Vedic injunctions in the form of performing the deeds enjoyed by the Sacred texts and refraining from those acts which are prohibited, would be rendered meaningless in respect of the puruṣa or the individual self.

The verses of the Bhagavadgītā<sup>11</sup> which deny kartṛtva to the ātman and ascribe it to the guṇas of prakṛti bear a different purport as is explained in the Rāmānujabhāṣya on the Gītā.

The very Gītā in a different adhyāya admits kartītva for jīvātman. 12 The Vedāntasūtra also explicitly states that jīva is kartā. 13

Vedanta Desika further points out that prakṛti can never become kartā in any sense. If it is argued that prakrti in the form of the physical body which is common to all persons performs all deeds, then it would amount to the admission of experiencing the fruits of the deeds by all individuals. In that case there would be no distinction between bondage and liberation. It cannot be said that the individual bodies are the determinant of experience of pleasure or pain by each individual separately, because the mere bodies cannot serve as the determinant for the experience of the fruits. The argument that karma or the results of the past deeds is the determinant, would not hold good because the karma associated with prakțti in the form of the body is also common to all. According to the Sankhyas, the atman of an individual is sarvagata or omnipresent and as the body of each individual is associated with atman, which is the common feature for all persons, the body alone cannot be the determinant for experiencing the fruits of the deeds by individuals separately. On the other hand if it is argued that the antahkarana of each individual which is distinct and which when falsely identified with the ātman, experiences bhoga separately, even then the position does not change because prakrti which is common to all is subject to delusion. Consequently, the antahkaranas of all individuals would become subject to delusion of identity with the self. There is no basis to determine that a particular purușa in conjunction with a particular individual antahkaraņa becomes deluded. Further purusa who is not admitted as  $j\bar{n}\bar{a}t\bar{a}$ , kartā and bhoktā cannot even have any delusion. If such a pure transcendental purusa is admitted as the subject of delusion, then it would to an apasiddhanta or wrong theory.

The theory that ātmāis vibhu or all-pervasive, is also untenable. The individual experiences pleasure or pain along with the body. When it is possible for an individual to experience bhoga even at a distant place through the body with which he is always associated, it is not necessary to postulate for this purpose that jīvātman should be vibhu. Even when jīvātman is devoid of a gross physical body constituted of the three

guṇas it is possible to have movement on account of the will of Paramātman in accordance with the karma of the individual as in the case of the utkrānti or exit of the jīva from the body after death and its movement to higher realms, as stated in the Upaniṣads. It is therefore not necessary to admit vibhutva for jīvātman.

While concluding the critical review of the Sāṅkhya school, Vedānta Deśika points out that the theories developed by the Sāṅkhyas are mutually oppose. The Sāṅkhyas admit that prakṛti is an aggregates of three guṇas (saṅghāta) and its orderly evolution is for the benefit of the puruṣa. This implies that puruṣa, for whom prakṛti exists, is the kartā or the subject of knowing and bhoktā or the subject of experience, that is, the enjoyer of the activities caused by prakṛti in the form of pleasure and pain. In the same breath they also deny kartṛtva and bhoktṛtva for puruṣa by affirming that puruṣa is niṣkriya and nirlepa.

In another verse of the  $k\bar{a}rik\bar{a}$ , it is stated that prakrti functions for causing bondage and liberation for the purusa (purusasya  $darśan\bar{a}rtham$ ). <sup>16</sup> In a more explicit way it is pointed out that just as the milk of the cow is intended for the growth of the calf, in the same way prakrti functions for the purpose of causing liberation from bondage for the purusa. <sup>17</sup> In one another verse of the  $k\bar{a}rik\bar{a}$ , it denies bandha and moksa for purusa ( $tasm\bar{a}t$  na badhyate). <sup>18</sup> Thus all such statements which are of conflicting nature confirm the criticism made by the author of the  $Ved\bar{a}ntas\bar{u}tra$  in the words:  $vipratised\bar{a}cca$   $asama\bar{n}jasam$ . <sup>19</sup> It means that Sānkhya philosophy is most unsound as their teachings are of conflicting nature.

If it is the accepted theory of the Sāṅkhya that ātmā is not either kartā or bhoktā, there would be no need to admit puruṣa as a distinct ontological principle other than prakṛti. If this position is accepted, it would amount to the theory of Cārvāka that body itself is the self. It puruṣa is not boddhā or the subject of knowledge and prakṛti is devoid of knowledge, there is no scope for a pramātā or knower and in the absence of it there are no valid pramāṇas to establish a sound philosophical theory. This would bring Sāṅkhyas close to Mādhyamika for whom there are no valid pramāṇas either to prove his own theory or disprove the theory of a rival school.

#### REFERENCES

1. Sānkhyakārikā, v. 3.

126

- 2. See Sānkhya-pravacanabhāṣya.
- 3. See BG, XIV.5, Sattvam rajas-tamaḥ iti guṇāḥ prakṛti sambhavah.
- 4. Tait. Up., II.6: Tat sṛṣṭv tadevānuprāviśat, saccatyaccābhavat. Also Br. Up., Mādhyandina version, V.7.3: Yaḥ ātmani tiṣṭhan, yamātma na veda, yaḥ ātmānam antaro yamayati....
- See Sānkhyakārikā: puruşasya daršanārtham kaivalyārtham tathā pradhānasya.
- 6. Mahat-tattvam-iti proktam buddhi-tattvam taducyate.
- 7. See Sānkhyakārikā: dharmo jñānam virāga aiśvaryam; sāttvikametadrūpam, tāmasam-asmād-viparyāstam.
- 8. Sāttviko rājasaścaiva tāmasaśca tridhā mahān.
- 9. Rājasa mahān prāṇah vāyum adhisthitya dehamādhatte.
- 10. Jānātyeva ayam puruṣaḥ (quoted by Rāmānuja in RB). Aiso Praśna Up.: Eṣa hy boddha.
- 11. BG, XVIII.20: kāryakāraņa-kartrtve hetuh prakrtirucyate.
- 12. Ibid., XVIII.14.
- 13. VS, II.2.33: Kartā śāstrārthavattvāt.
- 14. See Sānkhyakārikā-sanghāta parārthattvāt.
- 15. Cf. kaivalyārtha pravitteh—the word pravitti implies kartītva or effort to be made for attaining kaivalya.
- 16. See Sānkhyakārikā.
- 17. Vatsa vivardhi-nimittam kṣīrasya yathā pravṛttiḥ ajñasya; puruṣa vimokṣa nimittam tathā pravṛttiḥ pradhānasya.
- 18. See Sānkhyakānikā.
- 19. VS, II.2.9.

### 11

### Yoga School

THIS SCHOOL comes up for consideration soon after the examination of the Sāṅkhya school. Though it is allied to Sāṅkhya Darśana insofor as the philosophical theories of the two schools are similar, yet it is regarded as a separate Darśana founded by Hiraṇyagarbha, the Vedic deity entrusted with the task of the creation of the universe. The major difference between the two schools arises on the philosophical side by the admission of *Īśvara* as the third ontological principle besides prakṛti and puruṣa accepted by the Sāṅkhya. On the practical side, it has developed a comprehensive yogic sādhana to be adopted for the realization of the self, which is the spiritual goal to be attained. Hence Yoga school is designated as Seśvara-Sāṅkhya to distinguish it from Sāṅkhya school which is characterized as Nirīśvara-Sāṅkhya.

The title adopted for this chapter in the Paramata-bhangā is Yogasiddhānta-bhangādhikāra. At the very outset Vedānta Deśika raises the question whether it is necessary to criticize Yogasiddhānta since the important philosophical theories of Yoga, which are somewhat similar to those of Sānkhya, have already been refuted. More importantly the Yoga Darśana has the distinction of being founded by Hiranyagarbha, who is not only a reputed sage like Kapila, the founder of the Sānkhya, but also the Vedic deity brought into existence by the Supreme Being and also entrusted with the task of the creation of the universe. Besides he was the direct disciple of the Supreme Being, who taught him the Vedas soon after creation and he was also the guru of Rudra and other celestial deities.

Further, the Yogaśāstra promulgated by such a highly respected person, has admitted the three tattvas, viz., prakṛti, puruṣa, and Īśvara as taught in the Upaniṣads and also accepted their difference and reality (satyatva). The Yogasūtras formulated by the sage Pātañjali also mention Īśvara, who is described as the Being free from all afflictions and karma.<sup>2</sup> It is also stated that praṇava or the syllable Aum denotes Him.<sup>3</sup> The commentary on the Yogasūtras contributed by sage Vyāsa states that the puruṣa referred to in the sūtra is the Īśvara who is the Ruler of the entire universe. The Mahābhārata mentions that Hiraṇyagarbha is the promulgator of Yogaśāstra (hiraṇyagarbho yogasya vaktā). In view of all these facts the entire Yogaśāstra is to be accepted as authoritative.

Vedānta Deśika acknowledges all these facts. Nevertheless he considers it necessary to critically examine the Yoga Darśana to determine what teachings or theories of it are in conformity with the Vedanta and what are at variance with Vedanta. According to the statement of the Mahābhārata, there were several adherents of the Sāṅkhya and Yoga schools who conducted discussions about Sānkhya and Yoga.4 Naturally it appears that there were differences of opinion among them and consequently different theories were developed later which might have deviated from the original teachings of Kapila and Hiranyagarbha. Hence Vedanta Deśika justifies his attempt to critically examine the Yoga school as it was known at that time. Thus he states at the beginning of the review that he attempts to determine what is opposed to Vedanta and what is not opposed to it in the Yogaśāstra. With these general remarks he proceeds to examine the main theories of Yoga. Even though Hiranyagarbha was a Vedic deity, he too could be subjected to delusion, being an exalted individual self (jīvātmā) like other individual selves.

The following are the important theories which are at variance with Vedānta. First, according to the Vedāntasūtra, as interpreted by Rāmānuja, Brahman who is organically related to the cit (jīvas) and acit (cosmic matter) is the material cause (upādāna-kāraṇa) of the universe. As against this view, the Yoga school maintains the theory that Īśvara admitted by them is only the nimitta-kāraṇa or instrumental cause of the universe. This

Īśvara, like the puruṣa of Sānkhya, is devoid of kriyā or function and śakti or power to create the universe but by his mere presence by the side of the prakṛti (sannidhi-mātra), He makes the prakṛti evolve itself into the universe. Secondly the glory of Īśvara (aiśvarya) consists in His reflection in prakṛti (upādhi-viśeṣa-prayukta), similar to the reflection of the face in the mirror placed in front of it.

Thirdly in the matter of the order of evolution of the tattvas from prakṛti, the Yoga school differs from Vedānta. According to Yoga, from mahat-tattva evolve the six evolutes, viz., ahankāra and the five tanmātras and from ahankāra comes eleven indriyas and from tanmātras arise the five elements. According to the Vedānta the eleven indriyas arise from sāttvika-ahankāra and the tanmātras evolve from tāmasa-ahankāra. With regard to the Yogic sādhana which is laid down for attaining mokṣa, it is not regarded as a form of worship of the Paramātman (paramapuruṣa-ārādhana) who is to be attained as the goal, but on the contrary it is aimed for the purpose of realization of jīvātman. Kaivalya or the existence of jīvātman in its true form, free from the association with citta or the mind and its functions is mokṣa and not the attainment of Paramātman which is the goal for Vedānta.

All these theories are opposed to the Vedānta doctrines and hence they are refuted. Keeping this in mind, the author of the Vedāntasūtra says: etena yoga pratyuktah.<sup>5</sup> It means that the Yoga school also stands refuted by the criticisms offered against the theories of Sānkhya. The implication of this sūtra, as interpreted by Rāmānuja, is that the philosophical theories of Yoga, which are similar to those of Sānkhya, stand refuted as they are opposed to Vedānta. But what is not opposed to Vedānta such as the prescription of the Yogic sādhana for attaining samādhi are acceptable to Visistādvaita as this is useful for the purpose of Bhaktiyoga as sādhana.

While summing up the review, Vedānta Deśika points out that the original founders of these schools, sage Kapila and Hiranyagarbha, were not opposed to the Vedānta doctrines. It is only the later adherents of the schools who created the conflict with Vedānta in respect of the doctrines developed by them. This fact is implied in the statement of the Mahābhārata,

which reads: Bahavah puruṣā rājan sānkhya-yoga vicārinah; naite icchanti purusam ekam kurukulodvana. It means that there were several adherents of Sānkhya and Yoga schools who expounded their own theories and they did not like to admit the existence of one Supreme Being (Paramapurusam ekam). From this point of view the Mahābhārata also extols both Sānkhya and Yoga.6 The implication of these statements, as explained by Vedanta Deśika, is that the original founders of these schools were not against Vedanta and hence they are not to be condemned. Only the later followers of these schools who further developed the Darsana by modifying the doctrines, created a conflict with Vedanta teachings. Hence whatever is opposed to the Vedānta is to be rejected and whatever conforms to Vedānta theories is to be accepted.

#### REFERENCES

- 1. Ch. Up.: Yo brahmāṇam vidadhāti pūrvam yo vai vedāmsca prahinoti tasmai.
- 2. See YS: Kleśa-karma vipākāśayaiḥ aparāmṛṣṭaḥ puruṣa-viśeṣaḥ.
- 3. Ibid.: Tasya vācakah praņavāh.
- 4. See Mbh.: Bahavah puruṣā rājan sānkhya-yoga vicāriṇah.
- 5. VS, II.1.3.
- 6. See Mbh.: Sānkhyam yogah pāncārātram vedāh pāśupatam tathā; ātmapramāņany-etāni na hantavyāni hetubhih.

## 12

# Pāśupata School

In the Paramata-Bhanga this school comes up for critical examination soon after Yoga-siddhānta, for the reason that it also admits Īśvara as the nimitta-kāraṇa or the efficient cause of the universe. Bādarāyaṇa also considers this school along with Sānkhya, Yoga, and Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika since the theory of Īśvara as only the nimitta-kāraṇa of the universe is opposed to the Vedānta theory of Brahman as the upādāna-kāraṇa. Besides, many of their religious practices are opposed to Vedic tradition.

There are several schools of ancient Śaivism known under different names based on different Śaiva Tantras. They are: (1) Śaiva, (2) Pāśupata, (3) Saumya, (4) Laguḍa, (5) Pratyabhijña Darśana, and (6) Raseśvara Darśana. Among these, Pāśupata is regarded as the oldest school which existed even at the time of Bādarāyaṇa. All of them are developed primarily on the basis of Śaiva Āgamas and they all admit Śiva as the Supreme Deity as against Brahman or Viṣṇu accepted as the Ultimate Reality in the Upaniṣads and Vedāntasūtra.

The Sarvadarśana-sangraha of Mādhavācārya, a work of the fourteenth century, includes Pratyabhijña Darśana and Raseśvara Darśana besides Nakulīśa Pāśupata Darśana. Following the teachings of Bādarāyaṇa in the Vedāntasūtra, and the commentary on it Rāmānuja, Vedānta Deśika confines his attention to the critical analysis of the Pāśupata school only since it is considered fully developed and is the oldest school of ancient Śaivism.

Coming the their doctrines, the Pāśupata Darśana admits thirty-six tattvas or ontological principles instead of twenty-five accepted by Sāṅkhya, Yoga and other schools. The primordial

cosmic matter named prakṛti which is the cause for the evolute known as mahat, is conceived as of two kinds, viz., avyaktam and traigunyam. The avyakta is the subtle or unmanifest state (sūkṣmāvasthā) of the three guṇas of prakṛti, whereas the traigunya is the gross or manifest state (sthūlāvasthā) of the guṇas. There is no Scriptural basis or rational justification for such as division of prakṛti into two categories. If it is conceived as a logical possibility or as a postulate, the same kind of division should be made in respect of mahat which is the next evolute of prakṛti.

Along with avyakta, the Pāśupatas also admit five principles. These are: (1) niyati or unseen power, (2) kāla or time, (3) rāga or the principle which causes attachment, (4) vidyā or knowledge, and (5) Kala or the principle which causes obstruction of knowledge. These are inherent in the māyā even during the state of dissolution of the universe along with Śiva and puruṣa (jīvātmā). According to Śaivism, māyā, puruṣa and Śiva exist eternally (nitya tattva).

Māyā is conceived in this system as a cosmic power (śakti) which binds in accordance with the sankalpa of Siva, the souls at the time of creation with the physical body, sense organs, intellect, etc. to enable them to experience pleasure and pain. Niyati, kāla, rāga, and vidyā serve as accessory causes for māyā. In the absence of the support of the trustworthy Agamas and Scriptural and Smrti texts, there is no logical justification for admitting these postulates. The concepts of  $k\bar{a}la$  (time), svabhāva (nature), niyati (fate), and yadrcchā (chance) mentioned in the Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad² as the possible causes for the creation of the universe cannot be construed in support of the Pāśupata theory because these concepts in the Upanișads are mentioned as possible alternative theories to explain the creation of the universe other than Brahman or God. The will of God in accordance with karma or the results of the past deeds performed by the jivas in earlier births is responsible for the birth of individuals in the present life and mere niyati or any other unknown factor cannot serve the purpose. All the other principles such as kala, vidyā, rāga, etc. are superfluous.

Some of the epistemological theories formulated by the Pāśupatas are also defective. They make a distinction between

two kinds of knowledge (1) that which reveals the objects directly and (2) that which causes the experience of objects in the form of joy and pain. Such a distinction does not hold good because what is cognized itself leads to the experience of the object.

The theory of bondage or bandha and liberation or mokṣa for jīvātman formulated by Pāśupata is most unsound as it is opposed to the Upaniṣadic teachings. They maintain that the jīvātman which is regarded as omnipotent and monadic in nature (aṇu) is eclipsed by three kinds of bondage, viz., mala, māyā, and karma. As and when it is liberated by these it becomes omniscient, omnipresent (sarvagata), and omnipotent (sarvaśakta) and also equal to Śiva in respect of all its glory (śivatulya-aiśvarya). All these views stand opposed to the Upaniṣadic teachings and the Vedāntasūtra which emphasise sāmya or equality of the liberated jīva with Brahman in respect of certain attributes and, in particular, the enjoyment of the bliss of Brahman (bhogamātra-sāmya).3

Coming to the doctrine of *Īśvara*, the Pāśupatas conceive it as of five forms. These are: (1) *Īśvara-tattva* (2) *Śiva-tattva* (3) *Śakti-tattva*, (4) *Sadāśiva-tattva*, and (5) *Vidyā-tattva*. The details of the five forms of *Īśvara* and their functions are given in the *Paramata-bhanga* based on *Śaivāgamas.*<sup>4</sup> Vedānta Deśika critically examines these details and comes to the conclusion that these are defective since they are mutually opposed (pūrvāpara-viruddha).<sup>5</sup>

Under the broad heading of Śaivism, several other schools have been developed with different names such as (1) Śivādvaita or that which upholds the doctrine of Śiva as the only ultimate Reality and that jīvas become dissolved in the state of mukti with Śiva, (2) Pāṣaṇavādi Śaiva or those who concede the existence of jīvas in the state of mukti but they are devoid of attributes such as jñāna, and (3) Sāmyavādī Śaivas or those who admit equality of jīvas with Śiva in the state of mukti.

Regarding the Śivādvaita, the criticisms levelled against Pracchanna-Bauddhavāda (Advaita) also apply to Śivādvaita. Regarding the Pāṣaṇavādī Śaiva the criticisms levelled against the Vaiśeṣika theory of mukti would apply to it. As regards

the Sāmyavādī Śaiva, the arguments advanced against the wrong interpretation of the śāmya-śruti would apply to them.

Vedānta Deśika also examines critically a few other important doctrines enunciated in the Pāśupata Tantras. The tattvas are classified into four kinds: (1) Pati or Śiva, (2) paśu or bound selves, (3) vidhi or duties to be performed, and (4) Yoga or the attainment of union with Śiva. Paśu or jīvātmās are classified into six categories, viz., (a) svābhāvika-kārya-kāraṇas, (b) ārabdha-kārya-kāraṇas, (c) vyavṛtta-kārya-kāraṇas, (d) sammūddha-kārya-kāraṇas, (e) sammūdha-kārya-kāraṇas, and (f) āddhya-kārya-kāraṇas. Some details of these categories are furnished in the Paramata-bhanga. According to Vedānta Deśika, these are not supported by the commonly accepted Śruti and Smṛti texts (sarva-sammata smṛti-itihāsa pūraṇādi-virodha).

Vedānta Deśika also refers to certain religious observances adopted by the followers of Pāśupata religion such as that a person becomes a Brāhmaṇa by assuming Śiva-dīkṣā and that one becomes an ascetic (yati) by Kāpālavṛta. These are all opposed to the authoritative orthodox Āgamas (āptāgama virodha).

According to Vedānta Dešika, the Pāśupata mata falls outside the scope of orthodox Vedic religion on several grounds. First, it places Vedas on par with their religious treatises (tantras) and also considers Vedas as pauruṣeya or as authored by somebody. As the knowledge about Śiva is not adequately available in the Vedas, greater importance is accorded by the Pāśupatas to the Śaiva Āgamas. The existence of Īśvara is established on the basis of inference and Śiva is regarded as the nimitta-kāraṇa for the universe. The para and apara-tattvas are not properly presented. The religious observances are laid down as opposed to Vedas.

The stray reference to Rudropāsanā in the Atharvaśiras Upaniṣad as the means to mokṣa cannot be regarded as a Scriptural support to Pāśupata religion since the upāsanā referred to here, as explained by Rāmānuja is to be interpreted as upāsanā on Paramātman as the inner soul (antaryāmī) of Rudra (Rudraśarīraka paramātmā upāsanā).

In the same way the casual references made to the greatness of Umāpati, Paśupati, Śrīkantha as the son of Caturmukha Brahmā

cannot be taken as the sources of authority for Pāśupata mata in the same way as Kapila, though extolled as a sage, who taught Sāṅkhya (sāṅkhyasya vaktā kapilaḥ) is not regarded as authoritative.

In the Mahābhārata, Pāśupata mata is declared to be outside the Vedic religion as it is opposed to the Vedic teachings. It does not also acknowledge Nārāyaṇa as Paratattva.

Keeping all these facts in mind, Bādarāyaṇa who is the author of the Mahābhārata has stated in the Brahmasūtra that the Pāśupata mata is unsound (patyuḥ asāmañjasyatvāt).8

#### REFERENCES

- 1. See commentary on PMB, p. 73: Māyā puruṣa śiva iti etat tritayam mahārtha samhāre avaśiṣyate.
- 2. Svet. Up., I.1.1.
- 3. See VS, IV.4.21.
- 4. See *PMB*, pp. 89, 94: Śuddhāni pañca tattvāni. See also commentary on *PMB*, p. 89.
- Ibid., p. 97: Ādyanteşu smaranti siva tattvam; sakti sadāsiva tattva īsvara-vidyākhya tattve ca.
- 6. Ibid., pp. 102-4.
- 7. Some details of the religious observances of the Pāśupata such as drinking water and eating food by using human skull, smearing the body with the ashes of the cremated dead body (śavabhasma) are given in the Śrībhāṣya. See commentary on VS, II.3.25.
- 8. VS, II.2.35.

### 13

### Pāñcarātra School

IN THE PARAMATA-BHANGA this school comes up for examination Limmediately after the critical review of the Pāśupata school. Though it is not intended, unlike the Pāśupata, for refutation, it is included in the treatise with the main objective of defending it against the criticisms levelled by others that Pāñcāratra treatises are not authoritative. As is evident from the Vedāntasūtra, even at the time of Bādarāyaņa there were criticisms against the authoritativeness of the Pancaratra on the ground that some of their doctrines were opposed to the Vedanta. One of the major objections which is mentioned by Bādarāyaņa as a prima facie view, 1 is that the Pāñcarātra admits the theory of the origin of the jīva whereas jīva according to Vedānta is eternal (nitya). In order to answer such objections Badarāyaņa was required to evaluate the soundness of the Pancaratra doctrines and prove their authority. The same task is undertaken by Vedanta Deśika in the Paramata-bhanga. He examines in greater detail all possible objections against the authoritativeness of the Pancaratra and answers them. That is the reason for adopting the title for this chapter "Bhagavat-śāstra-virodhaparihāra" instead of Bhagavat-śāstra-bhanga-vāda as in the case of other schools. He states all objections against Pāñcarātra and answers them comprehensively. The importance of taking school for review can be judged from the fact that he has contributed an independent treatise under the title Pāñcarātrarak,  $\bar{a}$  which presents in much greater detail all the arguments in defence of Pāñcarātra. The chapter (adhikāra) included in the Paramata-bhanga is a briefer account of the important points.

137

At first Vedānta Deśika points out that the Pāñcarātra treatises enjoy the Supreme authority since the teachings contained in them are promulgated by no less a persom than Nārāyaņa, who is the Supreme Being and omniscient (sarvajña) and omnipotent (sarvaśakta) and as such the author of these texts in not subject to any delusion, forgetfulness and incapacity to teach the doctrines. It is stated in the very Pancaratra treatise that the Lord Himself imparted these teachings containing the essence of the Vedanta doctrines out of compassion for the benefit of His devotees.<sup>2</sup> These were taught to great sages such as Sanatkumāra, Nārada, Śāṇḍilya, etc. who were devoted to Him. In later epochs these teachings were imparted to other by these very sages. Hence there is no room for questioning their authority, unlike the teachings imparted to the demons and other unqualified persons as in the case of the Agamas of the non-Vedic schools, for the purpose of deluding them.

The major objection against the authoritativeness of the Pāñcarātra treatises is that some of the philosophical doctrines advanced in them are opposed to those taught in the Vedanta. Vedānta Dešika rules out this possibility by property interpreting the statements of the Pancaratra texts in conformity with the Upanisadic statements. Thus, for instance, some of the Pancaratra treatises speak of seven tattvas or metaphysical categories viz., Īśvara, avidyā, karma, kāla kartavyatā (duties to be performed), itikartavyata (accessories for the sādhana) and samyama (realization of oneness with Paramātman). Vedānta, on the contrary, acknowledges only three tattvas, viz., cit, acit, and İśvara. But this objection is unfounded, contends Vedānta Deśika. The metaphysical categories can be classified as two (*Īśa* and *īśitavya*), or as three or as even five (arthapañcaka) and as seven from different standpoints. But the principal tattvas are three only, viz., cit, acit, and Iśvara and these are acknowledged and discussed in the Pancaratra treatises. Thus, the following statement of the Pāñcarātra acknowledges the three tattvas and discusses their nature: "acetanā parārthā ca nityā satata vikriyā; triguņā karminām kṣetram prakṛteḥ rūpam ucyate, vyāptirūpeṇa sambandhaḥ tasyāśca puruṣasya ca; sa hi anādiḥ anantaśca paramārthena niścitaḥ." It means: Prakti is non-sentient, eternal and constantly changing, characterized by three gunas and serves as the body for the

jīvas. It is pervaded by the puruṣa (jīva) and that jīva is beginningless, infinite numerically and eternal. Hence there is no opposition between the teachings of the Pāñcarātra and the Vedānta regarding the principal tattvas.

The expression vyāptirūpeṇa sambandhaḥ in the same verse explaining the relationship between jīva and prakṛti in terms of pervasion (vyāpti) appears to militate against the theory of aṇutva of jīva. But is not so, explains Vedānta Deśika, because as further elucidated in the Purāṇas, this vyāpti of the jīva in the body is to be taken in the sense that the jīva is pervasive in the body through its dharma-bhūta-jñāna similar to the presence of oil in the oil seed, and not by its svarūpa which is atomic (aṇu).

Similarly, the evolutes of *prakṛti* which is conceived as śakti, is counted more than the commonly accepted number by making a distinction between sūkṣma-avasthā (unmanifest state) and sthūla-avasthā (manifest state). But Such enumerations would not be treated as a conflict with the normally accepted theory.

Another important objection against Pāñcarātra is related to the question of the identity of the jīva and Īśvara in the state of mukti. While the Vedāntasūtra clearly states that the liberated jīva is devoid of the cosmic functions (jagad-vyāpāravarjam), some of the Pañcaratra treatises speak of acquisition of brahmabhāva or becoming same as Brahman (Bhāgavata),3 Rulership of all (Sarveśvaratva) and omnipotence (Sarvaśaktitva). These views, Vedānta Deśika contends, are to be understood in accordance with the interpretations of (1) the Scriptural statements which state that a  $\bar{p}va$  who has realized Brahman becomes Brahman, that is, it becomes similar to Brahman (brahmaiva bhavati) (2) the texts which state that jīva, after the attainment of Brahman manifest with eight attributes of Brahman, and (3) the Upanișadic texts which state that it attains sāmya or similarly with Brahman (nirañjanah paramam sāmyam upaiti).

All these statements, if they are properly interpreted, do not speak of identity of jīva with Brahman with the cessation of bondage. Jīva, after liberation, becomes equal to Brahman in respect of certain aspects only, other than jagad-vyāpāra.

In accordance with the will of *Īśvara*, *jīva* enjoys certain freedom (sa svarāt bhavatī) and performs activities without any obstruction since he is free from the influence of karma.

Pāñcarātra treatises admit besides Vāsudeva, three vyūha manifestations of the Supreme Being in the names of Saṅkarṣaṇa, Aniruddha, and Pradyumna. They are entrusted with specific cosmic functions. They are also regarded as the presiding deities of jīva, manas, and ahaṅkāra tattva, respectively. Besides, it is also stated that jīva in the name of Saṅkarṣaṇa originates from Vāsudeva. This view supporting the theory of the origin and birth of jīva is considered as opposed to the Scriptural teaching according to which jīva is devoid of birth and origin and that it is eternal (nitya).

Vedānta Dešika refutes this objection. He points out that the concerned statement of the Pāncarātrasamhitā does not speak of the origin of the jīva. On the contrary, it implies, as explained by Rāmānuja in the Śrībhāṣya, that Vāsudeva, Sankarṣaṇa, Pradyumna, and Aniruddha referred to in the statement are manifestations (vyūhas) or Parabrahma for the purpose of meditation by devotees seeking to attain Brahman.

Infact Sankarṣaṇa is no the name of the jīva. Nor does Pradyumna denote manas. In the same way Aniruddha cannot be ahankāra. The association of the term jīva with Sankarṣaṇa, manas with Pradyumna and ahankāra with Aniruddha conveys the idea that these three vyūha forms of Vāsudeva are the presiding deities of the three evolutes, respectively. The term jāyate does not literally mean "originates" but, on the other hand, it implies prādurbhāva or manifestations of Vāsudeva in the form of Vyūha-avatāra out of His sankalpa.

Further the very  $P\bar{a}\bar{n}car\bar{a}trasa\dot{m}hit\bar{a}$  denies the origin of  $j\bar{v}a$ . Thus it states that  $j\bar{v}a$  is  $an\bar{a}di$  and also ananta or without

end (jīvo ānādi anantaķ kathitā).

After establishing that there are no conflicts between Vedānta teachings and those of Pāñcarātra regarding the major philosophical theories. Vedānta Deśika proceeds to show that even in respect of certain religious practices (anuṣṭhāna) relating to the construction of the temples and consecration of a deity etc., laid down by the Pāñcarātra, there is no opposition (virodha) between the teachings of the Pāñcarātra and Vedic teachings.

Nor is there any opposition between the Pāñcarātrasamhitās and other Smṛti texts compiled by sages such as Dakṣa, Gautama, Vyāsa, Parāśara, etc. If in a few cases there appear to be conflicts, these could be easily reconciled by proper interpretation. The varṇāśrama-dharma or observance of prescribed rituals in accordance with one's varṇa or caste and āśrama or stage of life, which is accorded an important place in Smṛti texts (dharma-śāstra), are accepted even by the Pāñcarātra texts. The following statement of the Pāñcarātra emphasizes the importance of worship by one who scrupulously observes the varṇāśrama-dharma:

varņāśrama ācāravatā puruṣṇa paraḥ pumān; Viṣṇuḥ ārādhyate punaḥ na anyat tat-toṣakārakaḥ. The Supreme Lord Viṣṇu is worshipped only by persons who scrupulously follow the varṇa and āśrama-dharma. In no other way He is pleased.

In fact some Pāñcarātra texts acknowledge that Bhagavadarcanā or worship of Bhagavān, is also part of varṇāśramadharma. According to Rāmānuja, Bhagavad-ārādhanā is a nityakarma or a mandatory karma. What is laid down by Dharmaśastra complied by the sages are not overlooked by the Bhagavadśāstra (Pāñcarātra treatises) and hence the validity of the Pāñcarātra cannot be questioned on that basis. The Pāñcarātra texts even prohibit the worship of Viṣṇu by those who strictly do not follow the varṇāśrama-dharma.<sup>5</sup>

More importantly the *Mahābhārata*, compiled by the sage Vedavyāsa, who is also the author of the *Brahmasūtra*, discusses the greatness of the Pāñcarātra system as compared to Sāṅkhya, Yoga, and Pāśupata and extols it as the Supreme authority. The following verses establish beyond any doubt that these treatises are most authoritative:

idam śreyam idam punyam idam hitam anuttamam bhaviṣyati pramāṇam vai etadeva anuśāsanam. This (Pāñcarātra teachings) are sacred; they are meritorious and they are most beneficial; this serves as most authoritative and acceptable.

The statement—"Pāñcarātrasya kṛtsnasya vaktā nārāyaṇaḥ svayam" which means that the entire Pāñcarātra teachings are taught by Lord Nārāyaṇa Himself, sets aside any doubt

regarding its prāmānya. Yāmuna, a predecessor to Rāmānuja, has contributed an independent work titled Āgama-prāmānya to establish the authoritativeness of the Pāñcarātra Āgamas. As stated earlier, Vedānta Deśika has also written an independent treatise under the title Pāñcarātra-rakṣa in which he defends the Pāñcarātra Āgamas against all possible objections questioning its importance and validity. In view of these facts Vedānta Deśika is perfectly justified to claim that there is no opposition (virodha) between the Vedānta and the Pāñcarātraśāstra.

#### REFERENCES

- 1. See VS, II.2.39-40.
- 2. Vedānteşu yathā sāram sangrhya bhagavān ṛṣiḥ; bhaktānukampāya vidvān samcikṣepa yathāsukham. (Quoted in PMB, p.139.)
- 3. See Mund. Up.: Paramam sāmyam upaiti. Also, Tait. Up.: Brahma veda brahmaiva bhavati.
- 4. See Paramasamhitā: paramakāraņāt vāsudevāt samkarṣaņo nāma jīvo jāyate.
- See PMB, chap. 21, p.173: Varņāśrama-paribhraṣṭaiḥ nārādhyo bhagavān hariḥ.

### 14

# Śabda-brahma-Vivartavāda of Vaiyākaraņa

THIS MEANS to be the oldest school of Vedanta which existed long before Śańkara. Its chief exponents, as stated by Vedānta Deśika, are Bhartrhari and Halāyudha who belonged to the school of grammarians (vaiyākaraņa). Though they are primarily grammarians and have contributed scholarly treatises on the subject of grammar (vyākaraņa) including a commentary on Patañjali Mahābhāsya (commentary on Pāṇinisūtras), they have attempted to give a Vedāntic bias or complexion to their theories by conceiving śabda or sound (in transcedental form) as Brahman or the Ultimate Reality of the Upanisads. Thus states Bhartrhari: śabda-brahma is the only one Ultimate Reality and the entire universe is an illusory manifectation of it (vivarta). Halayudha, on the other hand, states that śabda-brahma alone is the life energy of all entities in the universe and the entire universe is a modification (parināma) of it. The following statement, which is an invocation verse, and which sums up the central doctrine of Halayudha, is quoted by Vedānta Deśika in support of this theory:

śabda-brahma yadekam yac-caitanyam ca sarvabhūtānām; yat parināmam tribhuvanam-akhilam-idam jayati sa vāṇi. <sup>1</sup> Śabda-brahma, the one Reality without a second, is the life energy of all beings and the entire universe is a modification of it.

As will be seen presently, both these theories are rejected Vedānta Deśika as untenable. In Support of the doctrine of śabda-brahma, the grammarians have conceived a novel theory of sphoṭavāda. The term sphoṭa means that from which the meaning of a word becomes explicit (sphuṭati asmāt arthaḥ).

According to this school, words as such do not directly produce the knowledge of the thing. The letters, a group of which constitute a word, generate the essence of sound known as sphota which produces the knowledge of the thing. As stated by Vedānta Deśika in the Tattvamuktākalāpa, the following argument is advanced in support of it.

A word has several letters. Do these letters convey the meaning individually or collectively? If it be the former, then the very first should convey the meaning. This does not happen. If the letters convey the meaning collectively, then that power not being found in the first letter, how can all the letters of the word combined together get such a power to convey the meaning? Therefore words as such do not convey the meaning. A special potency or essence becomes manifest in letters when they are combined in a particular form and this produces the meaning.<sup>2</sup>

This is the most unsound theory, contends Vedānta Deśika. It is generally acknowledged that words which are the combination of letters (varṇa-saṅghāta) and the sentences which are the combination of these words (pada-saṅghāta) convey the meaning. This is so obvious to our perceptual experience. By overlooking this commonly accepted principle, the grammarians postulate a special concept named sphota, which is supposed to reveal the meaning of a sentence. This cannot be proved by any of the pramāṇas—pratyakṣa, anumāna, or āgama. It is a mere postulate and it does not help to know whether or not a sentence conveys a sound meaning.

It is important to understand properly the meaning of a sentence in order to determine whether or not it conveys a valid theory. For this purpose the postulation of *sphoṭa* or the sound essence generated by the words is of no use. Even in the absence of it, is possible to know that a sentence or statement bears a proper purport. Perception does not reveal the existence of *sphoṭa* other than the letters and words in the sentences. Even if we carefully and concentratedly hear or contemplate, we do not notice the so called *sphoṭa* or essence of sound in the words or sentences. Nor can it be proved by means of inference (*anumāna*).

The supporters of sphotavāda argue that it may not be possible to prove the sphota or word essence by means of perception. Nevertheless its postulation becomes necessary because letters are not parmanent and it is not possible to explain except through sphota, that the same letters always do convey the same meaning of the words. This argument is untenable, contends Vedānta Deśika. Whatever causes the manifestation of sphota, the same should be able to convey the meaning of words. If the varṇas can as well cause the śabda, there is no need to postulate a new concept like sphota for the purpose.

Even verbal testimony, neither Scriptural nor Smṛti statements, support the sphoṭa theory. The statement of sage Vyāsa in the Mahābhārata praising the Lord as sphoṭa who is stated to be inherent in the letters (sphoṭastvam varṇaguṣṭaḥ) is intended to speak of the glory of the Lord, as in the Bhagavadgītā, Lord Kṛṣṇa is being identified as the rasa in the water, as tejasin the fire, etc. Such statements of Vyāsa cannot be construed

in favour of the theory of sphota.

Even the statement of Halāyudha, to which we have referred earlier, viz., that śabda-brahma is the Reality and the entire universe is a modification (parināma) of it, does not lend any support to the theory of sphota. Further the śabda cannot be treated as sentient Being. Śabda normally refers to ethereal sound and it is non-sentient. What is non-sentient cannot be the cause of the universe of living and non-living beings. Such a theory is also totally opposed to the Scriptural teaching. If śabda-brahma is taken as personified Deity then it amounts to a glorificatory statement.

Similarly, the statement of Bhartrhari that śabda-brahma is the only Ultimate Reality and it illusory manifests itself in the form of letters and words which denote the objects, does not also lend support to the theory of sphoṭa conceived as the essence of śabda. Besides, the concept of vivarta or illusory appearance of the Reality as the universe, is untenable. The criticisms against the Advaitins, Vivartavāda are equally applicable to Śabda-brahma-Vivartavāda.

Against these objections, it may be argued that the orthodox Vedāntins maintain that the praņava or the latter Aum which

is recited at the commencement of Vedic recitation, contains the essence of entire Vedas and it denotes the Supreme Being and all that exists is caused by it. If this is acceptable, why should the critic object to the theory that from śabda-brahma originates the manifold śabda-prapañca or the universe of words and letters?

Against this argument Vedānta Deśika contends that if this theory is advanced on the ground that it is a possibility (sambhāvanā) on the basis of the analogy of the Vedic syllable Aum, then it lacks any support of the valid pramāṇas. If, on the contrary, an inferential argument is advanced in support of the vaiyākaraṇa theory, it stands opposed to the accepted pramāṇas (pramāṇa-virodha). What is regarded as a sambhāvanā is also open to doubts and hence it cannot be taken as proof for the theory. The inference may take this form: artha prapañcaḥ originates only from śabda-brahma, because it is śabda-brahma as in the case of the cosmic universe. This anumāna stands opposed to the Scriptural statement which states that the entire universe is caused by Brahman.

There is one other view advanced by the grammarian according to which there is close relationship between śabda and artha or object of perception. This is known as śabdānuvedha. Whenever the sense organs are in contact with the objects, the objects are perceived along with the words denoting them, In other words, śabda is closely associated with the awareness of the object.

This view is also rejected by Vedānta Deśika, as unsound. Only after the objects are perceived, do the words denoting them become known. As explained in the Tattvamuktākalāpa, the idea of the elephant boy comes to the mind only after the elephant is seen. It is only after the object is seen, its name comes to our mind. Further, it is nor correct to say that both śabda (sound) and artha (object), manifest simultaneously. Thus, for instance, infants, as well as deaf and dumb persons who see the objects do not have any knowledge of the words denoting the objects perceived by them. It cannot be said that such persons have the knowledge of some kind of super normal or subtle sound (sūkṣma śabda), because there is no proof in support of the existence of such subtle

sound. The mention of subtle sounds in the mantra-śāstra under the names of sūkṣma, paśyanti, madhyamā, vaikharī, is intended for the purpose of meditation and it has no bearing on the sound as commonly understood. Even if such statements are made by trustworthy persons (āpta vākya), śabda in the subtle state cannot denote any object or meaning. Such statements regarding the different states (avasthā) of śabda are intended for different purposes. The adoption of some kind of inference would not find any support of pramāṇas.

The Mīmāmsaka theory of śabda-svarūpa-nityatva or that śabda is eternal, does not lend support to śabda-brahma doctrine. Such as view is also opposed to the Vedānta which does not accept the nityatva of letters (varṇas). Besides it does not serve the purpose of proving the eternality of vedas. Śabda is an evolute of prakṛti and it cannot therefore be treated as eternal. That Veda is nitya, can be established even without accepting the śabda-nityatva, as is explained by Rāmānuja in the Śrībhāṣya.<sup>5</sup>

The theory of śabdādhyāsa advanced by Bhartrhari is also not sound. According to Bhartrhari, the perception of the so-called object takes place through the hearing of the sound of the word (śabda) and not independent of it. Śabda itself projects or manifests as object. There is no difference between śabda or a word and the object denoted by the word. The two are one and the same. Because of such an identity the cognition of the object takes place the moment the śabda is known.

This argument is refuted on the ground that śabda and object are distinct and can never be identical. The object exists even prior to the origin of śabda and it continues to exist even after the cessation of śabda. Further, the sound of the word (śabda) and the object (artha) denoted by it are to be grasped by different sense organs. Śabda is known through the ear, whereas the object is perceived through the visual organ. The two do not become manifest at the same time. A word may have different meanings but at the time of hearing a word, we grasp only one particular meaning. If sound and object are identical, then all the meanings of the word should have occurred to our mind when the word is first heard.

This is not so. There are different words which are synonymous but they all refer to the same object. When we get the knowledge of the object, then all the synonymous words should have come to our attention. But this does not happen. Śabda and artha cannot be identical and hence the theory of śabdādhyāsa of Buddhists and Bhartrhari is untenable.

There is another theory developed by the Buddhists and also Vaiyākaraṇas according to which knowledge itself illusorily manifests in the form of words and sentences. This is known as *pratibhā-vākyārthavāda*. Even this is untenable since it is opposed to our common experience proving that only through the sense organs external objects are directly known.

In view of all these critical observations Vedanta Desika affirms that the theory of sphota and the doctrines of śabdabrahma as the sole Reality is the cause of everything in the universe are to be ignored (anādaraņīyam). The Supreme Being (Parama-purusa) who is the sole creator of the universe is the proper Para-Brahman and not the Sabda-Brahman, as conceived by the grammarians. The term brahma used in other contexts is to be taken in secondary sense. Thus, for instance, the Gītā employs the term śabda-brahma. The relevant verse reads: "śabda-brahmani niṣṇātah param brahma adhigacchate." In this context, śabda-brahma means the knowledge of Brahman derived from the Agamas (agamotha jñanam). In another text, we come across another statement: "jijñasurapi yogasya śabdabrahma ativartate." Here sabda-brahma stands for prakrti (primordial cosmic matter). The term brahman in its primary sense only denotes Para-Brahman or the Supreme Being, who according to the Vedanta, is the primary cause of the Universe. Vedanta Desika further observes that the conclusive theory of Vedānta, viz., the Supreme Being established in the Upanişads as qualified by cit and acit in their subtle form (sūkṣma cidacit viśista) undergoes modification as Brahman qualified by cit and acit in the manifested form is acceptable even to the great sages such as Pāṇini, Kātyāyana, Pātañjali (the commentators on Pāṇinisūtras). It is therefore not approriate to say that there are certain mutual contradictions in the theories mentioned in the treatises on grammar such as aindra, candra, maheśa, daurga, kaumāra, and piśalya which came into existence at a

later period. Even if some contradictions are found, these can be reconciled by proper interpretation in accordance with the accepted valid theories as in the case of the conflicting statements found in the eighteen Purāṇas, which was compiled and edited by sage Vyāsa, the reputed author of the Mahābhārata. Thus it is stated (quoted by Vedānta Deśika): "Aṣṭādaśa purāṇāni aṣṭau vyākaraṇāni ca; jñātva satyavatīsūnuḥ cakre Bhārata-samhitām." The principle of reconciliation is adopted by adopting the classification of eighteen Purāṇas into sāttvika, rājasa, and tāmasa. The same principle can be adopted in the case of eight Vyākaraṇas. The authors of these Vyākaraṇas are also influenced by the sāttvika, rājasa, and tāmasa guṇas and accordingly, they would have said different things. What is found in sāttvika Vyākaraṇas are to be taken as valid and in accordance with it, the correct theories are to be accepted.

#### REFERENCES

- 1. See PMB, chap. 14, p.153.
- 2. See TMK, IV.87; also see FVV, p.126.
- 3. See TMK, IV.88.
- 4. śabda-brahma-yadaikam yaccaitanyam ca sarvabhūtānām; yat pariņāmam tribhuvanam-akhilam-idam jayati sa vāņi. (Quoted by Vedānta Dešika in PMB, p.153.)
- 5. See RB on VS, I.3.39; also see FVV, pp.101-3.
- 6. See TMK, IV.34: śabdāt prāk paramapi artha siddheh.

### 15

# Advaita Vedānta of Śankara

MONG THE EXTANT Vedanta schools, Sankara's Advaita Vedanta is the oldest and important living system. But this system of philosophy is the one which is also open to severe criticism by almost all the theistic schools of Vedanta, and in particular Rāmānuja and Madhva. Apart from the elaborate and systematic criticism offered by Rāmānuja in the Mahāsiddhānta portion of the Jijnāsādhikarana of the Śrībhāsya, Vedānta Deśika has written an independent polemical work named Śatadūsanī containing sixty-six vādas, each one dealing with a major topic of Advaita. Madhva too has attacked vigorously Advaita doctrines, particularly the mithyātva or illusory character of the universe in his prakarana granthas. His illustrious follower, Śrī Vyāsatīrtha has written an independent work named Nyāyāmīta in which the major doctrines of Advaita are vehemently criticized. Vedanta Deśika has therefore included as separate chapter in the Paramata-bhanga, under the title "Pracchanna-bouddha-bhangavada" (chap. 11), in which he has offered succinct and strong criticisms against a few important theories of Advaita Vedānta. As we have explained earlier, this chapter comes immediately after Mādhyamika Buddhism, for the reason that the concept of māyā or avidyā adopted by Sankara to explain the illusory character of the universe and jīvātmans is similar to the concept of Samvṛti admitted by the Mādhyamikas to explain empirical transactions in the universe. Though Śankara is an orthodox Vedāntin whose system of philosophy is founded on the authority of the Upanișads, the Vedāntasūtras and the Bhagavadgītā, the doctrines of Nirguņa Brahman, the theory of the identity of jīva and Brahman, the

view that the universe is illusory (jagan-mithyātva) and the postulation of māyā would amount in the opinion of Vedānta Deśika, to the admission of the principles of Mādhyamika's śūnyavāda or that everything in the universe is void and nonexistent. By way of elucidation of this strong criticism, Vedanta Deśika points out that Yogācāra school of Buddhism does not accept either the subject (boddhā) or the external object other than the mental series and that all the dharmas that we attribute to the knower are falsely imagined to belong to it (kalpita). The Vaibhāsika, which is another school of Buddhism. on the other hand, admit buddhi or knowledge as the only reality, while everything else is non-eternal. Similar to these teachings, the Advaita School of Vedanta admit that other than the Atman (Brahman) as the only Reality, everything else is illusory. Hence this school of Vedanta is refuted along with the Mādhyamika Buddhism.

In reply to the objection whether it is appropriate to treat Advaita Vedānta on par with Buddhism, Vedānta Deśika points out that on closer and dispassionate study, the two systems have some common features. Buddhism maintains that buddhi or knowledge is kṣanika, that is, it does not endure for more than a moment. It is also many (bahu) in the form of continuous series of ideas. In the case of Advaitin, knowledge (termed as anubhūti) is nitya or eternal but all the dharmas or attributes we ascribe to it are considered imaginary (kalpita). That is, it is falsely superimposed on it and these do not really belong to it. Hence, Vedānta Deśika contends, that the two schools of thought have some affinity. 1

In the Paramata-bhanga Vedānta Deśika does not take up a detailed criticism of all the doctrines of Advaita, as this task has already been accomplished in the Śatadūṣaṇī and other philosophical treatises. He therefore confines his attention to a few crucial topics such as the validity of pramāṇas (prāmāṇya), absence of valid proofs for establishing the doctrine of undifferentiated Reality, the plurality of the jīvātman, the māyā. Vedānta Deśika attempts to prove how Advaita is a defective Upaniṣads and the Vedāntasūtras

#### VALIDITY OF PRAMANAS

The question relating to the validity of the pramāṇas is first taken up. The doctrines advanced by an exponent of a system require to be well grounded on the valid means of knowledge. In the absence of any valid proof in support of it, it is bound to be rejected as non-authoritative. Like all the other schools of Vedānta, Advaitins have also admitted the three important pramāṇas: pratyakṣa, anumāna, and āgama (Scripture). Of these, Scripture is accorded greater validity and it is regarded as the Supreme authority in spiritual matters.

The metaphysical stand adopted by Advaita Vedanta presents some problem with regard to the validity of the pramanas. According to Advaita, Brahman alone is absolutely real and everything else is illusory. If this is the case, the pramanas cannot be regarded as real in the proper sense of the term and in the absence of valid pramānas, the Advaitin cannot that the doctrines advanced by him are sound. This is the main objection raised by Vedanta Desika. The Advaitin gets over it by arguing that the pramanas though not real (pāramārthika), have empirical reality (vyāvahārika satyatva), that is, for practical purposes they are regarded as real and on this basis it is possible to establish one's theories. Vedānta Deśika is not satisfied with this explanation and contends that on final and careful scrutiny, it is found that what is regarded as vyāvahārika satya, turns out to be false, similar to the reality of the objects seen in the state of dream (svapna pramāna tulya).

There are other arguments advanced by the Advaitin in defense of his position but all these are discussed in the Śatadūsanī and proved to be untenable. An important point of criticism is that Scripture which is regarded as the Supreme authority for knowing Brahman, cannot be claimed as the source of authority since it being the product of avidyā, is not free from defect. The argument that the knowledge of Brahman derived from the Scripture is uncontradicted and hence it is real, is not sustainable, contends Vedānta Deśika, because this is contradicted by the teachings of the Mādhyamikas for whom everything is śūnya or non-existent.

#### THE THEORY OF NIRVISESA BRAHMAN

After making these critical remarks regarding the pramanas Vedanta Desika criticizes the concept of nirvisesatva, which constitutes the svarupa of Brahman. Following the arguments advanced by Rāmānuja in the Śrībhāṣya, while refuting the doctrine of Brahman as nirviśesa or devoid of all attributes, he points out that none of the pramanas—either pratyaksa, or anumāna or even śabda (scripture) can prove the existence of a nirviśeșa entity. According to the Viśistadvaitin, all entities, both material and spiritual, are saviśesa or qualified with attributes.

Pratyakşa does not reveal an entity or even Brahman as devoid of qualification. There are two theories regarding this. According to one theory, there are two kinds of perception known as nirvikalpaka or indeterminate perception and savikalpaka or determinate perception. In the first stage, that is soon after the contact of the sense organs with the external object, we perceive only bare being and it is only in the next stage, we see the object as qualified. This theory is considered untenable because even in the first stage, we see the object as qualified with some quality (kenacit viśesena) while in the second stage, we see it as qualified with specific characteristics. According to the second theory, which is advanced by the author of Brahmasiddhi, perception reveals only sat (sanmātra) and the difference that is apprehended later on is superimposed on sat due to avidyā. Even this theory is refuted as it is opposed to our common experience (upalambha virodha).

The Advaitin adopts the dialectical argument to deny the very reality of bheda. But such a dialectic can also be advanced to prove that even abheda or non-difference is not real. If all differences are considered to be mithyā or illusory, it would lead to the position of denial of difference even between pramāṇa and apramāṇa, sādhya and sādhana, svapakṣa and parapakṣa, sādhana and duṣaṇa, vādi and prativādi, jaya and parājaya. Then there would be no human transaction.

Even the anumāna or inference and Agama or the Scriptural texts do not establish the nirvisesa Reality. The syllogistic arguments adopted to prove that Anubhūti (Brahman) is avedya

and that Brahman is nirviśesa suffer from the logical defects.

Besides, if the nature of Brahman can be known by means of inference, then it would militate against the stand taken in Vedānta that śāstra or sacred text, is the only source of authority for the knowledge of Brahman. The Upaniṣadic texts also do not point out that Brahman is Nirviśeṣa. The mention of the terms such as nirguṇa, niṣkriya, niṣkala, etc., in a few stray statements convey the idea that Brahman is devoid of heya guṇas or defilements.

The following argument is advanced by the Advaitin in defence of his theory of Nirvisesa Brahman: If according to the Scriptural texts Brahman is devoid of jāti, that is, as belonging to particular species, guṇa or quality, śakti or capacity to function, vyāpāra or activities, vibhūti dravyam or glorious aspects, etc., is it appropriate to consider such a Reality as Savisesa or endowed with attributes? All such conceptions in respect of Brahman are therefore imaginary and caused by ignorance. In the final analysis, the true nature of the Ultimate Reality is to be admitted as absolutely undifferentiated.

Vedānta Deśika controverts this argument. This is not a correct interpretation of the Upanisadic texts which negate certain characteristics in respect of Brahman. The Upanisads only negate such physical qualities commonly ascribed to the material entitites. They do not deny characteristics which constitute the distinguishing features of Brahman. This point is made more explicit by specifying what is to be attributed to Brahman and what is to be denied in respect of it. The following dharmas which are well established by the Scriptural texts dealing with the nature of Reality are to be admitted: (1) designation of *Īśvara* by a name such as Nārāyaņa or Vișņu, (2) the distinguishing attributes such as satyasya satya, satyatva, jñānatva, anantatva and ānandatva, (3) ātmatva, that is, that it pervades everything in the universe, (4) sarvādhiṣṭhāna śakti or that it is capable of serving as the ground or source of everything in the universe, (5) jagat-sṛṣṭyādi-vyāpāra or that it is the sole cause of the creation, sustenance and dissolution of the universe, (6) the Rulership of both the cosmic and transcendental universe (vibhūtidvaya), and (7) svarūpa vikāraabhāva, that is, devoid of any change or modification in respect of its svarupa. All these distinguishing characteristics of Brahman are undeniable, as these are well established by the Upanisadic texts. The characteristics which are to be negated in respect of Brahman are: the physical qualities such as sthūlatva, anutva, hrasvatva, dīrghatva, etc., stated in the Brhadāranyaka text, change or modification in Brahman in respect of its svarūpa, experience of pleasure or pain caused by physical body, absence of auspicious attributes (kalyāna gunābhāva), since these are not warranted by Scriptural texts.

In the same way, the Scriptural statements which speak of the attributes and negation of the same in respect of  $j\bar{\imath}v\bar{a}tman$  can also be reconciled by interpreting them with reference to the  $up\bar{a}dhi$  or limiting adjuncts with which they are associated. Thus for instance in the statement " $n\bar{a}yam$  devo na martyo  $v\bar{a}$ " ( $j\bar{\imath}va$  is neither deva nor mortal being), its implication is that the  $j\bar{\imath}va$  as far as its intrinsic nature is concerned, is alike but the distinction made as celestial being, human being, etc., is due to the association of the different types of body caused by karma.

The very distinction made between *dharma* and *dharmī* is questioned by the Advaitin on the basis of a dialectical argument. But this is refuted as it is not a correct theory. The distinction between the two is to be admitted as it is evident to our experience.<sup>4</sup>

The view of the Advaitin that Brahman is pure, undifferentiated Being devoid of sajātīya-bheda, vijātīya-bheda, and svagata-bheda, on the basis of the Chāndogya text (sadeva ekameva advitīya), is not tenable as it is opposed to all pramāṇas (sarva-pramāṇa viruddha). Thus, it is not possible to establish that Brahman is Nirvišeṣa.

It may be argued that there is no need for any pramāna to prove that Brahman is nirvišeṣa because it is svayam-prakāśa which implies that it is self-evident or self-established. Vedānta Deśika controverts this argument. Brahman may be svayam-prakāśa but the mere svayam-prakāśatva cannot prove that it is also nirvišeṣa in character. That self-luminous Brahman is Nirvišeṣa is to be proved by some other pramānas. In that case, what is proved by another pramāna becomes a characterized entity (savišeṣa). If another individual or oneself cognizes the self, he perceives it as a qualified entity (višiṣṭa) and not

as devoid of all determinations. In other words, what is nirviseṣa can never become an object of apprehension and even if it is apprehended, it is seen only as a qualified entity. Further, if svayam-prakāśatva constitutes the very svarūpa of Nirviseṣa Brahman, then the theory that it becomes eclipsed by avidyā (avidyātirohita) and that there is adhāyasa or superimposition on it leading to the bhrānti and its removal, etc., are all inconceivable. Only if ātman is qualified with attributes, it is possible to explain that it does not manifest fully (aviśadatva) due to the false superimposition of dharmas which do not belong to it (viruddhākāra adhyāsa) or due to some of its dharmas being eclipsed.

Further nirviseșa-jñāna or undifferentiated consciousness cannot be considered as the knower or the subject of knowledge, because cognisership involves change or modification. For this reason, the Advaitin regards the empirical ego or the internal organ (ahankāra) as the cogniser. But this theory also suffers from a drawback because what is a non-sentient entity like the physical body cannot be the knower. It would therefore be more appropriate to admit, as the Visistadvaitin does, that the entity denoted by the notion of "I" (ahamartha) itself is the true self. The inferential arguments advanced by the Advaitin to prove that ahamartha or the entity denoted by "I" is not ātman, that it is non-sentient, etc., and that only pure consciousness (samvit) is ātmā, sākṣī, or mere witness and it is pratyaktva or self-revealing, etc. are untenable because these stand opposed to our perceptual experience and the Scriptural texts. That ahamartha itself is the true atman is well established by Alavandar in Atmasiddhi and also by Rāmānuja in the Mahāsiddhānta portion of the Śrībhāṣya. If the entity denoted by "I" is not admitted as the self, it would not be possible to explain satisfactorily the Upanişadic statements such as "All this is Brahman," "That thou art" which equates the universe and Brahman as well as the jīvātman and Brahman.

# THE THEORY OF MITHYATVA OF THE UNIVERSE

The Advaitin contends that, if Nirvisesa Brahman alone is absolutely real, it would follow that the universe which is generally regarded as real (satya) is not so. But this cannot

be established, contends Vedānta Deśika. The Scriptural texts which negate the universe such as neha nānāsti kiñcana cannot support this theory because such texts, if properly interpreted with reference to the contexts, convey a different meaning.<sup>5</sup> It only implies that there does not exist any other entity which is not inherently related to Brahman (abrahmātmaka vastvantaram). If it is attempted to establish the illusoriness by means of anumāna or inferential arguments and Āgama or Scriptural texts, then these would stand opposed to perceptual experience (kalātyayāpadeśa). Perception which is the foundation for inference cannot be ignored. If by overlooking perceptual knowledge, inference is adopted, it would not be a valid pramāṇa.

The description of the universe as mithyā in the sense of sad-asad-vilakṣaṇa, that is, it is neither sat nor asat but different from both, involves self-contradiction (viruddha), similar to the concept of sad-asat. Whatever arguments are offered to defend the theory of anirvacanīyatva, these are found untenable when subjected to logical analysis. These concepts can also be satisfactorily explained in a different way. Thus, for instance, taking the instance of the cognition of silver in the conchshell, the silver which is real and exists elsewhere is seen in the shell due to the eye-defect or some other reason. Since it does not actually exist in the shell, it is being negated. There is no justification to conceive the concept of sadasat-vilakṣaṇa to explain this phenomenon.

The Scriptural text nāsadāsīt no sadāsīt negating both sat and asat, cannot be taken as a proof for the concept of sadasad-vilakṣaṇa, because this statement is intended to explain how the universe in the state of dissolution cannot be described as sat or asat. The theory that māyā or ajñāna which is of the nature of sad-asad-vilakṣaṇa is the material cause of the universe (upādāna-kāraṇa) is also untenable, because the jagat which is its product is not found to be mithyā since its existence as real is evident to our experience.

# THE THEORY OF REMOVAL OF AVIDYA

Regarding the nature of the means to overcome avidyā and the realization of the absolute oneness of the reality, Vedānta Deśika points out that the theory of the Advaitin that liberation

from bondage takes place by means of the realization of the knowledge of the identity of jīva and Brahman is opposed to the several scriptural texts which affirm that proper knowledge of difference (bheda) between jīva and Brahman leads to mokṣa. If according to the Advaitin the concepts of bondage (bandha), the knowledge which removes ajñāna causing bondage (nirvartaka  $j\tilde{n}\tilde{a}na$ ), the theory that  $j\tilde{n}\tilde{a}ta$  or the individual self is the aspirant for moska, that Isvara is the bestower of knowledge (jñānaprada), that the Sacred texts provide the spiritual knowledge (*jñānotpāda-śāstra*), and even the very cessation of avidyā (avidyānivrtti) are all mithyā, then the enquiry or investigation into the nature of Brahman (brahma jijnāsā) and the teaching of Vedānta to the disciples by a preceptor are of no value (nisphala). When it is so well established by all pramanas that the universe is real, the theories such as that vākyārtha-jñāna, that is, the aparokṣa-jñāna arising from the study of the Scriptural texts, nisprapañcikarana niyoga vāda or constant meditation on Brahman in the form of dissociating prapañca (universe) from Brahman leading to the realization of pure Brahman and dhyāna-niyogajanya-sākṣātkāra or the realization of true form of Brahman after observing the meditation enjoined in the Upanisad would not prove the illusory character of the universe (prapañcabādha).

Vedānta Deśika briefly mentions a few other inconsistencies involved in the Advaita Vedānta. That the Upaniṣadic texts such as tattvamasi (Thou art that) generate aparokṣa jñāna or knowledge of immediate nature is a self contradiction similar to the concept of jīvan-mukti or that one is liberated though one is embodied. If according to his system ātman is nityamukta or ever free from bondage by its very nature, there is no justification to speak of the jīvan-mukti. Similarly, the theory of bādhitānuvṛtti, that is, the continuance of the body even after the total cessation of avidyā, is untenable. If the preceptor is aware that the disciple is mithyā, the teaching of Vedānta to him is unjustified. If the preceptor knows that his disciple is real, he cannot be qualified to teach Vedānta.

### THE THEORY OF JIVA

The theory that there is only one jīva (eka-jīva-vāda), does not allow for drawing distinction between the individuals as

sukhī or dukhī, as disciple and preceptor and as one bound and the other as free from bondage. The theories which speak of the plurality of  $\bar{piva}$ , also suffer from defects. To overcome this criticism, the plurality of  $\bar{piva}$  is admitted on the basis of the reflection of one Brahman in several internal organs caused by  $avidy\bar{a}$  on the analogy of the reflection of a single moon in several waves of watershed. Even this theory is also unsound, as explained in detail in the  $\hat{Sribhasya}$  and the  $\hat{Satadusani}$ . Besides, the  $\hat{pivas}$  as reflections of Brahman in the antahkaranas become destroyed as in the case of the reflections of the moon, when the watershed is removed.

Ajñāna should have a locus, that is, it should belong to somebody and should also be related to an object. What is the locus of ajñāna? There are two views regarding this matter. According to some Advaitins, Brahman is the āśraya for jñāna. According to others, jīva is its locus. In either case, it is untenable. Brahman which is of the nature of prakāśa or self-luminous knowledge cannot be the locus since the two are mutually opposed. To avoid this difficulty, if jīva is postulated as the locus of  $aj\bar{n}\bar{a}na$ , it involves a vicious circle. If  $\bar{j}\bar{\nu}va$  is a reflection of Brahman in the antahkarana, Brahman assumes jīva-hood only after the reflection of it in the antahkarana takes place. Prior to it, there is no jīva as such who apprehends jīva-hood as a reflection of Brahman. If Brahman itself comprehends, then Brahman is subjected to delusion. If jīva apprehends that it is a reflection of Brahman, jīva does not exist as such until the reflection is apprehended. In either case, the theory of jīva as pratibimba of Brahman falls to the ground.

#### THE CONCEPT OF MAYA

The very difference made between  $m\bar{a}y\bar{a}$  and  $avidy\bar{a}$  on the ground that  $m\bar{a}y\bar{a}$  inheres in Brahman, whereas  $avidy\bar{a}$  inheres in  $j\bar{i}vas$  is untenable. If on this basis, Brahman as associated with  $m\bar{a}y\bar{a}$  is able to see the illusory  $j\bar{i}vas$  and the jagat, then Brahman would be subjected to  $aj\bar{n}\bar{a}na$  or ignorance, which is not a satisfactory theory.

The term  $m\bar{a}y\bar{a}$  does not necessarily mean illusory apprehension of an object. It also bears other meaning as that which is capable of creating the variegated universe. It

is in this sense the term  $m\bar{a}y\bar{a}$  is employed in the Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad equating it with prakṛti or primordial cosmic matter. If in the state of divine incarnation, as human or other beings, the Supreme Lord exhibits grief or ignorance, it is just a mere acting (abhinaya) to delude other persons.

While concluding the critical review of the Advaita Vedānta, Vedānta Deśika presents the following correct view which stands established on the unquestionable Scriptural authority and other pramanas. The Supreme Being creates the universe through the media of māyā which stands for the primordial cosmic matter, as is stated in Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad: asmāt māyī srjate viśvametat.6 Māyī is the Supreme Lord, who is the controller of prakṛti, as explained in this Upaniṣad (māyinam tu maheśvaram); māyā is the primordial cosmic matter (māyām tu prakṛtim vidyāt). As part of the creation of the universe, the jīvas who are brought into existence by associating them with the bodies, mind and sense organs, are also entangled with māyā, taken in the sense of past karma. Thus states the Upanisad: tasminścanyo māyayā sanniruddhah. Īśvara is the cause of the bondage (bandha) in accordance with the past karma of the \(\bar{\eta}\)vas (\(\bar{I}\)svarah karm\(\bar{a}\)nur\(\bar{u}\)pa bandha hetuh). The same *Īśvara* is also the cause of the liberation of jīvas from bondage through the observance by the jīvas the requisite vidyās or the upāsanās as enjoined in the Upanisads. Thus, the three tattvas or the ontological entities, viz., İśvara, cit, and acit (cosmic matter) are eternally different (nitya bhinna), each one possessing the distinctive characteristics (pratiniyata guņa višiṣṭa). All the three are real and well established by the valid pramānas. Only such sound philosophical teachings based on the pramāṇas and in particular on the authority of unquestionable Scriptural texts become acceptable to those who take their stand on the valid pramanas.

#### OTHER SCHOOLS OF ADVAITA

In the *Paramata-bhanga* one particular school of Vedānta expounded by Śankara is covered. Vedānta Deśika points out that there are several other types of Advaita taught in earlier times under different names such as Brahmādvaita, Śivādvaita, Vāsudevādvaita, Sphoṭādvaita, Samvid-advaita, and Sad-advaita. Brahmādvaita is the school which upholds that *Hiranyagarbha* 

160

or Caturmukha Brahmā is the only Supreme Reality. Śivādvaita refers to the school which maintains that only Siva existed prior to the creation of the universe (Siva eva kevalah). Vāsudevādvaita is the school which emphasizes that other than Vāsudeva, no other deity exists (Paramah pareśah sa vāsudeva no vato anyadasti). Sphotadvaita is the school which accepts that sphota or word essence which is called sabda-brahma is the only Reality (Sphotastvam varna justah). This is briefly covered in the Paramata-bhanga as the school of Vedanta upheld by Bhartrhari. Samvid-advaita is the school of thought advocated by the Yogācāra Buddhist for whom samvit or series of mental ideas is only real and the external objects are mere projections of it. This is also covered in the Paramata-bhanga under Buddhism. Sad-advaita is the school of though upheld by the Sānkhyas for whom sat taken in the sense of primordial cosmic matter is the primary cause of the universe and everything in the universe is constituted of the three gunas of prakrti. According to Vedanta Desika, all these schools are intended to attract people to join the new type of school founded by those exponents but none of them is philosophically sustainable, as is made evident in the Brahmasūtras of Bādarāyana, Śatadūsanī and other philosophic treatises.

#### REFERENCES

- Cf. the verse of Yādavaprakāśa quoted by Vedānta Deśika in Śatadūṣaṇī: Vedo' nṛto buddhakṛtāgamo' nṛtah prāmānyam tasya ca tasya cānṛtam; boddhānṛto buddhiphale tathā anṛte yūyam ca boddhāśca samānasamsadaḥ.
- 2. For details see, Satadūṣaṇī, vāda 13.
- 3. See Ch. Up., sadāyatanāḥ, sat-pratisthāḥ.
- 4. SD, vāda 13; also see FVV.
- 5. See FVV.
- 6. Svet. Up., IV.9.

## 16

## Dvaita Vedānta of Madhva

MONG the three principal schools of Vedanta, Dvaita Vedanta developed by Madhva (AD 1199–1278) occupies an important place. Like Advaita and Viśistādvaita, it presents a distinctive doctrine of Vedanta based on the authority of the Upanisads, Brahmasūtra and the Bhagavadgītā, as interpreted by Madhva. While it is antagonistic to Sankara's Absolutist Vedānta, it has closer affinity to Rāmānuja's Viśistādvaita, insofar as the fundamental doctrines are concerned. It accepts the Brahman of the Upanisads as Supreme Being who is identified with personal God in the name of Visnu and who is endowed with numerous attributes. It also admits the reality of the cosmic universe and the existence of the eternal individual selves as distinct from Brahman. In view of it Vedanta Desika regards Madhva's Dvaita as sannikṛṣṭa-mata or a philosophical system having closer affinity to Viśistādvaita.1 Presumably, due to this reason he has not subjected Dvaita Vedanta to a criticism, unlike Śańkara's Advaita. Hence it is left out of a critical review in the Paramata-bhanga. However, he has made a few brief critical remarks in the Paramata-bhanga and also in his other works on a few important theories of Dvaita Vedanta which stand opposed to the Upanisadic teachings and the views of Bādarāyaṇa. We shall consider these points in the present chapter.

With regard to Brahman, which is the central doctrine of Vedānta, the major point of difference between the Dvaita Vedānta and Viśiṣṭādvaita is about the nature of causality of Brahman with reference to the universe. The issue involved is whether Brahman, which is the sole cause of the universe,

162

as stated in the Taittirīya Upaniṣad and the Vedāntasūtra, is the upādāna-kāraņa (material cause) of the universe or it is mere nimitta kāraņa (instrumental cause) as in the illustration of the potter who makes the pot. In the instances which are cited in the Chandogya Upanişad2 to elucidate the causal relationship between Brahman and the universe, the lump of clay is mentioned as the material cause of pot and other articles made of clay, with reference to the general statement viz. that the knowledge of one (causal) substance leads to the knowledge of all other products made out of it. The general statement is called  $pratij\tilde{n}\tilde{a}$  and the illustration in support of it as drstānta. Taking these facts into consideration, Bādarāyana formulates the sūtra which reads as: prakṛtiśca pratijñā dṛṣṭānta anuparodhāt.3 The sūtra interpreted both by Śańkara and Rāmānuja means that Brahman is the material cause, the word prakṛti being interpreted as upādāna-kāraṇa on the basis of Pāṇini sūtra.4 The adoption of this meaning for the term upādāna is considered relevant, as otherwise the general statement ( $pratij\tilde{n}\tilde{a}$ ) and the illustration offered to elucidate it would not be meaningful. This is the view of Bādarāyaṇa, as interpreted both by Šankara and Rāmānuja.

But Madhva, on the contrary, does not admit that Brahman is the upādāna kāraņa of jagat, on the ground that the admission of upādānatva for Brahman would involve change in respect of the svarūpa of Brahman. It is therefore only nimitta-kāraņa of the universe. On the analogy of the potter and the pot produced by him. Prakṛti or the primordial cosmic matter is accepted as material cause of the universe, as it evolves into the universe through the will of Paramatman. Accordingly he offers a different interpretation for the Vedāntasūtra dealing with the material causality of Brahman. By overlooking the Chāndogya passage on which the sūtra is formulated, Madhva adopts a different Scriptural text as the vişaya-vākya for the

sūtra in support of his intepretation of the sūtra.5

As explained by Vedānta Deśika in the Adhikaraņa-sārāvalī, the stand taken by Madhva that Brahman is not the material cause but it is only the nimitta-kāraņa of the universe, is not philosophically sustainable. It is not only opposed to the teachings of the Upanisads, particularly the passage of Chandogya and

also the views expressed by Bādarāyaņa in the Vedāntasūtra. According to the Upanisadic texts dealing with the causation of the universe (kāraṇa-vākyas), Brahman itself wills to become many. 6 The Taittiriya Upanisad specifically states "tad-ātmānam svayam akuruta," which means that Brahman itself evolved into the universe. Mundaka Upanisad uses the expression bhūtayoni for Brahman and cites the example of the spider weaving the web (out of its saliva). All these statements reveal that Brahman itself is the upādāna-kāraņa of the universe. If it were only the instrumental cause, similar to the potter producing the pot, it cannot be the principal cause of the universe as in the case of the potter not being the principal cause of pot. It is therefore obvious that accordingly to Bādarāyaṇa, Brahman which is defined in the Taittiriya Upanisad as the primary cause of the creation of the universe, is the material cause. If it were the mere instrumental cause, then there would be no justification for Bādarāyaņa in refuting the theory of seśvarasānkhya and the school of Pāsupata which only accept Isvara as nimitta-kārana.

The admission of upādānatva for Brahman would not effect the svarūpa of Brahman as contended by Madhva. The author of the Vedantasūtras has provided a suitable explanation for it. Brahman possesses vicitra-śakti or variegated powers than it can undergo modification without affecting its svarūpa. As elucidated by Rāmānuja, Brahman does not directly undergo any transformation but it makes the prakrti, which is the body (śarīra) in the technical sense that it is always sustained and controlled by it, evolves itself into the universe. The changes on account of transformation apply to prakrti, which is the body of İśvara, while Brahman which is its ādhāra or supporter is not in any way affected. This is illustrated by the analogy of the self of an individual who passes through the states of boyhood, youth, manhood and old age, etc. is not effected by changes taking place in the body. According to the Visistādvaita epistemology, the changes in respect of the qualities (dharmas) of a substance do not affect the substratum (dharmi).

As explained supra, chap. 3 on Para-tattva, upādānatva is of two kinds. An object is regarded as upādāna-kāraņa when it modifies itself into a different state as in the instance of a

164

pot. An entity is also regarded as upādāna-kārana when it serves as the basis for the avasthas or different states it undergoes (avasthāntara yogitvam eva upādānatvam).7 The analogy of a boy growing as youth, man, old, etc. is of this type. In this case individual self associated with the physical body is the material cause by virtue of its being the aśraya or serving as the substrate for the changes taking place in the body. In the case of the first instance, there is total transformation of the substance (svarūpa vikāra) but it is not so in the second instance. Brahman is ajada-dravya or spiritual substance and is it capable of assuming different states. The changes taking place in respect of prakrti do not affect Brahman. The concept of śarīra is applicable to prakti, if we bear in mind the definition offered by Rāmānuja for śarīra (see supra, chap. 1). Thus the Dvaita Vedanta suffers from this drawback by not admitting upādānakāranatva for Brahman.

Another theory of Dvaita Vedanta which needs to be critically examined is the nature of relation of Brahman to the jīvas and also the universe (jagat). This is of greater importance in Vedanta than that of upadanatva of Brahman. All schools of Vedanta have admitted on the basis of the Upanisadic teaching, the three metaphysical principles, viz., Brahman, nva, and jagat. The Śvetāśvatara describes these as bhoktā (pva), bhogya (object of experience) and preritara or controller of both. What is the nature of the relationship between these three ontological entities? This has engaged the attention of all the schools of Vedanta and divergent views are expressed regarding this matter. Even at the time of Bādarāyaṇa, different views were held on this question by the ancient Vedanta teachers such as Aśmarathya, Audulomi and Kāśakṛtsna, as is evident from the references made to them by name in the Vedantasūtra. The issue involved is whether the relationship between Brahman and the jīvas and also Brahman and jagat is one of non-difference (abheda) or difference (bheda) or difference and non-difference (bhedābheda). If it is non-difference (abheda), is it absolute non-difference (kevala-abheda) in the sense of identity (tādātmya) or viśiṣṭa-abheda in the sense of oneness of a qualified entity. Logically these are three possibilities for explaining the relationship between the three ontological

entities admitted in the Vedanta. An answer to this important issue determines the nature of the Vedanta school as Advaita, Visistādvaita, Dvaita, and Bhedābheda. Students of Vedānta are familiar with these views and it is not necessary to go into these details. Śańkara admits the relation of absolute nondifference (kevala-bheda). His Vedānta is therefore characterized as Advaita or Absolute non-dualism. As against this theory, Madhva subscribes to the theory of kevala-bheda or absolute difference between the three ontological entities. His Vedanta is therefore designated as Dvaita. Bhāskara and Yādavaprakāśa and the later followers of their doctrine adopt bhedabhedavāda or both difference and non-difference between Brahman and the other two ontological entities. Rāmānuja, on the contrary, accepts both bheda and abheda relation from different stand points unlike Bhāskara and Yādavaprakāśa. That is, the three ontological principles are absolutely different (atyantabheda) but Brahman as inherently or inseparably related to jīvas and the jagat (viśiṣṭa tattva) is one (abheda). Hence the Vedanta of Rāmānuja is designated as Visista-Advaita or oneness or Brahman as organically related to nvas and jagat. We shall not enter into the discussion of the details of these doctrines. We are at present only concerned with the consideration of the issue whether the stand adopted by Madhva in this regard is philosophically sustainable.

As pointed out earlier, the Upanisads speak of both difference and also non-difference between these ontological entities. There are some Upanisadic texts which speak of non-difference between Brahman and jīva and also Brahman and the jagat. There are also several Upanisadic texts which point out that the three ontological entities are different by virtue of their intrinsic nature. The Upanisads which is the Revealed Scripture cannot teach two different theories. The apparent conflict therefore needs to be reconciled. Each exponent of Vedānta offers his own explanation to reconcile this conflict. Sankara who upholds the doctrine of absolute non-difference (abheda or advaita) accords greater validity to the Upanisadic texts teaching non-difference such as Tat-tvam-asi, Aham brahmāsmi, Ayam ātmā brahma and lesser validity to the texts speaking of difference between Brahman and jīva and Brahman and jagat.

Madhva, on the contrary, who subscribes to the theory of bheda or difference among the ontological entities accords greater validity to the texts speaking bheda and lesser validity or importance to the texts teaching non-difference. The abheda referred to in the Upanisadic texts is taken by Madhva in a figurative sense. As a compromise between these two extreme views, Bhāskara and Yādavaprakāśa as well as other bhedābhedavādins speak of both difference an non-difference. As these two concepts—bheda and abheda—involve self-contradiction, it has not received serious attention of the Vedāntins.

Rāmānuja, on the other hand, attempts to reconcile the conflict by according equal validity to both kinds of Upanişadic texts. He admits both bheda and abheda between the three ontological entities-from different standpoints. The three ontological entities—*İśvara*, cit, and acit—are different as taught in the Upanisad, by virtue of the difference in respect of their intrinsic nature. But at the same time, abheda or unity of the three entities is maintained by emphasizing the fact that Brahman as organically related to the jivas and the universe (as a višista tattva) is one Reality. This explanation is offered on the authority of Antaryāmī Brāhmaņa of the Brhadāraņyaka Upanisad which repeatedly points out that Brahman abides in all the sentient and non-sentient entities as their Inner Controller, and all the entities are its śarīra or body in a metaphysical sense; while Brahman itself is the Universal Self (śarīrī). The merit of this theory is that both the bheda śrutis and abheda śrutis are accorded equal validity by admitting both abheda and bheda in their primary sense. That is, Brahman as organically related to the jīvas and the jagat, is one višista Reality, while the three ontological entities are absolutely different by virtue of their intrinsic nature.

This explanation offered by Rāmānuja is in full conformity with the views expressed by Bādarāyaṇa in the Vedāntasūtras. There are two adhikaraṇas (topical sections) which directly deal with the questions of the relation of Brahman and jīvas. The first one is named Vākyānvayādhikaraṇa, in the fourth pāda of the first adhyāya, in which the relation of jīvātman to Brahman is dealt with. The second is called Amśādhikaraṇa included in the second pāda of the second adhyāya, in which

the nature of the relation of jīva to Brahman is specifically explained by Bādarāyaņa. As regards the relation of Brahman to jagat is concerned, it is discussed in Ārambhaņādhikaraņa and Ahikuṇḍalādhikaraṇa included in the second pāda of the third adhyāya.

In the Vākyānvayādhikaraņa, as explained both by Śaṅkara and Rāmānuja, Bādarāyaṇa, while discussing the import of the term ātman employed in the passage of Maitreyī Brāhmaṇa, mentions names of three sages, Asmarathya, Audulomi, and Kāsakṛtsna, who held differing views regarding the relation of jīva to Brahman.8 The sūtras containing the views of Asmarathya and Audulomi, as interpreted by Sankara and Rāmānuja, convey that the relation of jīva to Brahman is either difference (abheda) or difference and non-difference (bhedābheda). The view expressed by Kāsakṛtsna is regarded as the view of Bādarāyaṇa both by Śankara and Rāmānuja. The relevant sutra reads: avasthiteh iti Kāsakrtsnah (VS, I.4.22). It means that the Supreme Self (Paramatman) exists in the individual self (avasthiteh). Śankara interprets the term avasthiti in the sense that the highest self exists as if it were nva, to conform to the doctrine of identity of jīva and Brahman. But the term taken in the proper sense should mean, as Rāmānuja interprets, that Brahman abides in jīvātman. According to the Antaryāmī Brāhmana of Brhadāranyaka Upanişad, Brahman abides in jīvātman (ya atmani tisthan), as its antaryāmin. In view of it, the implication of this sūtra with reference to the relation of jīva to Brahman, is not non-difference, as Śańkara interprets, but one of inherent relation and by virtue of Brahman's immanence in the jīva, the two as inseparably related is one (viśista vivakṣayā ekatva), as explained by Vedānta Deśika 9

This explanation, though not explicitly conveyed in the Vākyānvayādhikaraņa, becomes evident in the Amśādhikaraņa, in which Bādarāyaṇa states clearly that jīva is an amśa of Brahman. The relevant sūtra reads: "amśo nānā vyapadeśāt anyathā ca." 10 It means that the jīvātman is part of Brahman on account of difference and otherwise also. Its implication is that some Scriptural texts speak of difference between jīva and Brahman (nānā vyapadeśāt), while other texts speak of

non-difference (anyathā ca). In order to reconcile both these conflicting teachings, jīva is to be regarded as amśa or part of Brahman. The term amśa literally means part but jīva cannot be taken as part of Brahman for the reason that Brahman is niravyaya or devoid of parts. It is therefore interpreted in two ways: (a) as if it is a part (amśa iva), as Śankara means and (b) as an essential characteristic of Brahman (asādhārana dharma) of a viśiṣṭa entity as Rāmānuja explains. The meaning offered by Śankara is not tenable because Brahman and jīva are not identical but are different by nature. Hence the other meaning offered by Rāmānuja is more appropriate since it conforms to the views of bheda and abheda with regard to jīva's relation to Brahman.

These two sūtras—"Avasthiteh iti Kāsakṛtsnah" and "Amso nānā-vyapadeśāt anyathā ca" clearly indicate that Brahman and nva are inherently related and in view of it, the two though are different, can also be regarded as non-different by virtue of its immanence in it. If such an explanation is not admitted it would not be possible to uphold the validity of the two kinds of Upanisadic texts speaking of both difference and non-difference in the primary sense. The other plausible explanationas adopted by Śańkara is that only Brahman is absolutely real, whereas the  $\bar{p}vas$  are illusory being the reflections of Brahman in the antahkaranas. As there is only one Reality which is absolutely real, abheda or non-difference stands established. The texts which teach difference between Brahman and jīvas are to be taken, according to Śańkara, in a secondary sense and these are of lesser validity, as compared to the texts emphasizing abheda. But this explanation as pointed out earlier, is untenable, because Scriptural texts speak of both difference and non-difference between Brahman and jīvas in the primary sense, as conveyed by the expressions  $n\bar{a}n\bar{a}$ and anyathā vyapadeśāt by Bādarāyaņa. The term vyapadeśa implies primary sense, according to Pāṇini.

In dealing with the subject of relation of Brahman and jīvas, Madhva takes an altogether different stand and in this respect, he deviates from the teachings of the Upaniṣads and also Vedāntasūtra. The Upaniṣads explicitly mention that Brahman and jīva are non-different in such statements as Tat-tvam-asi,

Aham brahmāsmi, Ayam ātmā brahma. Based on the Upanişadic texts Bādarāyana also acknowledges abheda relation as conveyed in the two sūtras to which we have referred. In order to accommodate the teachings of the abheda śrutis, Bādarāyaņa employs the terms avasthiti and amsa in these sutras respectively. Madhva does not admit that Vākyānvayādhikaraņa deals with the subject of the relation of jīva to Brahman. This adhikarana and the relevant sūtras are explained in a different way without reference to jīva's relation to Brahman. The sūtra in the Amśādhikarana is no doubt acknowledged by him as dealing with the subject of jīva's relation to Brahman but he offers a different explanation to the term amsa, to fit with his premise that abheda spoken of in the sūtra is to be taken in the secondary sense. The term amsa for Madhva implies sadrsya or similarity between Brahman and nva in respect of some qualities, such as jñāna and ānanda. Mere similarity between two entities, such as moon and the face of an attractive woman, cannot prove non-difference between the two. To overcome the objection, the followers of Madhva add the qualification of dependence of one on the other (tadadhīnatva), as in the example of the jar on the floor. But the dependence of one on the other (tadadhīna) also does not convey an inherent relation because such relation is separable. The word avasthiti employed by the Vedäntasūtra on the basis of Antaryāmī Brāhmana refers to a permanent and inseparable relationship between jīva and Brahman. Madhva uses the terms bimba and pratibimba to explain the relation of Brahman to jīva. Brahman is bimba, while jīva is its pratibimba, not in the sense of reflection, as Advaitin says but in a technical sense as a dependent reality. Even this explanation does not prove the intimate or inherent relationship that exists between these ontological entities, as conveyed by the terms avasthiti and amsa employed by Bādarāyaņa to affirm the relation of non-difference (abheda) in the sense of organic unity or oneness as a qualified entity (viśista-tattva). This is the criticism that is leveled against Madhva's theory of jīva's relation to Brahman from the standpoint of Višistādvaita.

The same kind of criticism holds good in respect of the relation of Brahman to jagat. As pointed out earlier, the

Ārambhanādhikarana and Ahikundalādhikarana of the Vedāntasūtras deal with the question of the relation of the universe to Brahman. The Vedantasutra mentioned in the Ārambhaṇādhikaraṇa deals with the question whether Brahman which is the cause of the universe and the jagat which is its effect is different or non-different. The relevant sūtra reads: Tad-ananyatvam ārambhana śabdādibhyah. 11 This sūtra is framed by Bādarāyana on the basis of the Chāndogya passage in which the causal relation between Brahman and the jagat is discussed on the analogy of the clay and the pot, etc., made out of it. The word arambhana mentioned in the sūtra occurs in this Upanișadic statement (vācārambhaṇam vikāro...).12 The word ananyatva is used to explain that cause and effect are not absolutely different, as Naiyāyikas believe but are non-distinct as otherwise a causal relationship cannot be satisfactorily explained.

This sūtra, if properly interpreted, implies that though Brahman as cause and the jagat as effect are different they are also non-different (ananya) in the sense that it is the same Brahman as associated with cit and acit in their subtle form becomes Brahman as associated with cit and acit in, their gross from after the creation of the universe. This is the view expressed by Rāmānuja. It is necessary to adopt this interpretation to explain the non-difference between Brahman and jagat, as conveyed in such Upaniṣadic texts as sarvam khalu idam brahma, ātmevaidam sarvam, etc., which equate Brahman and jagat.

Madhva does not accept this view. This sūtra in the Ārambhaṇādhikaraṇa is interpreted in a different way. In the first place he does not make any reference to the passage of the Chāndogya in which the word ārambhaṇa is used and the same term used in the sūtra. He quotes as the viṣayavākya a statement from Rgveda which refers to the origin of the universe, though contextually this passage in not relevant for the sūtra formulated by Bādarāyaṇa to discuss the causal relationship between Brahman and jagat. Madhva attempts, by adopting a novel interpretation of the sūtra, to prove through a double negation (ananyatva) that Brahman is the independent

cause and all the accessories such as prakṛti, jīvas, kāla, karma, etc., are by hypothesis metaphysically dependent on Brahman. 13

The Ahikundaladhikarana included in the second pada of third adhyāya specifically discusses the question of relation of the universe to Brahman, according to Rāmānuja (the relation of jīva to Brahman, according to Śankara). Bādarāyaņa introduces three sūtras14 in which he refers to the different views regarding the nature of the relation in terms of bhedābheda and abheda (non-difference) by citing two illustrations: (1) The serpent and its coil (ahi-kundala) and (2) The luminous body and its light (prakāśa and prakāśāśraya). The illustration of the serpent and its coil conveys the idea of differencecum-non-difference between Brahman and jīva, according to Samkara. As a serpent it is one but if we look at the coils, there is difference. On the basis of this explanation, the  $\bar{n}va$ . prior to its liberation, is different and after liberation, it becomes identical with Brahman. According to Rāmānuja, this illustration conveys the idea of non-difference between Brahman and the non-sentient universe. That is, the non-sentient universe constitutes the special form (samsthana visesa) of Brahman, as coil of the serpent. The illustration of light and its substrate indicates both difference and non-difference. The light and its luminous body are different but at the same time they are identical insofar as both are of the same nature of lustre (tejas).

Both these sūtras are taken to support two prima facie views, both according to Śańkara and Rāmānuja, since Bādarāyaṇa offers his view in a subsequent sūtra. The sūtra in which Bādarāyaṇa conveys his own view reads as pūrvavad vā. It literally means as stated previously. The word vā implies that the view contained in the present sūtra is different from the two prima facie theories referred to earlier which are considered to be defective.

Śańkara, as an advocate of the doctrine of identity refers to an earlier  $s\bar{u}tra$ ,  $^{15}$  which speaks of non-difference between  $j\bar{v}va$  and Brahman as in the case of the luminous body such as the sun and its reflection in the waves. Brahman is one but it appears as many  $j\bar{v}vas$  due to the limiting adjuncts.

Rāmānuja, who does not subscribe to the theory of absolute oneness or tādātmya of jīva and Brahman, refers to the sūtra

in the Amśādhikarana in which the relation of jīva to Brahman is explained in terms of amśa, which property interpreted implies an integral part in the sense of an essential or distinguishing attribute being inherently related to its substance. By virtue of Brahman abiding eternally in jīva, as stated in the Antaryāmī Brāhmaṇa and also by Bādarāyaṇa by using the expression avasthiteḥ. Brahman and jīva are non-different in the sense that Brahman as organically or inherently related to jīva is one as a viśiṣṭa tattva, though Brahman and jīva are different by their very nature. Thus the relation of both abheda and bheda between Brahman and jīva as well as Brahman and jagat are reconciled without relegating bheda śrutis to the category of lesser validity.

Madhva unfortunately does not acknowledge that Ahikundalādhikarana deals with the relation of either nva to Brahman, as Śańkara does, nor that between universe and Brahman, as Rāmānuja interprets. According to him, these sūtras deal with the question of the relation of Brahman and its attributes. He raises the issue, claimed as the prima facie theory, whether the attributes such as bliss (ananda), knowledge, power, etc. can also constitute the essence of Brahman. According to Bādarāyaṇa, as interpreted by Madhva, there is no contradiction in Brahman being the essence of these attributes and also it possessing these attributes as its property since both these facts are borne by the testimony of Sruits. The illustrations cited by Bādarāyaņa are intended, according to Madhva, to prove the identity of the attributes with Brahman on the basis on the doctrine of non-difference between guna and gunī admitted by Madhya.

Without entering into the discussion of the merit of this interpretation it may be noted that Madhva as an advocate of Dvaita Vedānta does not admit that the Ahikuṇḍalādhikaraṇa establishes that Brahman and jagat are non-different in any way. Similarly, he does not admit that the Vākyānvayādhikaraṇa deals with the theory of non-difference between Brahman and jīva. Even Amśādhikaraṇa, which is devoted to discuss the relation of jīva and Brahman, as is evident in the sūtra, does not support the difference between the two in the primary sense on the basis of the inherent relationship between the

two, as explained by Rāmānuja on the basis of the sūtra and the Upaniṣads. Difference between the three ontological entities is of greater importance to Madhva than any kind of oneness (abheda) or organic unity. Such a theory of relationship between the three ontological entities, viz., Īśvara, jīva, jagat does not conform either to the Upaniṣadic teachings or the Vedānta-sūtras of Bādarāyaṇa. This is a major drawback of Dvaita Vedānta in the same way as Advaita Vedānta of Śaṅkara which suffers from the defect of emphasizing absolute non-difference without acknowledging the real difference that exists between Brahman and jīva as well as jagat, as warranted by the Scriptural texts and the Vedāntasūtras.

The third major theory of Dvaita Vedānta which is also open to criticism is ānanda-tāratamya or the gradations of experience of ānanda or bliss in the state of mukti by the muktas or the souls liberated from bondage. This theory is advanced by Madhva on the basis of the premise that jīvas including the mukta jīvas are different from each other in respect of their intrinsic nature (svarūpataḥ bheda) and hence even in the state of mokṣa each jīva enjoys only its quantum of ānanda in accordance with its status. In support of this unusual theory, not accepted by any other earlier Vedānta schools, either Bhāskara, Yādavaprakāśa and Rāmānuja, Madhva seeks the support from a few Upaniṣadic passage and in particular the passage in the Ānandavallī of Taittirīya, by misconstruing the import of the text in favour of his theory.

Whatever may be the merit of this theory, it does not conform either to the teachings of the Upanisads or the Vedāntasūtras of Bādarāyaṇa dealing with the status of mukta. The major point of criticism against this theory, as explicitly stated by Vedānta Deśika. Paramata-bhanga also in one of his works, 16 is that it is opposed to the text of Mundaka Upanisad, which categorically states that the jīva, after it is liberated from bondage, attains a status of sāmya or similarity with Brahman. The relevant text reads: niranjanah paramam sāmyam upaiti. 17 The Bhagavadgītā also reiterates the same by using the expression sādharmya or equality. The Taittirīya Upanisad specifically states that the muktātmā enjoys all the auspicious

qualities of Brahman along with Brahman (so' aśnute sarvān kāmān saha brahmaṇā vipaścita). In view of these Scriptural texts. Vedānta Deśika remarks that Ānandatīrtha (Madhva) in advocating the Ānandatāratamya, ignored the Sāmyaśruti. 19

Further, there is no difference between one mukta nva and another in the state of moksa. The difference between one jīva and another is made only in respect of the nature of the body assumed by it. Intrinsically, they are alike. This is well brought out in the verses of the sixth adhyāya of Bhagavadgītā, as correctly interpreted by Rāmānuja. 20 With the removal of bondage and dissolution of the body, the jīvas are not different. They are all alike in respect of their intrinsic nature. The plurality of jīvas is due to the fact that they are infinite in number (ananta) and also are eternal (nitya), as stated in the Upanisads. The postulation of a visesa or a special quality as inherent in each jīva to distinguish one from the other is logically not sustainable, as it cannot be proved by any of the pramānas. This point is brought out in the criticism levelled against the theory of viśesa postulated by the Vaiśesika as a separate concept. 21 If one  $j\bar{i}va$  is to be distinguished from another, it is done on the basis of the upādhi or limiting conditions such as time factor (kāla), place (deśa) and functions performed and more importantly with reference to the type of the body with which it is associated due to past karma, during the state of bondage. In the state of moksa, if a distinction is drawn between one mukta and another mukta and such as Viśvaksena, Ādiśeṣa, and Garuḍa, who perform special services for the Lord, these are due to the functions they perform in accordance with the sankalpa or Paramātman. Hence Madhva's doctrine of Anandatāratamya is unsound philosophically and logically.

### REFERENCES

- 1. See SD, opening verse.
- 2. Ch. Up., VI.1.4.
- 3. VS, I.4.24.
- 4. Pāṇini, sūtra I.4.30: Janikartuh prakṛtih.
- 5. See Madhva, Brahmasūtrabhāsya, I.4.24

- 6. See Ch. Up., VI.1.3: Tad aikṣata bahusyām prajāyeyeti. Also see, The Philosophy of the Vedantasūtra, 5, p. 68.
- 7. See SD, vāda 52. Also FVV, p. 247.
- 8. VS, I.4.20-22. See also The Philosophy of the Vedāntasūtra, pp.106-9.
- 9. See Nyāyasiddhāñjana, opening page.
- 10. VS, II.3.43.
- 11. Ibid., II.1.15.
- 12. Ch. Up., VI.1.1.
- 13. See B.N.K. Sharma, Brahmasūtras, vol. I, pp. 368-69.
- 14. VS, III.2.27-29.
- Ibid., III.2.25: Prakāśādivacca avaiseyam prakāśaśca karmaņyabhyasat.
- 16. See Rahasyatrayasāra, chap. 22. See also p. 23.
- 17. Muṇḍ. Up., III.1.3.
- 18. BG, XIV.2: Idam jñānam upāśritya mama sādharmyam āgatāh.
- 19. See RTS, 22.
- 20. See BG, VI.29-31.
- 21. See chap. 8.

# 17

# Bhedābheda Vedānta of Bhāskara and Yādavaprakāśa

s different from Advaita Vedanta of Śankara, a few other schools of Vedanta were developed by the exponents such as Bhāskara, Yādavaprakāśa, Nimbārka, and the followers of Caitanya. Chronologically Bhāskara and Yādavaprakāśa came soon after Śankara but earlier than Rāmānuja and Madhva, whereas Nimbārka came after Rāmānuja and Madhva. 1 The followers of Caitanya came long after Madhva. Though all these schools are categorized under the heading of the Bhedābhedavādins or the upholders of the doctrine that the relationship between Brahman and the jīva as well as Brahman and the jagat is one of difference and non-difference, they are acknowledged as distinct schools of Vedanta and designated differently as Aupādhika-bhedābhedavāda (Bhāskara), Svābhāvika-bhedābhedavāda (Yādava and Nimbārka) and Acintya-bhedābhedavāda (Caitanya). Earlier than Śaṅkara, Bhāskara, and Yādavaprakāśa, Bhartṛprapañca had advocated Bhedābhedavāda. He is stated to have upheld Brahma-pariņāmavāda or transformation of Brahman itself as jagat and also the bhedābheda relation between Brahman and jīva as well as Brahman and jagat. Except the extensive references made to his views by Śańkara and Sureśvara, we do not have any of

As the literature on Bhartṛprapañca is not available, it is not taken up for examination. As regards the extant Bhedābheda schools, Vedānta Deśika has included a separate chapter for Bhāskara and Yādavaprakāśa under the title Bhāskarādibhaṅgādhīkāra (adhikāra 13). The word ādi implies all other

Bhedābhedavādins. The objective of including these schools in the Paramata-bhanga is to prove that the concept of bhedābheda is not logically tenable and the system of Vedānta based on this doctrine is totally opposed to Višiṣṭādāvaita Vedānta. The later schools founded by Nimbārka and the followers of Caitanya are not included in the Paramata-bhanga for the obvious reason that they came into existence long after Vedānta Deśika. However, as these are modified forms of the Vedānta of Bhāskara and Yādavaprakāśa, the criticisms offered against Bhāskara and Yādavaprakāśa would also be applicable to them. We shall therefore present a critical review of the schools of Yādavaprakāśa and Bhāskara in detail and mention briefly about other later schools of Bhedābheda, though not dealt with by Vedānta Deśika.

In the Paramata-bhanga the school of Bhaskara comes up for critical examination soon after the examination of Jainism in the same way as the Advaita of Śańkara follows soon after Buddhism. Though both Advaita of Sankara and the Bhedabheda of Bhāskara are orthodox Vedānta schools based on the Upanisads and the Vedāntasūtra, the justification for consideration of these schools along with the unorthodox non-Vedic schools—Buddhism and Jainism is that in the opinion of Vedanta Deśika, both these schools have some common features in respect of their main tenets with that of Buddhism and Jainism respectively. Though prima facie such a treatment accorded to Advaita and Bhāskara's Vedānta is not fair, it is not considered inappropriate by Vedanta Desika for the main reason that Advaita has adopted the postulate of avidyā to account for the phenomenal character of jīvas and jagat in the same way as the Mādhyamika Buddhists adopt the concept of samurti to explain the existence of the phenomenal universe. Similarly Bhāskara has admitted the concept of Bhedābheda of Jainism, ignoring the self-contradiction involved in it, to explain the nature of the relation of Brahman to jīvas as in the case of Jainas for whom the relation of dravyas to the paryāyas (attributes) is one of bheda and abheda. Hence Vedānta Deśika characterizes Advaita as Pracchanna-bauddha and Bhāskara as Jaina-gandhi-vedāntī. Though this phraseology may sound as a strong criticism, it is employed to indicated the defective

nature of both these schools of Vedānta, since the concept of avidyā in the sense understood by Advaita as sadasad-vilakṣaṇa has no basis in the Upaniṣads or the Brahmasūtras. Similarly the description of the relation of Brahman to jīvas as one of abheda and bheda logically involves a self-contradiction. This is a general criticism applicable to all schools of Bhedābheda in whichever form it is presented.

## CRITICISM OF THE DOCTRINE OF YADAVAPRAKAŚA

Coming to the detailed criticism of the Bhedābhedavādas, Vedānta Deśika first takes up the main doctrine of Yādavaprakāśa because the criticisms levelled against this school are also applicable to Bhāskara. According to Yādavaprakāśa, Brahman which is conceived as sat is the only ultimate Reality. It is of the nature of self-luminous knowledge (svaprakāśa) and omnipotence (sarva-śakti). It comprises three parts (amśas). These are Īśvara or God, puruṣa or the jīva and prakṛti or the primordial cosmic matter. All these are eternal and non-different from Brahman.

Vedānta Deśika points out that such a conception of the ultimate Reality is most unsound, because it is opposed to the teachings of the Upaniṣads which categorically state that Brahman is niramśa or devoid of parts and that it is different from prakṛti as well as puruṣa and that Īśvara is the very Brahman.<sup>2</sup> It may be objected that, the three principles, viz., Īśvara, jīva and prakṛti as amśas of Brahman are different from the sat and hence it cannot be claimed that sat is one Reality. This objection is ruled out by Yādavaprakāśa on the ground that the element of sat is recurrent in all the three and as such all the three principles are not different from Brahman. This is explained on the analogy of the ocean and the foam (phena), bubbles, waves, etc., arising from the calm sea water. Though the modifications of the calm sea are different from the sea, these are not actually different from the sea.

This explanation does not hold good, contends Vedānta Deśika. When all the modifications of the sea water become re-absorbed in the sea, it is not possible to determine the part of the sea in which these are absorbed and the part from which

they again arise (avyavasthitabhāga). If this position is accepted it would follow that each time the jivas come into existence similar to the rise of the waves. Such a theory would militate against the theory of eternality of Iśvara, jīva and prakṛti. Besides, the new jīvas would be subjected to the experience of the effects of karma not experienced in earlier births and also the destruction of the effects of deeds acquired in earlier births. If it be argued that the origin of these tattvas takes place from a separate fixed part of sat (vyavasthita-bhāga), then it would amount to the admission of four parts in sat instead of three. Another difficulty arises with regard to explaining the relationship between the fourth part and the other three parts and in terms of bheda or abheda. The admission of both bheda and abheda involves contradiction. If it is both bheda and abheda, then the criticism offered against the Jaina theory of bheda and abheda would also apply to this case.

Coming to further details of the threefold nature of sat, Vedānta Deśika points out that the concept of Īśvara as an amśa of Brahman is defective. Īśvara as part of Brahman is regarded as possessing unsurpassing jñāna, ānanda, aiśvarya (glory) and that these qualities become eternally manifest (āvirbhūta) in Him. This view cannot be sustained. If these qualities are already present in Brahman which is comparable to the calm ocean free from waves, etc., then these should be present at all times in Brahman since these are not eclipsed by anything else. In that case, if they become newly manifest in Īśvara, then these attributes become newly revealed in Īśvara. If it is argued that their manifestation in Īśvara is due to the fact that He is part of Brahman, then they should also be manifest in the jīvas and prakṛti since these are also amśas of Brahman. But it is not so.

Yādavaprakāśa admits that Īśvara is also of threefold nature viz., vijñānamaya, manomaya, and prāṇamaya. If this means that the svarūpa of Īśvara comprises three forms, then it would militate against the several Scriptural texts which emphasise the unitary character of Īśvara.

There are a few other arguments advanced in support of the concept of *Īśvara* as threefold. But these, when subjected to critical analysis, fall to the ground.<sup>3</sup>

The theory of pva as part of Brahman is also open to criticism. According to Yadavaprakasa, the difference between nva and Brahman is not caused by upādhi or limiting adjuncts as in the case of Bhāskara, but it is svābhāvika, that is, it is real and natural. In such a theory, only one, the samaṣṭi-puruṣa or the aggregate of all nvas known as Hiranyagarbha, is regarded as bhoktā or the subject of all experiences and all the other individual jīvas who are different, are the modifications of the samasti-purusa. Such individual selves are separate from each other with their own bodies. They are anu in nature and numerous. They are also eternal (nityas). Such an explanation offered by Yādavaprakāśa is defective because it militates against the Scriptural teaching which emphasizes the eternality of jīva (jīva nityatva). This is according to the view that jīvas are modifications of the samaṣṭi-puruṣa. If, on the other hand, the individual jīvas are also taken as different part of the aggregate purușa (samudāya ekadeśa-viśeșa) similar to the trees of the jungle (vana) and the individual trees (vrksadīnām vana), then there would be no difference between samastipurusa and single individual jīva, just as the trees of the jungle are not different from the individual trees.

It may be argued that  $\bar{pivas}$  are parts of Brahman and hence some attributes of Brahman are manifest in some  $\bar{pivas}$  while some are eclipsed. Therefore the samasti  $\bar{piva}$  and manifested  $\bar{pivas}$  differ from each other. But such an explanation does not hold good. If the feature of  $\bar{piva}$  being an  $am\dot{s}a$  of Brahman is common to all  $\bar{pivas}$ , then the gunas of Brahman should be equally present in all  $\bar{pivas}$  at all times. It is possible to explain that these differences in the  $\bar{pivas}$  are the natural qualities of the  $\bar{pivas}$ , similar to the general qualities such as rupa, rasa, etc., in objects. But such gunas cannot constitute the attributes of Brahman as sat which is recurrent in all  $am\dot{s}as$ .

The classification of jīvas into three main categories such as siddhas, baddhas, and muktas and further classification of siddhas into two groups as ajñānasiddhas and yogasiddhas is also defective as it is not warranted by any Scriptural and Smṛti texts. In the same way the description of ajñānasiddhas as aids or those that are serviceable to Iśvara (upakarana-bhūta) and the yoga-siddhas as those who possess supernatural

powers such as animā, garimā, etc., is also defective. This view also stands rejected since the yogasiddhas have been included among the category of baddhas.

The theory of three types of bondage, viz., prakṛti-bandha, vaikārika-bandha, and daksiņa-bandha with which baddha jīvas are associated is also unsound as it is opposed to the commonly associated theory of bondage in the form of punya-pāpa-rūpa karma.

In the case of mukta jīvas, it is believed that only seven gunas (attributes) become manifested in the state of mukti. This is also opposed to the Scriptural text according to which eight gunas which are inherent in jīvātman become manifested in the state of mukti.4 If muktas are free to enjoy ananda or bliss of Brahman there should be no objection to admit satyasankalpatva too, which is the eighth guna, in the state of mukti.

There are a few other details regarding the relationship between Brahman and pva in the state of mukti. All these are

unsound, contends Vedānta Deśika.5

The views advanced regarding the nature of prakrti which is a part of Brahman according to Yadava are also untenable. If prakrti is part of Brahman, it is not appropriate to regard it as acetana on the ground that brahma-gunas are eclipsed in it. According to the Smrti texts, it is acetana by its very nature.6 According to Yādavaprakāśa prakrti itself is of three kinds, viz., kāla (time), paramākāśa (transcendental world) and avyaktam (unmanifest prakrti). This view is untenable because it is opposed to the commonly accepted pramāṇas according to which prakṛti is different from kāla and paramākāśa.

Coming to the evolutes of prakrti, Yadava makes a distinction between jñānendriyas and karmendriyas. The karmendriyas are regarded as having been produced for each body separately. There is no pramana in support of this view. Such an explanation is opposed to the statements which mention the origin and dissolution of all indriyas. This is also opposed to the Vedāntasūtra and Smṛti texts which teach about the nature of indriyas—

both jñāna and karmendriyas.

In conclusion Vedānta Deśika refers to the following invocatory verse of Kātyāyanakārikā which is considered to be the basis for Bhedābhedavāda of Yādavaprakāśa and which is claimed as the view of a sage:

Īśvara avyākṛta prāna virat bhūtendriyormibhih; yūt pranṛtyadiva ābhāti tasmai sad-brahmane namah.

I offer my salutation to that sat which is Brahman and from which emanate like waves (from the calm sea) *Īśvara*, unmanifest prakṛti (avyākṛta) and prāṇa, buddhi, ahankāra, and indriyas as well as elements.

Even if this is considered as a doctrine promulgated by a sage, it is to be ignored since it is opposed to the Scriptural teachings.

In the same way, the doctrine advanced by Brahmadatta (claimed to be an exponent of Bhedābhedavāda and svarūpa-pariṇāma for Brahman, stands rejected on the basis of the criticisms advanced against Yādavaprakāśa. If Śruti and Smṛti texts speak of bhedābheda between ontological entities, these are to be explained on the basis of bheda and abheda from different standpoints (viśiṣṭa ākāra bheda).

#### CRITICISM OF THE DOCTRINE OF BHASKARA

Similar to the doctrine of Yādavaprakāśa, Bhāskara also maintains that sat which denotes Brahman is the only one ultimate Reality. It contains in it *Īśvarāmśa* or the aspect of *Īśvara* which is eternally Omniscient and Omnipotent (sarvaśakta). It is also associated with upādhi or the limiting adjunct named avidyā, which unlike in Advaita Vedānta is real and which transforms itself into prakṛti and its evolutes such as mahat, ahaṅkāra, etc. It is always acetanā or non-sentient in character. *Īśvara*, who is eternal and anādi, takes the form of jīvas due to the association with upādhi in the form of bodies caused by avidyā. When jīvas become free from the limiting conditions, they become one with *Īśvara*. This is explained on the analogy of ether (ākāśa) which is one, becomes many when conditioned by several pots, but with the destruction of the pots several ākāśas become one.

Vedānta Deśika points out that all these arguments advanced by Bhāskara to establish his doctrine of behdābheda are untenable when these are subjected to critical analysis. In other words, the main teaching of Bhāskara, viz., that sat denoting Brahman alone is one Reality and that it comprises two parts, viz., cit and acit in the form of *Īśvara* and that these are different and non-different from the *upādhi*, are opposed to Śruti and Smṛti texts. Besides as in the case of Jaina doctrine of *bhedābheda* relation between *dravya* and *paryāyas* or qualities, it is logically untenable since *bheda* and *abheda* are mutually contradictory.

According to Bhāskara, jīva and Īśvara are essentially nondifferent (svābhāvika-abheda) but they are different due to the limiting condition (aupādhika). That is, jīva is considered different due to the association of avidyā with Brahman. This is similar to the ocean and the waves, etc., arising from it. Though the waves and the ocean are essentially the same, the waves as such are regarded as different from the ocean. When the waves subside, the two become one.

The distinction drawn between svābhāvika abheda and aupādhikabheda between Brahman and jīva cannot be established either by pratyaksa or anumana due to the fact that both these ontological entities are beyond the scope of perception. In the absence of perception, inference which is dependent on the basis of invariable concomitance (vyāptī) between sādhya and hetu cannot also be formulated to prove the theory. The Scriptural texts also do not reveal that there is svābhāvika-abheda and aupādhikabheda between these two ontological entities. The Scriptural texts which speak of both abheda (tat-tvamasi) and bheda (such as  $j\tilde{n}a$   $aj\tilde{n}a$ ) and also texts referring to the relationship between the two in terms of śarīra and śarīrī do not explicitly convey the idea of aupādhika-bheda between Iśvara and jīva. If some Scriptural texts refer to the oneness of jīva and Brahman in the state of mukti, it is to be understood in the sense of sāmya or sādharmya or equal status in respect of certain attributes but not absolute.

The Mundaka text<sup>8</sup> which states on the analogy of the rivers flowing into the ocean becoming one with it, do not imply absolute dissolution or absorption of river water with sea water. It signifies that the river water is mixed with sea water and the two become indistinguishable but not totally lost. This is to be understood in the same way as in the illustration cited in the Katha Upaniṣad<sup>9</sup> about the water in a small vessel, when poured into pure water contained in a jug becomes

the same (tādṛgeva-bhavati). This does not mean that water of the small vessel becomes absorbed or lost in it, but on the other hand, it only means that it remains mixed with it and also becomes pure. This is evident from the fact that the level of water in the jug increases with the mixing of water of the small vessel.

The illustration of the ākāśa, conditioned by the pots of different sizes, becomes one with the all-pervasive ākāśa with the destruction of the pots, does not support the theory of Bhāskara, viz., that the jīvas which are conditioned by the bodies become identical with Brahman because conditioned ākāśas do not acquire any new character of identity (svarūpaikyāpatti). The jīvas by their very nature are the same as Brahman, according to Bhāskara. The characteristic of their being different from Brahman caused by limiting conditions ceases to exist. In the same way, jīva which by its very nature is one with Brahman, assumes the same condition as it was before with the cessation of karma.

There are similar statements in the *Viṣṇupurāṇa*<sup>10</sup> which prima facie lend support to the theory of Bhāskara. But these texts, if properly interpreted with reference to the context, emphasise the difference that exists between *jīvas* and Brahman and they do not prove absolute identity.<sup>11</sup>

If, according to the central doctrine of Bhāskara, jīva is the very Brahman conditioned by the limiting adjunct, it is not possible to speak of difference between the two ontological entities of different nature only on the basis of upādhi, on the analogy of the limited  $\bar{a}k\bar{a}sa$  and the all-pervasive ethereal ākāśa conditioned by the pots. Besides, it would militate against the Gītā teaching which describes jīva as acchedya or nondivisible. If that part of the all-pervasive Brahman becomes nva when it is conditioned by the upadhi in the form the body, then with the change of the bodies new jīvas which condition other parts of Brahman, would not be able to carry with it the experiences of the deeds performed earlier. Besides, every time a jīva comes into existence with the association of Brahman with a new upādhi, bondage and similarly mokṣa or liberation from it with the cessation of the association of the body with Brahman would take place (pratiksanam bandhamokṣa prasangaḥ). If that part of Brahman which becomes associated with upādhi becomes free from bondage, the same becomes associated with another upādhi and thus becomes again bound. It cannot be said that only a particular fixed part of Brahman becomes associated with upādhis and as such Brahman is not subject to bondage and release all the time since there is no basis to postulate such a theory. Nor can it be said that *upādhi* is *vibhu* or all-pervasive and such a Brahman conditioned by upādhi becomes jīva. This goes against the theory of jīva as aņus or monadic, accepted by Bhāskara. Further, all the upādhis in the form of bodies which experience sukha and duhkha would become applicable to Brahman also. This would be opposed to the theory of Iśvara being free from all afflictions. If it is argued that nva is upadhi-visista Brahman and such a Brahman is not affected by suffering, which actually applies to upādhi and not to Brahman, then it would amount to the admission of Carvaka doctrine. To escape these criticisms it is safer to accept the theory that jīvas as associated with bondage in the form of bodies and sense organs experience pleasure and pain and with the removal of bondage, these jīvas attain the status of Brahman. Such a theory is sounder and is in accordance with Sruti and Smrti texts.

After criticizing the doctrines of Yādava and Bhāskara separately, Vedānta Deśika points out the common defect of both the schools of Bhedābhedavādins—(1) those who maintain that Īśvara and jīvas are by their very nature different and also non-different and (2) those who uphold that both these entities are by their very nature non-different (abheda) but they are different (bheda) due to upādhi. If Īśvara, according to these schools, is an amśa of Brahman and He is by nature omniscient (svatah sarvajñah), the question is raised whether or not this Īśvara is aware that jīva which is either an amśa of Brahman or the very Brahman conditioned by upādhi, is non-different from Him? If He is not aware of it, then He cannot be regarded as sarvajña. If He knows this fact, then He would be experiencing all the afflictions of jīvas and consequently He too would be going through the cycle of births and deaths

endlessly. Similarly if  $\bar{l}$ śvara and  $\bar{j}$ īva are non-different, then the special (exclusive) characteristics of  $\bar{l}$ śvara such as  $\bar{a}$ nanda would also be applicable to  $\bar{j}$ īva.

#### REFERENCES

- 1. According to some scholars, Nimbārka is claimed to have existed before Madhva.
- Cf. Śvet. Up., VI.11.19: Niṣkalam, niṣkriyam, śāntam niravadyam nirañjanam. Also I.10: Pradhāna-kṣetrajñapatiḥ, kṣaraṁ pradhānaṁ amṛtākṣaram haraḥ kṣarātmānau īśate deva ekaḥ....
- 3. See for details, PMB, pp. 116-18.
- 4. See Ch. Up., VIII.1.5: Apahatapāpam vijaraḥ vimṛtyuḥ viśokaḥ vijighatsuḥ apipāsaḥ satyakāmaḥ satyasaṅkalpaḥ.
- 5. See PMB, pp. 123-24.
- 6. VP: Acetanā parārthā ca nityā satata-vikriyā.
- 7. See Vișnudharma: Ghata-dhvamse ghatākāśo na bhinno nabhaso yathā.
- 8. Muṇḍ. Up.: Yathā nadyās-syandamānāḥ samudre astam gacchanti nāmarūpe vihāya; tathā vidvān nāmarūpādvimuktaḥ parātparam puruṣam upaiti divyam.
- 9. Katha Up., II.1.15: Yathtodakam śuddhe śuddham äsiktam tādrgeva bhavati.
- 10. VP: Vibhedajanake ajñāne nāśam-ātyantikam gate; ātmano brahmaņo bhedam asantam kaḥ kariṣyati.
- 11. See RB, I.1.1.

## 18

## Other Bhedābheda Schools

#### SVĀBHĀVIKA BHEDĀBHEDA VEDĀNTA OF NIMBĀRKA

IMBĀRKA WAS born in south India about the middle of fourteenth century. According to modern scholars he belongs to the period later than Rāmānuja and Madhva. Though like other theistic schools of Vedanta, he admits three tattvas-Brahman, jīva, and jagat, he differs from them in advocating the relation of bheda and abheda between Brahman and nvas and Brahman and jagat. This relationship, according to him is also not aupādhika, that is, it is not caused by upādhi or limiting adjunct as in the case of Bhāskara but it is svābhāvika, that is, the three ontological entities are different (bheda) by their very nature and also they are non-different (abheda) by their very nature (svābhāvika). Hence his Vedānta is designated as Svābhāvika Bhedābhedavāda, as different from Aupādhika Bhedābhedavāda of Bhāskara. As we have seen earlier, the Bhedābhedavāda advocated by Yādavaprakāśa is also svābhāvika. That is, the relationship between Sat or Brahman and three tattvas named Īśvara, cit (jīva), and acit (cosmic matter) which are regarded as amsas or parts of Sat is one of both bheda and also abheda by their very nature (svābhāvika). The theory of Brahman as both non-difference and also different from jīva and jagat by its very nature (svābhāvika) at all time involves self-contradiction. It may be possible to overcome the selfcontradiction by admitting absolute non-differene or identity of the three principles as is done by Sankara. But this theory is not acceptable to Nimbarka since it militates according to him, against Scriptural texts speaking of real difference between 188

them. The other alternative to overcome the criticism is to admit absolute difference (atyanta bheda) between the three ontological tattvas, as upheld by Madhva. This theory also is not acceptable to Nimbarka since several Scriptural texts speak of abheda, such as Tat-tvam-asi, Ayam ātmā brahma, etc. The theory of Yādavaprakāśa, according to which Sat is different and non-different from Iśvara, jīva and cosmic matter which are the parts (amsa) of Sat, is also considered to be defective. Rāmānuja admits three tattvas—Īśvara (Brahman), jīvātman or individual self and jagat or primordial cosmic matter and adopts the relation of body to the soul (sarīra-sarīrībhāva) between Brahman and the jīvas as well as cosmic matter. On the basis of this logical principle of inherent or organic relationship, he reconciles the conflict between the bhedaśrutis and abheda-śrutis and accepts both bheda and abheda between Brahman and jīvas as well as Brahman and jagat from different standpoints. The three ontological entities are different because they are of different nature. But Brahman as organically related to jīvas and jagat is one (viśistaikya vivakṣayā ekatva). But the concept of śarīra-śarīrī relation is not acceptable to Nimbārka. He therefore advocates svābhāvika abheda and also svābhāvika bheda. The question to be considered is whether this theory is philosophically and logically tenable.

If we go by the criticisms levelled by Vedanta Desika against Yādavaprakāśa, who also admits Svābhāvika Bhedābheda, this doctrine is untenable. As stated earlier, the main point of criticism is that both bheda and abheda cannot co-exist. They are mutually opposed, like light and darkness. On this ground the Jaina's doctrine of Saptabhangī (Anekāntavāda) is refuted by the Vedantins. For the same reason the Vedanta expounded by Bhāskara and Yādava has been vehemently criticized by Šankara and Rāmānuja. By merely qualifying Bhedābheda concept with the terms such as svābhāvika, aupādhika, it is not possible to escape the criticism against the Bhedābhedavāda. In order to overcome this criticism, one has to accept either Abhedavāda or Absolute oneness of Brahman by denying the reality to the jīvas and jagat and regarding them as illusory manifestations of Brahman, as Śankara has done or absolute difference between the three ontological entities, as Madhva

has done. The other alternative is to admit *bheda* as well as *abheda* from different standpoints, as Rāmānuja has advocated. The Bhedābhedavāda, in whatever form it is formulated, cannot escape the criticism of self contradiction and other philosophical and logical defects pointed out by Vedānta Deśika against Yādavaprakāśa.

Now coming to the details of specific defects of Nimbarka philosophy, if bheda and abheda cannot coexist because of mutual opposition, how can svābhāvika bheda and svābhāvika abheda can coexist? If Brahman and jīvas are essentially (svarūpatah) are non-different, they cannot also by their very nature (svarūpatah) be different. They can be regarded as different only when Brahman becomes many when the same is conditioned by *upādhi* in the form of several bodies such as in the case of all-pervasive ākāśa becoming many by being conditioned by several pots. Nimbarka does not subscribe to this view of Bhaskara. The example of sea and the waves arising from it does not serve his purpose. Sea water and waves are essentially the same but as waves, it is regarded as different. But waves are caused by the wind or some other factor, which is the upādhi or conditioning factor for causing the waves. If svābhāvika abheda is accepted, svābhāvika bheda cannot be maintained.

Further if the jīvas and Brahman are essentially non-different (svarūpataḥ abheda), then the afflictions and other defects of the jīvas would also be applicable to Brahman. But Brahman by its very nature is free from all defects. It does not stand to reason to say that though Brahman and jīvas are essentially non-different (svarūpataḥ abheda), the defects of jīvas do not apply to Brahman. Hence the relation of svābhāvika bheda and abheda in respect of Brahman, jīva and jagat as advocated by Nimbārka is philosophically untenable. It is also not warranted by Scriptural texts. If svābhāvika bheda exists, as stated in the Upaniṣads, then svābhāvika abheda, in the sense of identity (svarūpaikya) cannot be maintained.

Nimbārka defends the svābhāvika abheda between three different ontological entities, by arguing that abheda is not to be taken in the sense of absolute identity (svarūpaikya), as Śankara interprets, by accepting Brahman as the only Reality,

whereas jīvas and jagat are illusory in character which amounts to the denial of their existence as real entities. If all the three entities are real and different in nature, their absolute identity is logically untenable. To overcome this objection, Nimbārka argues, as in the case of Madhva, that the jīvas and jagat do not have independent existence (svatantra-sattā bhāva) but on the contrary, they are dependent on Brahman for their existence (paratantra sattā bhāva). Since the jīvas and jagat are dependent on Brahman for their existence, they are regarded as non-different from Brahman.

In reply to this argument it is pointed out that mere dependence of jīvas on Brahman does not prove the theory of the two entities being non-different. Thus, for instance, the physical body is dependent on jīvātman for its sattā and pravrtti (functions). But the relation between the two cannot be treated as one of abheda. The dependence on Brahman (tadadhīna sattā) or even similarity between the two (tat śādṛśya) in respect of certain attributes such as jñāna and ānanda, as maintained by Madhva, does not mean abheda or even svābhāvika-abheda a term used by Nimbarka, following the logic of Madhva between the two ontological entities in the primary sense. The theory of svābhāvika bheda and svābhāvika abheda is not therefore tenable since the two logical concepts are mutually opposed like bheda and abheda unless these are conceived from different standpoints, as Rāmānuja has explained. As stated in the Antaryāmī Brāhmaņa and also in the Vedāntasūtra, Brahman abides in jīvātman as its Antaryāmin and controls it from within. By virtue of Brahman's immanence in jīva, the latter is regarded as non-distinct (ananya) and so also Brahman and jagat. Though jīva and Brahman are different by their very nature, the two are non-distinct in the sense that Brahman as inherently related to jīva is non-different as a višista entity, similar to a substance (dravya) as inherently related to its essential attribute is one. Only on the basis of such an explanation, bheda and abheda can be maintained for two ontological entities without contradiction.

ACINTYA-BHEDABHEDA VEDĀNTA OF CAITANYA SCHOOL

Kṛṣṇa Caitanya, popularly known as Caitanya Mahāprabhu, who was born in AD 1486 in Navadvīpa (West Bengal) is the

founder of Bengal School of Vaisnavism, also called Gaudīya Vaisnavism. Though he did not personally compose any literature, his followers, Jīva Gosvāmī and Baladeva Vidyābhūṣaṇa developed the philosophy of this school under the name of Acintya-Bhedabheda Vedanta. The concept of Acintya-Bhedabheda is adopted to explain the relation of God (Lord Krsna) to the material world. This term was first conceived by Jīva Gosvāmī, one of the close disciples of Caitanya, who has mentioned in his book Sarva-samvādinī which is a commentary on Bhāgavata-sandarbha. It was also employed later by Baladeva Vidyābhūsana in two of his books Siddhānta-ratna and Pramevaratnāvalī. The Vedānta philosophy expounded in these works is mostly influenced by the teachings of Rāmānuja and also Madhva. We do not propose to discuss these philosophical and religious teachings. We shall confine our attention to the critical examination of the main issue relating to the relation of God to jīvas and the jagat in terms of acintya-bhedābheda.

The word acintya means "inconceivable" acintya-bhedābheda, means "the relationship between God and the universe as well as the jīvas," which is one of bheda or difference and abheda or non-difference, is inconceivable. As stated earlier, the Bhedabhedavada was first developed in the area of Vedanta by Bhāskara and Yādavaprakāśa. Even long before Bhāskara and prior to Śankara, Bhartrprapañca and Brahmadatta, the ancient Vedanta exponents, are believed to be the advocates of Bhedābhedavāda to explain the relation of Brahman to the two ontological entities, viz., jīva and jagat. Bheda and abheda are two logical concepts to describe the relationship between two entities. These two are mutually opposed like light and darkness. The description of the relation as both bheda and abheda is therefore a self-contradiction. In the area of Vedanta, it became necessary to explain the relationship between Brahman and juga as well as Brahman and jagat. Yādavaprakāśa as against Śańkara's abheda-vāda or absolute oneness of Ultimate Reality by the denial of the reality of jīvas and jagat, adopted the doctrine of Svābhāvika-Bhedābhedavāda or natural difference and non-difference. As this was found defective, Bhāskara adopted the doctrine of Aupädhika-Bhedābhedavāda, that is, Brahman and jīvas as well as jagat are non-different by their very nature, while difference among them is caused by limiting adjunct in the name of avidyā, which is real, unlike in Advaita Vedānta. Both these schools were vehemently criticized by Rāmānuja and other Vedāntins. To overcome the criticisms, Nimbārka, who is also a Bhedābhedavādin, described the relationship among the three ontological entities by adopting the doctrine of Svābhāvika Bhedābhedavāda, that is, Brahman and other two ontological entities are non-different by their very nature and so also difference between them is natural (svābhāvika bheda). Even this theory was open to criticism. It is not basically different from the theory adopted by Yādavaprakāśa.

Caitanya school of Vedānta, which came into existence much later than Nimbārka, has introduced the concept of Acintya-Bhedābhedavāda. The term acintya is employed by Jīva Gosvāmī in place of the term svābhāvika used by Nimbārka.

According to Jīva Gosvāmī, Brahman is by nature pure and perfect. But it there is natural non-difference between Brahman, who is Lord Kṛṣṇa, and the jīvas, the defects of the latter would also exist in the former. By the same logic, the qualities of Lord, such as omnipotence, would also belong to the *n̄vas*. But this is not the case. Brahman, who is pure, does not possess any of the imperfections of the jīvas or of the world. Therefore the relation must be taken as acintya or inconceivable. According to Jīva Gosvāmī, this is more satisfactory explanation than all other explanations offered earlier by other Bhedābhedavādins since it resolves the puzzling problem of the relation among the three ontological entities. By way of elucidation of the term acintya it is pointed out that it is inconceivable to logic but it is understandable on the authority of Scripture. Śabda or Scripture is the sole authority for knowing the nature of the Supreme Lord. The Scriptural texts point out that the Lord possesses inconceivable powers and that he is the repository of conflicting qualities. Yet these conflicting qualities abide harmoniously in Him because of this inconceivable powers. The Scriptural texts which are quoted by Jīva Gosvāmī in support of his theory is the statements in the Mānd. Up. and the Kai. Up. (1-6).2

The question to be considered is whether the theory of Acintya-Bhedābheda overcomes the criticisms levelled against Nimbārka, who maintains Svābhāvika Bhedābhedavāda. On closer and objective examination, our answer is in the negative. If Svābhāvika Bhedābhedavāda of Yādavaprakāśa and also that of Nimbārka are untenable, Acintya-Bhedābheda cannot also be sustained. As pointed out earlier, if logical concepts of bheda and abheda cannot co-exist because they are mutually opposed, the same criticism applies to Svābhāvika Bhedābhedavāda and the Acintya-Bhedābhedavāda. By substituting the term svābhāvika by acintya the mutual opposition (paraspara vyāghāta) between bheda and abheda cannot be overcome.

The argument that the Lord possesses vicitra śakti and that there is no opposition between His being different and non-different from  $\bar{n}vas$  at all times does not stand to reason.

Further the Upanisadic texts do not explicitly state that the Lord is both different and non-different from jīvas and the universe by virtue of his sarvaśakti. The Māndūkya and Kaivalya Upanisads employ the term acintya along with other negative forms to describe Brahman as an inconceivable Reality but these cannot be taken as a support to the theory of Acintya-Bhedabheda relation between Brahman and the universe. Brahman can be one and also many from different standpoints. The only solution to this puzzling problem of absolute difference and the texts speaking of oneness or abheda among the three ontological principles is to resort to the explanation of śarīrātma bhāva or the relation of the body to the self, as adopted by Rāmānuja. Brahman as inherently or inseparably related to jīvas and jagat is non-different or one entity as a višista tattva. But the three entities, by virtue of the difference in respect of their intrinsic nature, they are also different. The merit of this theory would be discussed later.

## SUDDHĀDVAITA OF VALLABHA

In the preceding sections we have examined the various schools of Vedānta which uphold the doctrine of Bhedābheda relation among the three ontological tattvas—Brahman, jīva, and jagat. Along with these we may also consider the school of Vedānta designated as Śuddhādvaita expounded by Vallabha. Vallabha

was born in the middle of fourteenth century in Andhra Pradesh and he has written a commentary on the Vedāntasūtra under the name of Anubhāsya. In this and a few allied works, he has presented his views on the Vedanta doctrines. The term śuddhādvaita may give the impression that he, is an exponent of another form of Advaita. But actually, he, as a theist with passionate love for Lord Krsna, admits that Brahman is qualified with attributes and it is identified with Lord Krsna who is the Supreme Reality. He also maintains that jīvas and jagat are the manifestations of Brahman and as such these are real. Nor does he admit Dvaitavāda, that is, absolute difference or atyanta bheda among the three ontological entities as in the case of Madhva, though he is largely influenced by Madhva's teachings. He does not also accept Visistadvaita of Ramanuja, though many of his teachings in his Anubhāsya are similar to those of Rāmānuja.

Though he admits the reality of all the three tattvas, he does not accept the śarīrātma-sambandha or body-soul relation between Brahman and jīvas as well as jagat. He does not also admit the doctrine of Bhedabheda as advanced by Bhaskara, Yādavaprakāśa, and Nimbārka. But while explaining the relationship between Brahman and jīvas, which are real and many, being the manifestation of Brahman, similar to the sparks emanating from the fire, he maintains the view that they are non-different (abheda). Though he does not claim to be a Bhedābhedavādin, like Nimbārka, he comes closer to the school of Bhedābhedavāda insofar as he speaks of abheda or identity between Brahman and jīvas and also bheda between the two by virtue of their difference in respect of their intrinsic nature. Hence it would not be wrong to classify this school under the category of Bhedābhedavāda and examine it along with other schools of Bhedabheda

We shall not go into the details of all the doctrines of Vallabha. A fairly good account of the philosophy of Vallabha is given in the book *The Vedānta*<sup>3</sup> and in an article<sup>4</sup> by Sudananda Y. Shastry. We shall confine our attention, as in the case of Nimbārka and others, to the critical examination of the ontological relationship between Brahman and *jīvas* as well as *jagat* in terms of *bheda* and *abheda*.

According to Vallabha, both the jīvas and the non-sentient jagat are the manifestations of Brahman similar to the sparks emanating from the fire. Just as the fire and sparks are non-different, both being of the nature of fire, Brahman and jagat are essentially non-different. This is also explained on the analogy of the serpent and its coil (ahikuṇḍala), cited by Bādarāyaṇa in the Vedāntasūtra (III.2.26) while discussing the nature of relationship between Brahman and the non-sentient jagat. In the same adhikaraṇa, two other sūtras (III.2.27-28) are mentioned which discuss two other alternative views regarding the nature of relation viz., bhedābheda by citing the example of the sun and its prakāśa and viśeṣaṇa-viśeṣya bhāva or the relation of the substance to the attribute. This is according to Rāmānuja's interpretation.

The sūtra which cites the illustration of ahikuṇḍala, is taken both by Rāmānuja and Bhāmati as a reference to the Bhedābheda theory, and also the sūtra referring to the illustration of prakāśa (light) and prakāśavat (that which possesses light). Both the views are rejected by Bādarāyaṇa because the concept of bhedābheda is mutually opposed. The illustration of ahikuṇḍala (serpent and its coil) and fire and its spark (agni and visphulinga) which are cited by Vallabha as supporting the abheda between Brahman and jīva is not therefore tenable.

Vallabha contends that  $j\bar{i}vas$  are also brahma-svarūpa, since these are emanations from Brahman and hence the two are essentially non-different. This amounts to the acceptance of  $sv\bar{a}bh\bar{a}vika$  abheda advocated by Yādavaprakāśa and Nimbārka. If this is the case, then the defects of  $j\bar{i}va$  would also be applicable to Brahman. Then, Brahman cannot be regarded as Suddha. The argument that Brahman is not touched by the defects of  $j\bar{i}va$  or jagat even though they are non-different by nature does not stand to reason. Further the question arises whether Brahman, who is the  $\bar{l}\dot{s}vara$  or God and who is also omniscient ( $sarvaj\bar{n}a$ ) knows that He has become  $j\bar{i}va$ ? If He is not aware of it, He cannot be regarded as  $sarvaj\bar{n}a$ . If He knows it, He too would be subjected to the experience of the afflictions.

These criticisms can be escaped by admitting absolute identity (tādātmya or svarūpaikya) between Brahman and jīva and

maintaining that the jīvas are mere reflections of Brahman, caused by avidyā, as admitted by Śańkara, or by postulating a real upādhi, as conceived by Bhāskara. But such theories are not acceptable to Vallabha because Brahman becomes Aśuddha with the association of illusory māyā or even upādhi. Then the doctrine of Śuddhādvaita has to be given up.

If, on the other hand, atyanta-bheda between Brahman and jīva is accepted, as is done by Madhva, these criticisms levelled against svābhāvika abheda can be escaped. But even the theory of bheda-vāda is not acceptable to Vallabha. The only way of maintaining the purity of Brahman and also its difference as well as non-difference as declared in the Scriptural texts, is to adopt the theory adopted by Rāmānuja, viz., Brahman as organically related to cit and acit is one Reality and the three ontological entities are different by virtue of their intrinsic nature.

The explanation offered by Vallabha that the same one Brahman manifests itself as jīvas and jagat out of his will and that they are made to exist as different, as a līlā or sport of the Lord, is not logically tenable. Nor is it supported by Scriptural texts. Both jīvas and jagat are anādi and nitya.

They are not created or produced. They exist always either in their subtle form or unmanifest form with Brahman during the state of pralaya and in gross or manifest form after creation. This view is supported by the Scriptural texts. The Brhadaranyaka says: the universe including jīvas exist as avyākṛta or unmanifest during dissolution and the same becomes manifest after sṛṣṭi.5 Vallabha also admits that Brahman is the upādāna-kāraņa of the universe. If Brahman Itself transforms into universe, then It would affect its nirvikāratva. That is, if direct pariņāma is accepted, it would cause change in respect of brahma-svarūpa, as in the case of the lump of clay into pots. To avoid this criticism, parināma or modification is to be explained through a media. Śańkara admits the association of  $m\bar{a}y\bar{a}$  with Brahman and on account of māyā Brahman illusorily manifests itself as jagat. This is known as vivarta-vāda as against pariņāma-vāda. Visistādvaita maintains prakrti which is regarded as the śarīra of Brahman as the media through which jagat is caused by the process of evolution. Vallabha does not admit either māyā or any other media such as *prakṛti* for the creation of the universe. According to him, maifestation of the universe is out of the śakti of Brahman. If śakti or potential power is part of the Svarūpa of Brahman, then Brahman would be subject to modification. If śakti is taken as the saṅkalpa of Brahman, it would serve as an instrumental or efficient cause (nimittakāraṇa). It cannot itself manifest as jagat, just as the knowledge and capacity of the potter do not produce the jug. He is only instrumental cause and the clay is the material cause. Hence the view of Vallabha that out of śakti, souls and jagat which are same as Brahman are made to manifest amounts to saying that Brahman itself becomes universe, which is philosophically unsound.

#### REFERENCES

- 1. According to some scholars Nimbārka belongs to a period earlier than Madhva.
- See Mand. Up., 7: Adrstam avyavahāryam agrāhyam alaksanam acintyam avyapadesam.... Also, Kai. Up. (I.6): Hrtpundarīkam virajam visuddham vicintya madhye visadam visokam; acintyam avyaktam anantarūpam sivam prašāntam amrtam brahma yonim.
- 3. V.S. Ghate, The Vedanta, Poona, 1981.
- 4. Sunanda Y. Shastri, "Philosophy of Vallabhacharya," in *Theistic Vedānta*, New Delhi, 2003.
- 5. See Br. Up., I.4.7.

# Schools of Śivādvaita and Navya Viśistādvaita

HAT WE HAVE EXAMINED so far are the schools of Vedanta which were developed during the post-Rāmānuja and post-Madhva period and which are based primarily on the Upanisads and the Vedāntasūtra in a modified form by adopting the theories advanced either by Rāmānuja or Madhva. There are few other schools which came into existence against the background of the theology of Saivism and Vaisnavism. These are also claimed to be Vedantic as far as their philosophical doctrines are concerned. To complete our critical review of Vedanta schools, these are taken up for consideration. The following are the schools which are influenced by Saivism and Vaisnavism:

1. Kāśmīra Śivādvaita expounded by Abhinavagupta.

2. Śivādvaita of Śrīkantha also known as Śakti-viśistādvaita expounded in the Śnikanthabhāsya on the Vedāntasūtra with the commentary of Appayya Dīkṣita (fourteenth century) titled Śivārkamanidīpikā.

3. Śivādvaita of Śrīpatipaņdita expounded in the Śrīkarabhāṣya on Vedāntasūtra from the standpoint of the Vīra-śaiva

religious sect.

4. Navya Viśistadvaita developed by Swaminarayaņa belonging to the Uddhavi Vaisnava-sampradāya by mostly following Rāmānuja's Vīśiṣṭādvaita philosophy.

## Kāśmīra Śivādvatta

This was developed by Abhinavagupta about eleventh century AD. The term advaita may give the impression that it is a

Vedānta school, somewhat allied to Śaṅkara's Advaita Vedānta. But it is far from it in many respects. First of all, it is not developed, as in the case of the other major Vedanta schools, primarily on the basis of the Upanisads and Brahmasūtras. Secondly, it does not accept Brahman of the Upanisads as the Supreme Reality. Following the teachings contained in the Kāśmīra Śaiva Āgamas callsed Tantras, Śiva is the Supreme Being. The universe is the projection of Siva-Sakti and it is not an illusory manifestation of the Supreme Being due to māyā as in the case of Śankara's Advaita. Actually, it is one of several theological schools of Saivism. Rāmānuja in his commentary on Vedāntasūtra, mentions four schools: Kāpāla, Kālamukha, Pāsupata, and Śaiva. The Pāsupata school, which is one of the oldest schools of Saivism, which existed even at the time of Bādarāyana has been separately criticized both in the Bhāsyas of Śankara and Rāmānuja and also by Vedānta Deśika in the Paramata-bhanga. Hence Kāśmīra Śivādvaita does not need separate examination. The criticisms offered by Vedanta Deśika in the chapter Pāśumatabahiṣkāravāda on the ground that the teachings of Pasupata falls outside the scope of Vedic philosophy and religion hold good in respect of Kāśmīra Śivādvaita.

## ŚIVADVAITA OF ŚRĪKAŅŢHA

The Śivādvaita of Śrīkaṇṭha, though it is based on the Brahma-sūtra, unlike the Kāśmīra Śivādvaita, is not acknowledged as a system of Vedānta either by the followers of Śańkara or Rāmānuja. In a critical study of Śrīkaṇṭhabhāṣya as commented by Appayya Dīkṣita, by Mm. K.S. Varadacharya, a traditional scholar of Parakala Mutt, Mysore, it is shown that this work is of dubious nature written by some Śaivite under the name of Nīlakaṇṭha. The Śrīkaṇṭhabhāṣya is on the pattern of Rāmānuja-bhāṣya. In place of Nārāyaṇa, Nīlakaṇṭha uses Śiva. Śiva is the Supreme Reality and He is only the nimitta-kāraṇa, while Śiva-Śakti is the upādāna kāraṇa of the universe. This school is therefore called Śakti-viśiṣṭādvaita. Vallabha has remarked that Śrīkaṇṭha is Rāmānuja-cora (a thief of Rāmānuja). As the doctrines of this school are opposed to the Upaniṣads and

the Vedāntasūtra, as interpreted by Rāmānuja, it does not deserve any consideration.

## ŚIVĀDVAITA OF ŚRĪKARA

The Śivādvaita conceived by Śrīkara from the standpoint of Vīra-śaivism which is a contemporary sectarian movement in Karnataka state, is worse than Śrīkanṭha-bhāṣya. As rightly observed by Prof. N.G. Mahadevappa, a modern scholar on Vīra-śaivism, that Śrīpati Paṇḍita who, as a Vīraśaiva, vehemently condemns the Vedic teachings and Vedic religious practices, should have written a laudatory commentary on the Vedāntasūtra "looks not merely amusing but ludicrous." The admission of Para Śiva as the Supreme Being in place of Brahman is opposed to the teachings of the Upaniṣads and the Vedāntasūtra. It also accepts Śiva as only the nimitta kāraṇa² of the universe as in the case of Pāśupata school which is outright rejected by Bādarāyaṇa as well as Śaṅkara and Rāmānuja.

## NAVYA VISIŞŢĀDVAITA OF SWĀMĪ NĀRĀYAŅA

This is the latest school of Vedānta developed during the nineteenth century in the background of the influence of Vaiṣṇavism. The founder of this school is Swāmī Nārāyaṇa born in 1781 in a village near Ayodhyā. He was a disciple of Rāmānanda who himself was a follower of Rāmānuja. He established a new tradition known as Uddhava Vaiṣṇava Sampradāya. He has followed two small works titled Vacanāmṛta in Gujarati which is a manual on the religious duties to be followed by his disciples and Śikṣāpatrī (in Sanskrit), an epistle of precepts covered in 212 verses. In the latter work, he has expressed briefly his views on the philosophy and religion of his school.

As a devoted follower of Rāmānuja, he has closely followed the teachings of Rāmānuja. He himself states in the śikṣāpatrī that Viśiṣṭādvaita is his system of philosophy (matam viśiṣṭādvaitam me). He also states that the commentaries written by Rāmānuja on Vyāsasūtra (Brahmasūtra) and the Bhagavadgītā are accepted by him as sole authority on the philosophical theories (Rāmānujārya kṛtam bhāṣyam adhyātmikī mama). It is thus obvious

that the Navya Viśiṣṭādvaita founded by Swāmī Nārāyaṇa is not basically different from Viśiṣṭādvaita Vedānta of Rāmānuja.

However, the later followers of Swāmī Nārāyaṇa have introduced a few novel philosophical concepts as different from Rāmānuja's system. Instead of three fundamental tattvas or metaphysical principles viz., Īśvara, cit and acit, the Swāmī Nārāyaṇa school admits five eternal realities, namely, (i) Para-Brahman, the Supreme Being who is identified with Nārāyaṇa, (ii) Akṣara-Brahman, (iii) māyā-prakṛti, (iv) Īśvara (cosmic Self), and (v) jīva (individual selves). It is claimed that the doctrine of fivefold realities is supported by the Vedas, Prasthānatraya, Smṛti, Itihāsas, Purāṇas, Pāñcarātra, etc. Presumably, in view of the introduction of such doctrines, this school of Vedānta is named as Navya Viśiṣṭādvaita.

As a new school of Vedanta, it may be justified to incorporate into it, some novel theories, provided these are warranted by the Upanisadic texts and the authoritative Vedāntasūtras of Bādarāyaņa as interpreted by Rāmānuja. But, the admission of additional ontological principles such as Aksara Brahman, Isvara as cosmic Self in addition to Brahman identified with Nārāyana is not warranted by the Scriptural and Smrti texts including the Brahmasūtra. Rāmānuja, while defining the term brahman clearly states that Brahman is Purusottama, the Supreme Self and He is Sarvésvara.<sup>5</sup> The term aksara employed in Brhadaranyaka Upanisad denotes the Para Brahman. This term appearing in the adhyāya VIII of the Bhagavadgītā, according to Rāmānuja, denotes the jīvātman in the context of the upāsanā on jīvātman. Thus there is no justification to introduce these additional metaphysical principles and use the title of Navya Viśiṣṭādvaita for the school founded by Swāmī Nārāyaṇa except the fact that it is a new religious movement or sampradaya started two centuries ago. If, on the other hand, they follow faithfully the principles and religious teachings of Rāmānuja, as claimed by its founder, this school would not be open to any criticism, from the standpoint of Visistadvaita Vendanta.

#### REFERENCES

- 1. See the article on Vīraśaivism in the volume on the *Theistic Vedānta* by the Centre for Studies in Civilization, New Delhi.
- 2. See Br. Up., 1.4.7.
- 3. See Śikṣāpatrī, V.121.
- 4. Ibid., V.100.
- 5 See RB, I.1.1: Brahma-śabdena svabhāvato nirasta-nikhila-doṣaḥ asankhyeya kalyāṇa-guṇa viśiṣṭaḥ Puruṣottamo abhidhīyate; sa ca sarveśvaraḥ....

## 20

# The Doctrine of Upāya

THIS CHAPTER is devoted to the critical examination of the L upāya or the means laid down for attaining a higher Spiritual Goal (parama puruṣārtha) as conceived by the different Indian philosophical systems including Visistadvaita. In the preceding chapters Vedānta Deśika confined his attention to the critical review of the tattvas or the philosophical doctrines of these schools. The study of the tattvas constitutes an important part of a Darśana or a system of philosophy. A Darśana should also deal with the question of the main purpose (prayojana) for which philosophical investigation is undertaken. In the Indian philosophical background it is called the purusartha or a higher goal to be achieved by the study of philosophy. If a specific goal is admitted then the ways and means or what is called upāya, to be adopted for attaining the goal is also to be laid down. Thus the Darsana or a system of philosophy should cover all three topics—tattva, upāya (also named hita in Vedanta) and purusartha or goal. The present chapter examines critically the views or theories advocated by different schools of thought including Visistādvaita. It is titled "Parokta-upāyabhangādhikāra." The subsequent chapter will deal with the nature of the objective to be accomplished or what is technically called purușārtha to be attained, as presented by different schools of thought. It is therefore titled "Parokta-prayojanabhangadhikara."

At the very outset, Vedānta Deśika makes a critical remark that all the non-Vedic schools and also most of the Vedic schools including Advaita and Bhedābheda schools have been proved to be defective since their doctrines are opposed to the accepted pramāṇas and also not supported by sound logical arguments (sat-tarka). He will now attempt to show that these schools have also not presented a satisfactory theory of hita or the ways and means to be pursued to achieve the desired Spiritual Goal. He briefly mentions how each school has developed a defective theory of upāya.

Taking the school of Cārvāka first, Vedānta Deśika points out that the Carvakas do not accept any pramanas other than pratyakşa. Nor do they admit causal relation (kāraņa-kāryabhāva). In the absence of these, they cannot present any authoritative philosophical treatise which can be taught to others and also establish their own doctrines by refutation of the theories of rival schools. Regarding artha or the acquisition of wealth and kāma or sensual pleasure, which are considered by them as goals of life, there are no ways and means laid down for achieving these goals in any authoritative texts. Their teachings such as that consciousness (caitanya) is generated by the combination of the five physical components on the analogy of the emergence of intoxicating quality out of the admixture of certain ingredients and also the maxim that one should live happily until the end of life (yāvajjīvam sukham jīvet), do not serve the purpose of making an endeavour to achieve the happiness of the future which is not perceptible (apratyaksa)

Coming to the Buddhist schools, the Mādhyamikas maintain the theory that everything in the universe is śūnya and hence they cannot claim to have any valid pramāṇas. In the absence of it, they cannot establish their own doctrine and advocate a sādhana for obtaining the knowledge of śūnyatva (śūnyatva-sādhana).

The other three Buddhist schools admit the theory of kṣaṇa-bhaṅga, that is, nothing exists for more than a moment. If what exists at one moment does not persist in the next moment, then the sādhana or upāya adopted in the earlier moments do not have any bearings on the results that accrue out of it in the next moments since there is no continuity of the two together. What one individual accomplishes cannot be reaped by another individual in the next moment. If a specific goal enduring for a long duration does not exist, there would be no need to endeavour to attain it.

In the case of the school of Advaita Vedanta, which upholds that everything other than Brahman is lillusory (mithyā), a satisfactory theory of upaya for moksa cannot be formulated. According to Advaita, the direct to moksa is the intuitional knowledge of the identity of the self with Brahman, generated by the Scriptural texts such as tat-tvam-asi, which is capable of removing the  $aj\tilde{n}ana$  that causes bondage. If a person is not aware that everything other than Brahman is mithya, he does not endeavour to acquire such a knowledge that would eradicate ajñāna. If he already possessed such a knowledge, there would be no need to acquire a separate knowledge which can remove the ajñāna. It cannot be argued that even though the knowledge of identity is acquired, traces of ajñāna persist (bādhitānuvṛtti) and in order to eradicate it totally, the knowledge of identity of jīva and Brahman is to be acquired. But such a view cannot constitute the sadhana as an acceptable theory of Advaita. On the analogy of the potter's wheel which, though continues to move even after the production of the pot comes to a stop on its own, the ajñāna which though persists even after the dawn of the knowledge of identity of jīva and Brahman, should cease to exist, there is no justification to observe rigorous penance through samnyāsa-yoga for this purpose.

The theory that verbal testimony, that is, study of the Scriptural texts teaching the identity of jīva and Brahman generates aparokṣa-jñāna or knowledge of immediate nature which is the means to moksa, is untenable. The knowledge derived from śabda is of mediate character and it cannot remove the cosmic illusion leading to the direct realization of Brahman. Similarly the theory of dhyāna-niyoga, that is, the niyoga or a special potency in the form of advsta generated by the observance of continuous meditation on Brahman removes the cosmic illusion and that one should pursue this upāya for attaining moksa is also untenable. There is another theory known as Nisprapañca Niyogavāda, according to which the continuous meditation on Brahman as devoid of prapañca or the universe which is falsely super-imposed on it, can serve as the upaya for moksa. Even this theory is untenable as it is not supported by valid pramānas. Thus according to Vedānta Deśika, the

pursuit of any kind of *upāya* for attaining a higher Spiritual Goal does not hold good in Advaita Vedānta.

Coming to the Jaina school, Vedānta Deśika points out that the admission of Anekāntavāda or the theory that all things in the universe are of indeterminable nature, does not allow for the formulation of a constructive theory of upāya or sādhana to be pursued for a higher goal. If the religious or spiritual discipline prescribed for a higher goal is of the nature of both dharma and adharma according to the Anekāntavāda, it is not worthwhile pursuing for a higher goal, whose nature is also indefinite.

The Bhāskara school of Vedānta suffers from a similar defect. According to Bhāskara, karma or the performance of prescribed deeds and jñāna understood in the sense of upāsanā on Brahman, together (samuccaya) serve as the means to mokṣa. According to Yādavaprakāśa both karma and jñāna play important parts—the former removes the obstruction in the way of attaining mokṣa and the latter actually leads to mokṣa. Both these views are opposed to the Upaniṣadic teachings. Jñāna understood as upāsanā aided by karma-yoga and jñāna-yoga is the direct means to mokṣa. That is, upāsāna is the principal means to mokṣa, whereas karma is subordinate to it. Bhāskara and Yādava accord equal importance to both by upholding Jñāna-karma-samuccayavāda.

The school of Vaiyākaraṇa which maintain the theory that Śabda-brahma either illusorily manifests as the universe (view of Bhartṛhari) or it undergoes modification (pariṇāma) as jagat (view held by Halāyudha) suffers from the same defect as pointed out earlier in respect of Advaita. If an individual has already come to know that jagat which is an illusory manifestation of Śabda-brahma is illusory, there is no need to seek any further remedy to overcome the ignorance.by seeking tattva-jñāna. Same is the situation in respect of the Śabda-brahma-pariṇāmavāda of Halāyudha for whom jagat is satya or real. If an individual already knows this fact, there would be no need to pursue the means such as śravaṇa, manana and nididhyāsana, etc., for obtaining such a knowledge.

Taking the Vaisesika school, though the Vaisesikas have accepted the Vedas as the Supreme authority, they do not

admit that adrsta or unseen potency acquired through the observance of Vedic rituals which confer the fruits of karma, is in the form of pleasure caused to Iśvara (Iśvara-prīti), which alone confers the fruits of our deeds. Further they do not admit as taught in the Vedanta, that the grace of God earned by the meditation on Paramātman confers mokṣa. Instead of it, they accord greater importance to the meditation on jīvātman and regards the meditation on Paramātman (Īśvara-praṇidhāna) as one of the accessories for securing adrsta or the unseen potency which is helpful for overcoming the obstacles in the way of moksa. Such a distorted theory of the upaya or the ways and means to moksa is of no use for securing moksa.

Naiyāyikas also follow the same teachings as far as the means and goal are concerned. Hence their theory is also defective.

In the case of Nirīśvara-mīmāmsā school, the doctrine of sādhana advocated by them suffers from serious defects. In the first place they question the very existence of the celestial deities who are the objects of worship in the various rituals enjoined in the Vedas and so also their capacity to confer boons. Such a view is adopted in order to give importance to karma or the sacrifical rituals. Secondly, they do not accept that the devoted meditation on Brahman, as enjoined in the Upanișads, is the direct means to mokșa. Hence whatever other religious observances are laid down by them for the purpose of attaining moksa are futile.

With regard to the Sānkhya school, the philosophical tenets adopted by them do not allow for a satisfactory formulation of upāya. In the first place they have admitted only two metaphysical principles, viz., purușa and prakțti. The purușa is neither the subject of knowledge (jñatr) nor the agent of action (kartā). Such a purușa or jīvātman cannot have any functions in the form of either enjoyment of happiness while in bondage or the experience of joy in the state of liberation from bondage (apavarga). The dharma and adharma as well as the results accruing from them are common to all jīvas as these are the effects of prakṛti. Since both puruṣa and prakṛti are devoid of jñātrtva, there is no scope to pursue any prescribed means laid down by śāstra (śāstrādi pravṛtti).

Yoga Darśana does admit *Iśvara* besides *prakṛti* and *puruṣa*. But the spiritual discipline laid down by Yoga Darśana is aimed at the realization of one's own *jīvātmā*, which is not regarded as an integral part of *Paramātman*. Hence it stands opposed to the Yoga taught in the Upaniṣads according to which *Paramātmasākṣātkāra* is the Supreme Goal.

Coming to the Śaiva schools, Pāśupata in particular which is included in the Paramata-bhanga, Vedānta Deśika points out that the meditation on Śiva, who is the Supreme Deity for them, cannot lead to mokṣa since Śiva too, like Caturmukha Brahmā and other higher celestial deities, is an exalted soul and not the Para-Brahman or Para-tattva referred to in the Upaniṣads. Such an exalted individual, however great he may be, cannot confer mokṣa. Besides, the religious observances prescribed by the Pāśupata school are opposed to the Vedic practices (veda-viruddha-ācāra). Besides, in all these Śaiva schools the philosophical theories relating to the three fundamental tattvas, viz., Īśvara, jīvātman, and jagat (cid-acid-Īśvara tattva) are of different nature from what is taught in Vedānta. Hence the observance of upāya or the means to the attainment of higher spiritual goal is not of any value (niṣphalam).

# THE DOCTRINE OF *UPAYA* IN VISIŞŢĀDVAITA

After critically examining the theory of *upāya* presented by other schools of thought, both non-Vedic and Vedic including Advaita and Bhāskara, Vedānta Deśika briefly outlines the doctrine of *upāya* as enunciated by Viśiṣṭādvaita Vedānta on the basis of the authoritative Scriptural and Smṛti texts including the *Bhagavadgītā*. At the very commencement of the *Paramatabhanga*, he has presented the three fundamental philosophical doctrines of Viśiṣṭādvaita, viz., *cit* or *jīvātman*, *acit* or cosmic universe and *Īśvara* or the Supreme Being in three separate chapters. This is done with the main objective of providing a sound philosophic background against which the philosophical tenets of rival schools of thought could be compared and their defects known.

The two other important doctrines of Viśiṣṭādvaita, viz., (1) upāya or the ways and means for attaining a higher goal and (2) Parama-puruṣārtha or the nature of the Supreme Goal

are now outlined at the end of the *Paramata-bhanga* in two separate chapters (chaps. XXII and XXIII) along with a brief critical review of the theories of *upāya* of other schools of thought. Though these five chapters on one's own *siddhānta* should not be normally included in a treatise primarily devoted for the refutation (*bhanga*) of rival schools, these are presented with a view to highlight the soundness of the Viśiṣṭādvaita doctrines as compared to the defective doctrines of other schools.

As in the case of the three metaphysical doctrines discussed at the beginning, Vedānta Dešika does not present a detailed narrative account of both the sādhana and puruṣārtha as is generally found in other philosophical treatises. He confines his attention to a few important points relating to the sādhana which have been open to criticism not only from the camps of rival schools but also from the followers of Rāmānuja belonging to a different sect. This can be conspicuously noticed in connection with his presentation of the doctrine of self-surrender (prapatti) which, according to Rāmānuja, is an alternative direct means to mokṣa. The interpretation of the single verse in the concluding portion of the Bhagavadgītā (XVIII.66), which specifically enjoins Śaraṇāgati as a means to mokṣa, has become a subject of controversy. Vedānta Dešika therefore devotes special attention to this matter and explains the correct theory.

If the theories of *upāya* advanced by other schools of thought are proved to be defective, the question then arises: what then is the correct theory? By way of answering this question, Vedānta Deśika briefly states the correct view regarding *sādhana*.

According to the Hindu Religion, there are four human goals for which individuals aspire. These are dharma, artha, kāma, and mokṣa. Those who crave for mokṣa which is the Supreme Puruṣārtha, are categorized as mumukṣu. Those who aspire for the other three puruṣārthas are classified as bubhukṣu. Of these, mokṣa is accorded an important place as it is considered the highest goal. In accordance with one's desire and also eligibility, an individual aspiring for either svarga (heaven) or mokṣa or total liberation from bondage leading to the enjoyment of the bliss of Brahman, is required to adopt the ways and means as laid down by the Vedas and other Sacred

texts. The means enjoined by the Scriptural and Smrti texts for attaining these two goals are yāga or ritualistic sacrifices, dāna or giving charity and upāsanā or devoted meditation on Paramātman (Brahman). Only such means, as enjoined in the Sacred texts, which should take the form of worship of Paramātman (Parama-puruṣa-samārādhana) alone can serve as the means to attain the desired goals.

If upāsanā, also known as Bhakti-yoga in the Bhagavadgītā, is the direct means to mokṣa, how can it be said that Karma-yoga and Jñāna-yoga are the means to mokṣa, mentioned in the Bhagavadgītā? Vedānta Deśika answers this minor objection by explaining that Karma-yoga and Jñāna-yoga are subsidiary means to Bhakti-yoga which alone is the direct means.

The Bhagavadgītā and other religious treatises also mention methods to be adopted as means to attain God. Vedānta Deśika enumerates all these and explains that these are not to be taken as direct means to mokṣa, but they serve as accessories to the prescribed upāya. The other methods are:

- 1. Adveṣābhimukhyam,<sup>8</sup> that is, one should not entertain any hatred towards *Paramātman* and always look forward to receive His grace.
- 2. Avatāra-rahasya-jñāna,<sup>4</sup> or proper knowledge of the significance of the incarnations of Paramātman.
- 3. Puruṣottama-vidyā or the knowledge of Paramātman as uttama-puruṣa referred to in the Gītā, that is, He is the Supreme Being as distinct from baddha-jīva and also the mukta-jīva.
- 4. Sambandha-jñāna-mātram, that is, the mere knowledge of the intimate relationship that exists between jīva and Paramātman (a view held by a sect of Vaiṣṇavas).
- 5. Adhyavasāya-mātram or the unshakeable faith that the Almighty surely protects one who has totally surrendered to Him (prapattih viśvāsah).
- 6. Sankīrtana-mātram or the mere recitation of the names and glory of Paramātman.<sup>6</sup>
- 7. Ukti-mātram or the mere ardent prayer addressed to God seeking His protection.<sup>7</sup>
- 8. Viṣayavāsādi-mātram or the mere thinking of the Lord all the time as the sole protector.8

- 9. Svapravṛtti-nivṛtti, that is, to remain neutral without making any special effort for the sake of attainment of God since it comes out of His grace, whose concern it is to protect as in the case of an infant by the mother.<sup>9</sup>
- 10. Vaisnavābhimānam, that is, to remain devoted to a Vaisnava. 10
- 11. Ācārya-parigraham or to secure the grace of an ācārya. 11
- 12. Puruṣakāra-viśeṣam or to obtain the grace of Goddess Lakṣmī who acts as a mediator (puruṣakāra) for securing mokṣa.
- 13. *Īśvara-svātantrya-kṛpā* or to unchecked freedom and compassion of *Īśvara* as the main cause for liberation from bondage.
- 14. *Nirhetuka-viṣayīkarādi* or securing the protection from *Īśvara* without His imposing any specific condition. <sup>12</sup>

All these various methods which are mentioned in the religious treatises give the impression that there are various other means for attaining mokṣa. Vedānta Deśika clarifies that these are to be understood not as direct means to mokṣa but as aids to either upāsanā or prapatti which are specifically enjoined in the sacred texts as the means to mokṣa.

The Upanisads mention several vidyās or upāsanās such as Sad-vidyā, Dahara-vidyā, etc., as the means to mokṣa. But there is no mention of Nyāsa-vidyā which is the same as prapatti or self-surrender to God, as the direct means to moksa. Hence the question is raised whether such a vidyā named Nyāsavidyā as upāya exists? In reply to this objection, Vedānta Deśika states that just as upāsanā is enjoined in the Bhagavadgītā in the words, bhajasva mām or "meditate on Me," in the same way the Gītā also enjoins śaraṇāgati or self-surrender to God as the means to moksa in the words—māmekam śaranam vraja— "Surrender to Me as the sole refuge." Hence the two are distinct alternative pathways to moksa in accordance with the eligibility of the person. That is, for those who are incapable of observing the rigorous Bhakti-yoga, they can resort to the method of total surrender of oneself to God for protection. That śaraṇāgati is an alternative direct upāya to mokṣa, is well established in the Pāñcarātra Samhitās, Šaranāgati-gadya of Rāmānuja and many Vaiṣṇava religious treatises such as Rahasyatrayasāra and Nikṣepa-rakṣā of Vedānta Deśika.

In this connection Vedānta Dešika discusses the controversial issues rising from the different interpretations of the single Gītā verse dealing with this matter as offered by other commentators including Śańkara.

The relevant verse which is the subject of controversy reads:

Sarvadharmān parityajya māmekam śaranam vraja; Aham tva sarva-pāpebhyo mokṣayiṣyāmi ma śucaḥ. 18

Its general meaning is: "By Relinquishing all dharmas, seek Me alone for refuge. I shall release you from all sins. Do not grieve."

The implication of this verse according to Śańkara, is that by the total renouncement of all karmas (the word dharma being understood as the performance of prescribed deeds), one can attain Paramātman in the sense of realizing his identity (become one) with Him who is the same in all beings. The performance of karma is opposed to the realization of one's identity with Brahman, which is the mokṣa for Śańkara. The knowledge of the identity of jīva with Brahman (ātmaikya-jñāna) is therefore the means to mokṣa.

This is not a correct interpretation, according to Vedānta Deśika, because such a view is opposed to all the pramāṇas, particularly the Scriptural texts which speak of real bheda or difference between jīva and Paramātman and enjoin the performance of the prescribed deeds as mandatory and as such these should not be given up. Even contextually it is not appropriate that the dharmas in the form of Karma-yoga, Jñāna-yoga, and Bhakti-yoga taught in the earlier chapters of the Gītā are to be given up totally.

Yādavaprakāśa offers a different interpretation. According to him, this verse does not advocate the abandonment of the prescribed deeds but, on the contrary, it is intended to highlight the importance of śaraṇāgati. That is, it implies that even if one has to give up all karmas, it is important for him to seek śaraṇāgati in Paramātman.

This is also not an appropriate view since there is no need to offer such an explanation by adding the unnecessary word api after sarvadharmān parityajya.

There are several other interpretations on the statement "sarvadharmān partityajya." Vedānta Deśika mentions these views in the Paramata-bhaṅga and refutes them as untenable. These discussions which are of technical nature, do not have a direct bearing on the nature of upāya to be adopted for attaining a higher goal, We need not therefore go into these details. It would suffice to note the final view of Vedānta Deśika regarding these issues, as summed up by him in a brief statement.

According to him, there are two ways on which the Gītā verse is to be understood. By taking into consideration the nature of prapatti as explained in various other treatises, it is to be taken as a nirapekṣyādi-viśiṣṭa-vidhi. That is, it is a vidhi or injunction demanding the surrendering of oneself to the Lord for refuge, without requiring to observe the rigorous observance of Bhakti-yoga as aided by Karma-yoga and Jñānayoga as taught in the Gītā in the earlier chapters. This vidhi is intended for persons such as Arjuna who regretfully feels his utter incapability of following the rigorous Bhakti-yoga aided by Karma-yoga and Jāāna-yoga. This is a state of ākiācanya or the utter incapacity of oneself to follow Bhakti-yoga or any other means for attaining moksa. This is one of the eligibility requirements for śaranāgati as taught in the Pāncarātra Samhitā. This fact is conveyed by the expression mā śucah—"Do not grieve," stated in the later part of the verse.

The other alternative interpretation of the verse is to take it as adhikārī-viśeṣa-anuvāda pūrvaka yathāvasthita prapatti-vidhi. That is, it is a straightforward vidhi or injunction addressed to the individuals who fulfil the eligibility requirements for following the śaraṇāgati as the means to mokṣa. The eligibility requirements, as explained in the Pāncarātra texts, are akincanya or not capable of following any other means and ananyagatitva or not having anyone else (any other deity other than Viṣṇu) to protect the individual. The word sarvadharmān parityajya reiterates these eligibility requirements (adhikārī-viśeṣa-anuvāda). The word mamekam in the verse implies that other than the Supreme Being, no one else is able to protect the individual. 14

If either of the interpretations is adopted, there would be no room for conflict with the *pramāṇas* and also with the teachings contained in the earlier *adhyāyas*. All the controversial

issues relating to the interpretation of the Gītā verse referring to prapatti as a means to mokṣa have been fully discussed and answered in other works of Vedānta Deśika and in particular Nikṣepa-rakṣa and Rahasya-trayasāra (chap. 29). The chapter in the Paramata-bhaṅga is therefore mainly confined to prove the untenability of the theories on upāya advanced by different schools and how the Viśiṣṭādvaita theory is sound.

#### REFERENCES

- 1. See SD, vāda 7: Śabda-janya pratyakṣa-bhangavāda.
- 2. See Īśa. Up.: Avidyayā mṛtyum tīrtvā vidyayāamṛtam aśnute.
- 3. Vișnoh katākṣam adveṣam (quoted by Vedānta Deśika in the RTS).
- 4. BG.
- 5. Ibid., XV.18-20.
- 6. Mbh.: Sankīrtya nārāyaņa śabda mātram vimukta duḥkhāḥ sukhino bhavanti.
- 7. Sakrd uccārah samsāramocanam bhavet.
- 8. See Rāmāyana: Te vayam bhavatā raksyā bhavat-viṣaya vāsinah.
- 9. Cf. Ibid., garbhabhūtāh tapodhanāh.
- 10. See Paśurmanuṣyāḥ pakṣī vā ye ca vaiṣṇava samśrayaḥ; tenaiva te prayāsyānti.
- 11. See RTS: Ācāryavaļtayā muktau.
- 12. Nāham puruṣakāreṇa na cā'pyanyena hetunā; kevalam svecchayaiva aham kancit kadācana.
- 13. BG, XVII.66.
- 14. See RTS, chap. 29: Adhikāram puraskṛtya upāyasya nirapekṣatām; eka śabdena vaktīti kecit vākyavido viduḥ.

# The Doctrine of Puruṣārtha

philosophical doctrines and the theories relating to the upāya or the means of attaining a higher goal as presented by other schools, Vedānta Dešika proceeds to examine the theories advanced by them relating to the puruṣārtha or the nature of the goal to be attained for which purpose philosophical investigation or study of a Daršana is undertaken. At the very outset, he states that both the non-Vedic as well as Vedic schools do not serve any useful purpose (anukūla-phala) in this regard insofar as they do not help an individual to attain a higher spiritual goal such as mokṣa soon after his death. This sweeping and storing criticism by Vedānta Dešika is supported by the following Smṛti text of sage Manu, who is highly respected as an authority in respect of all spiritual matters<sup>1</sup>:

Yo vedabāyāh smṛtayah yāsca kāśca kudṛṣṭayah;

Sarvāstāh nisphalāh pretya hi tāh smṛtah.

The teachings of those schools which do not accept the authority of the Vedas and also of those schools which are developed as opposed to accepted valid *pramāṇas* and also based on fallacious logical arguments, are of no value because they do not serve the purpose of achieving a spiritual goal by an individual soon after his death.

In the chapter titled "Parokta-prayojanādhikāra" Vedānta Deśika substantiates this criticism by briefly stating the position of each school.

The Cārvāka school does not admit any pramāṇas except pratyakṣa nor the causal relationship. Hence they cannot claim that the philosophical discussions would lead to the acquisition

of any useful spiritual knowledge. Even the indulgence in eating and drinking acts would not serve the spiritual purpose.

Regarding the Mādhyamika Buddhists, they maintain that the realization of śūnyatva itself is mokṣa. But such a śūnyatva exists all the time (nityasiddha) and it is not a new state which is to be secured by some causal factors. If it is to be brought about, it cannot be nitya. Hence the study of the Sacred texts (Āgamas) of the Mādhyamikas, contemplation over what is learnt, etc., are futile.

The other three schools of Buddhism, viz., Yogācāra, Sautrāntika and Vaibhāṣika admit consciousness in the name of vijñāna but at the same time they regard it as kṣaṇika. Even this vijñāna endures in the form of a series of mental ideas (jñāna-santati). It is devoid of attributes (nirguṇa) and does not have bhoktṛtva or the capacity to experience anything. In the absence of bhoktṛtva there would be no scope for an individual to enjoy the fruits of the deeds performed by him. Hence if a goal as prescribed in their Sacred texts is to be attained, it is of no value (niṣphala).

The same kind of criticism applies to Advaita Vedānta. Though it admits ātman as nitya or eternal, it is only of the nature of consciousness (caitanya-mātra) and it is also devoid of all attributes (nirguṇa). It is neither the subject of knowledge (jñāta) nor the bhoktā or the subject of experience. Such a kind of ātman cannot therefore enjoy the fruits of the deeds performed by an individual. Besides, the avidyā which causes the bondage for the ātman and also the eradication of it by the knowledge of the true nature of the self are considered as mithyā or illusory. Such a view would render the endeavour to be made to attain a desired goal futile (svābhimata-prayojana-bhanga).

The Jaina school which upholds Anekāntavāda, that is, that the nature of an object or concept is of manifold nature cannot be determined in a specific way. The distinction between sukha and duḥkha and also bandha and mokṣa cannot be determined in a specific way. In the absence of settled theories, the attainment of human goals, whether if falls within the purview of our experience (dṛṣṭa-prayojana) or is beyond the scope of our experience (adṛṣṭa-phala) ceases to have any significance.

This criticism against the Jainas also applies to Bhāskara school of Vedānta which subscribes to the doctrine of Bhedābheda, that is, Brahman and  $j\bar{i}va$  are both different (bheda) and also non-different (abheda) by overlooking the contradiction involved in the co-existence of bheda and abheda. Besides, this school which admits svarūpaikya between Brahman and  $j\bar{i}va$  is open to the criticism of being opposed to the Scriptural texts which speak of  $s\bar{a}mya$  or equal status of  $j\bar{i}va$  with Brahman in the state of mukti.

Regarding the Vaiśeṣika- and the Nirīśvara-mīmāṁsās expounded by Prabhākara, the nature of the goal formulated by them also suffers from defects. They conceive mokṣa as a state of existence for the jīvātman as totally devoid of all experience, both sukha and duḥkha, similar to the piece of stone (pāṣāṇa-kalpa). This theory is directly opposed to the teaching imparted to Indra by Prajāpati in the Chāndogya Upaniṣad about the nature of mokṣa, according to which jīva in the state of mokṣa manifests itself with eight guṇas, such as apahata-pāpamatva, satyasaṅkalpa, satyakāma, etc., as distinct from the state of jīva (in bondage) and also during suṣupti or dreamless state when it does not have any experience.

The school of Mīmāmsā represented by Kumārila (Seśvaramīmāmsā) and the author of Nyāyabhūṣaṇa, a commentary on Vaiśeṣikasūtras maintains a modified theory of mokṣa as the experience of the bliss of one's own self (svātmānandamātra-anubhava). Even this cannot constitute the higher Spiritual Goal when it is compared to the enjoyment of the infinite bliss of Brahman along with His glory by the muktātmā in the

state of moksa, as stated in the Upanisads.

Coming to the Sānkhya school, they maintain that kaivalya or the state of existence of puruṣa (the jīvātman) totally free from the association with citta or mind and all its functions is mokṣa. According to the Sānkhyas, puruṣa is by nature always free and he is neither bound nor liberated. If this is their premise, the attainment of kaivalya cannot constitute a puruṣārtha or a state to be attained as a Goal (sādhya). A section of the Sānkhya school maintains a modified view according to which the acquisition of aṣṭaiśvarya or eight kinds of higher supernormal powers is mokṣa. But this cannot also be regarded as mokṣa because it is possible to acquire these powers while the jīvātman is in the state of bondage through the yogic practice.

The Pāśupata school believes that the attainment of a status equal to that of Paśupati or Śiva (paśupati sārupya) is mokṣa. But this theory cannot constitute the Supreme Goal, because Paśupati or Śiva is a Vedic deity like Caturmukha Brahmā, Indra, etc., who are brought into existence like other jīvas by Brahman. Attainment of an equal status with Paśupati, similar to the attainment of equality with Indra by Nahuṣa, Yayāti, etc., the Purāṇic personalities, cannot constitute the Higher Goal as conceived by the Upaniṣads.

After critically examining the theories of all other schools regarding the Higher Spiritual Goal to be attained, Vedānta Deśika states the correct theory as well established by Viśiṣṭādvaita Vedānta expounded by the Śārīraka-śāstra (Brahmasūtra) in the following statement:

Paramātmādhīna-tattulya tadanubhava mahānanda parama-prayojana. The highest Spiritual Goal is the attainment of the Supreme bliss of Brahman which is similar to that enjoyed by Brahman (tattulya or samāna-bhoga) by the liberated jīvātman by its being dependent on Paramātman (Paramādhīna).<sup>3</sup>

That is, the individual self, after it is liberated from bondage, attains the status of equality with Paramātman only in respect of the enjoyment of the bliss of Paramātman to the same extent as Brahman enjoys His own glory. Even in this state, though the jīva is free from bondage and becomes sarvajāa, it is still dependent on Paramātman since dāsyatva or dependence on the Lord is his svābhāvaka-dharma (svarūpa). Such a concept of mokṣa as conceived in the Vīšiṣṭādvaita Vedānta is in full accordance with the Upaniṣadic texts and the Vedāntasūtras based on it.<sup>4</sup>

### REFERENCES

- 1. See Rgveda: Yadvai kiñca manuravadat tat bheşajam. See also Ch. Up.: Manurvai yat kiñcit avadat tad-bheşajam.
- 2. See Sānkhyakārikā: Tasmān-na-badhyate... na mucyate na' pi samsarati kāścit.
- 3. Tait. Up.: So, śnute sarvān kāmān saha; Brahmana vipaścita. Also, Mund. Up.: Nirañjanah paramam sāmyam upaiti.

4. VS, IV.4.2: Bhogamātra-sāmya-lingācca. Also, VS, IV.4.17: jagad-vyāpāra-varjam.

## General Evaluation and Conclusion

In the Preceding Chapters we have presented the critical observations made by Vedānta Deśika on the fifteen schools of thought. The main points of criticisms on each school are summed up in the following resumé outlined by Vedānta Deśika in the concluding chapter of the Paramata-bhanga named Nigamanādhikāra.

#### Carvaka School

This school upholds that pratyakṣa or perception alone is the source of knowledge. This is not a correct stand because it is found that inference (anumāna) and also verbal testimony (śabda) serve as the sources of knowledge. The knowledge derived from the other two pramāṇas is not contradicted. The Cārvākas themselves have accepted in a number of cases that the knowledge derived from inference and also on the basis of the statements of reliable persons are true. Vedas or the Revealed Scripture is free from defects and hence it has to be accepted as a source of authority in respect of spiritual matters. It is therefore wrong to deny the existence of jīvātman as distinct from body and also the concept of God, which are well established in the Scriptural texts.

## MADHYAMIKA BUDDHISM

As the Mādhyamika believes that everything is śūnya or indeterminable, which almost amounts to non-existence, he hoes not have any valid pramāṇas which are needed to establish his own doctrines. He cannot therefore prove that śūnyatva is the truth. Consequently, the theories advanced by rival schools would stand valid.

#### YOGĀCĀRA BUDDHISM

This school maintains that  $j\bar{n}\bar{a}na$  alone, called  $vij\bar{n}\bar{a}na$  in the form of a series of mental ideas, is real, whereas  $j\bar{n}\bar{a}t\bar{r}$  or the subject of knowledge and  $j\bar{n}eya$  or the external object, do not really exist. The latter are falsely imposed on  $j\bar{n}\bar{a}na$  ( $kalpit\bar{a}k\bar{a}ra$ ). This is opposed to our perceptual experience in the form  $idam\ aha\bar{m}\ j\bar{a}n\bar{a}mi$ —"I know this," which involves three factors, viz., the subject denoted by "I," the object denoted by "this" ( $ida\bar{m}$ ) and the process of knowing denoted by "I know" ( $j\bar{a}n\bar{a}mi$ ). When this is a fact, the denial of the object and the subject would lead to the denial of even  $j\bar{n}\bar{a}na$ , by adopting the Mādhyamika logic of  $sarva-s\bar{u}nyatva$ . If, on the other hand,  $j\bar{n}\bar{a}na$  is considered important as it is evident, then he can as well admit the  $j\bar{n}\bar{a}t\bar{r}$  or knower and  $j\bar{n}eya$  or object.

#### SAUTRĀNTIKA BUDDHISM

This school admits both  $j\bar{n}\bar{a}na$  and  $j\bar{n}eya$  or the external object but the latter is to be inferred on the basis of the fact that knowledge has a content  $(j\bar{n}\bar{a}n\bar{a}k\bar{a}ra)$ . This is not a satisfactory explanation because on the basis of the content of the knowledge, it is not possible to know the object with all its specific qualities.

## VAIBHĀŞIKA BUDDHISM

Though this school accepts both jñāna and jñeya or the external object, it holds the view that bare being of the object without any qualifications seen at the first moment alone is real whereas what is perceived later along with certain qualities, technically called vikalpa, are mithyā or unreal since these are superimposed in the subsequent moment by the mind. This view would amount to the denial of the very object which is so evident to our perception. Further, this school along with Yogācāra and Sautrāntika regard that all entities in the universe are momentary in character (kṣanika). Consequently, we cannot explain the concept of memory (smṛti) and pratyabhijñā or the recognition of the object seen now as the same as the one seen earlier. Besides, if there is no continuity in the events, the fruits of the deeds done by one at a particular time has to be reaped by another individual at a different time.

#### ADVAITA VEDĀNTA SCHOOL

This school upholds the theory that other than  $j\bar{n}\bar{a}na$  ( $\bar{a}tman$ ) which alone is real, everything else is illusory (mithyā). What is admitted as Reality is one and nitya or eternal, unlike the theory of Yogācārā for which jñāna is kṣaṇika and many (bahu) in the form of numerous mental series. But the characteristics of ekatva and nityatva are also regarded as mityā by the Advaitin. For the Advaitin the Vedas which are regarded as an important source of authority (pramāna), are also the product of avidyā and thus it is rendered invalid by its being illusory in character. In the absence of valid pramānas it is neither possible to prove one's own doctrines nor refute the theories of other schools as invalid. Further, it is maintained that Brahman which is the one Reality and which is pure consciousness devoid of all attributes (nirviśesa), is eclipsed by avidyā whose nature is indescribable as either sat or asat (anirvacanīya). The existence of the nirviśesa entity and the mihtyātva or illusory character of the universe cannot be proved by any pramanas. Hence this school of Vedanta is not acceptable.

## JAINA SCHOOL

This school does not accept Vedas as a source of authority. Instead, it believes that a person named "Arhan" is sarvajña or omniscient and that all that is taught by him is authoritative. But it cannot be conclusively proved that Arhan is sarvajña as against a similar claim made for Buddha as sarvajña. Further, this school advocates the doctrines such as sapta-bhangī which are opposed to our perceptual experience. It also prescribes religious practices as opposed to Vedic teachings. Due to these reasons, it is to be rejected.

### BHEDĀBHEDA SCHOOLS OF VEDĀNTA

Bhāskara and Yādavaprakāśa, who are the chief exponents of this school embrace the co-existence of bheda and abheda like the Jainas, overlooking the contradiction involved in it. Similarly they admit difference and non-difference between guṇa and guṇā as well as jāti and vyakti. Brahman is free from all defects and is also niravaya or devoid of parts. The

admission of bhedāhbeda relationship between Brahman and jīva would lead to the acceptance of all the defects of the jīva in respect of Brahman. Hence this school is refuted.

## ŚABDA-BRAHMA VIVARTAVĀDA

This school expounded by Bhartrhari, a grammarian, advocates that śabda which is technically named sphoṭa is itself Brahman and it either illusorily manifests itself as the universe (according to Bhartrhari) or it directly undergoes modification (pannāma) as jagat (according to Halāyudha). This is rejected on the same ground as that of Brahma Vivartavāda of Advaita and also Brahma Pariṇāmavāda of Bhartrprapañca. Besides, the theory of sphoṭa or the word essence which is claimed to convey the meaning of words and sentences is unproved by any of the pramāṇas.

### VAIŚEŞIKA SCHOOL

This school is also rejected because of the following reasons. In the first place it does not accept that Veda is apauruṣeya, that is, it is not ascribed to an author. Āgamas or Revealed Scripture which is generally accepted as a separate pramāna is included in the inference. In the matter of enumeration of the tattvas, it does not admit prakṛti or the primordial cosmic matter and its other evolutes as taught in the Upaniṣads. Even with regard to the enumeration of the material entities, it admits the concept of avayavī or the aggregate of parts (avayavas) as distinct from the combination of parts (saṅghāta). More importantly it attempts to establish its theories based on fallacious inferential arguments (anumāna-ābhāsa).

### NYAYA SCHOOL

This school adopts most of the theories developed by Vaīśeṣika and hence the criticisms leveled against them would also be applicable to it. But however, Nyāya Darśana is included among the ten dharma-vidyāsthānas or the philosophical treatises which are useful for the acquisition of spiritual knowledge. The question therefore arises whether it would be proper to refute it. Vedānta Deśika replies that it is not inappropriate to criticize

it since the founders of the Nyāya school have not attempted to interpret or explain their thories in conformity with the Vedānta doctrines.

#### MĪMĀMSĀ SCHOOL

Mīmāmsā as one śāstra or treatise comprising twenty adhyāyas which deals with the interpretation of the entire Vedas—both the ritulistic portion and the Upanișadic portion, consists of three parts (kāndas) similar to the three adhyāyas of a treatise each dealing with a particular subject. Of these the first part which is generally acknowledged as Pürva Mīmāmsā compiled by sage Jaimini, is further divided into two schools due to the two different interpretations offered on the Jaiminisūtras by the later commentators—Kumārila Bhatta and Prābhākara. The major difference between the two lies in respect of the admission of *Īśvara*. One school which admits *Īśvara* is known as Seśvara Mīmāmsā and the school which denies *Īśvara* and the existence of celestial deities with bodies for whom yaga is performed is known as Nirīśvara Mīmāmsā. These two schools are also designated as Kabandha Mīmāmsā after the name of Kabandha, the mythological person whose head was cut off and Rāhu Mīmāmsā after the name of Rāhu, the mythological demon whose body was taken off. The Kabandha Mīmāmsā represented by Kumārila Bhatta accords greater importance to the ritualistic part of Vedas and as such it admits that karma or the performance of prescribed deeds is more important than the worship of Iśvara for granting rewards for the deeds performed. It is this school of Mīmāmsā known as Nirīśvara Mīmāmsā which comes up for criticism and is rejected.

As regards the Seśvara Mīmāmsā represented by Prabhākara, though it admits *Īśvara*, the ontological doctrines developed by them which are similar to those of Vaisesika, are defective. They admit the theory of moksa conceived by Vaisesika as a state of existence for the jīvātman as devoid of all experience,

similar to a piece of stone (paṣāṇa-kalpa).

Both these schools admit the Vaisesika theory of avayava and avayavī which cannot be proved by pramānas, the concept of apūrva or unseen potency caused by the yāgas as the bestower of the fruits of the deeds rather than the grace of Iśvara as

established in the Vedānta and also the denial of the possession of body by the *devatās* as established in the Āgamas. Hence both these schools of Pūrva Mīmāmsā stand rejected.

### SĀNKHYA SCHOOL

This school, no doubt, admits the authoritativeness of the Vedas unlike the Nirīśvara Mīmāmsā but it denies the existence of *Īśvara* as a separate tattva other than prakṛti and puruṣa. Further, the prakṛti is conceived as an entity comprising three components which are regarded as dravyas or substances instead of guṇas or qualities. Further, it maintains the theory that the effects (kārya) is latent in the causal substance similar to the oil in the oil seeds and what is latent is only made manifest (abhivyakti) by the causal factors. This theory is opposed to our perceptual experience.

Regarding the nature of ātman, the Sānkhyas admit that it is jñāta or subject of knowledge, kartā or the agent of action, it is subject to bondage and it is also liberated from it but in the same breath, they also say that all these functions do not belong to ātmā but belong to prakrti. Thus their teachings involve contradiction. More importantly they deny Īśvara as a separate ontological principle. Thus the system which is full of self-contradictions does not deserve to accepted.

## YOGA SCHOOL

Though this school enjoys a better status than that of Sāṅkhya by its admission of *Īśvara* as a separate tattva other than prakṛti and puruṣa, it is not sound because this *Īśvara* is regarded as an exalted puruṣa (puruṣa-viśeṣaḥ) who is only the nimitta-kāraṇa or the efficient cause of the universe and not upādāna-kāraṇa or the material cause of the universe, as Vedānta says.

With regard to sādhana and mokṣa, the Yoga school no doubt prescribes the eightfold ethico-religious discipline such as yama, niyama, etc. Though these constitute a well-formulated discipline, its significance is lost by conceiving the nature of the goal to be attained by the yogic sādhana is kaivalya or the state of existence of puruṣa or jīvātman as totally free from the association of citta and its functions instead of Paramātma-sāksātkāra.

#### PASUPATA SCHOOL

This school, like Yoga, admits all the three ontological principles—prakti, purusa, and Īśvara. But it does not acknowledge Īśvara as upādānā-kārana of the universe. He is only nimitta-kārana as in the Yoga school. With regard to the enumeration of the tattvas it mentions thirty-six instead of twenty-five as generally accepted, by adding unnecessary additional principles. More than anything, the religious observances laid down by the school are opposed to the Vedic teachings. Hence this school falls outside the scope of accepted orthodox schools.

#### PĂÑCARĂTRA SCHOOL

Though this school is included among the rival schools taken up for critical review, it is not intended for criticism (bhanga). There are some objections raised by the rival schools questioning its validity (prāmānya) on the ground that it advocates a few theories such as the origin of jīva (jīva-utpatti) as against the Upanişadic teachings which admit that jīva is nitya. It is therefore felt necessary to answer these objections and establish the validity of the Pañcaratra. The religious way of life taught in the Pañcarātrasamhitās are in full accord with the way of life advocated by Vedanta. These treatises mainly deal with the subject related to the modes of worship of the Parama-purusa or Supreme Being referred to in the Upanisads, through the means of upāsanā or devoted meditation and securing His grace, which alone confers moksa or liberation from bondage to the devotee. Hence it is to be accepted as most authoritative Bhagavatśästra useful for redemption from bondage.

The above criticisms offered against the fifteen schools of thought are confined to their main philosophical tenets (tattvas). Regarding their theories on upāya (means of attainment) and puruṣārtha (goal), these have been outlined briefly in the chaps. 20 and 21 of the Paramata-bhanga along with the theories upheld by Viśiṣṭādvaita on these topics. The three fundamental metaphysical doctrines (tattvas) of Viśiṣṭādvaita—cit, acit, and Īśvara, are presented in three in three separate chapters at the beginning of the treatise. Though these are not intended for refutation, the possible objections against the theories of

Viśiṣṭādvaita are answered. Thus Paramata-bhanga is a distinctive philosophical treatise containing a critical review of all the important systems of Indian philosophy that were prevalent during the time of Vedānta Deśika.

After briefly stating the defects of all the systems of philosophy other than Pāñcarātra that were prevalent at the time of Vedānta Deśika, a question is raised: what about the new schools of thought which may come up in later times and which may advance theories as opposed to Viśiṣṭādvaita Vedānta? Would it then be justified to claim that all possible objections against Viśiṣṭādvaita doctrines are answered?

In reply to this query Vedānta Deśika answers that whatever theories are found defective and hence need to be refuted, this task is already accomplished by the objections levelled against the theories which are similar to what is mentioned (nirasta-tulya-bhāga-dattottaram). If there are theories that may be newly formulated somewhat similar to what is presented by Viśiṣṭādvaita, then there would be no need to refute them (siddhānta-tulya-bhāga na dūṣyah).

As we have explained in the Introduction, this critical review is not undertaken by Vedānta Desika for a limited purpose of establishing one's own theories (svapakṣasthāpana) through the refutation of the theories of rival schools, but on the other hand, it is intended to provide a correct knowledge about the fundamental teachings of Visistadvaita Vedanta as compared to those advanced by the rival schools of thought. As we have pointed out in the preceding chapters, the non-Vedic schools such as Cārvāka, Buddhism and Jainism do not accept the authority of the Vedas. The Vedic schools such as Vaisesika, Nyāya, Sāṅkhya, Yoga, and Nirīsvara-mīmāṁsā, even though they accept the authority of the Vedas, have developed theories which do not conform to the Upanisadic teachings and which are also found logically defective. Even among the Vedanta schools such as Śańkara's Advaita, Bhedābhedavāda of Bhāskara and Yādavaprakāśa, though they are based on the Upanisads and the Vedāntasūtra, have advanced doctrines which are found untenable. An aspirant for moksa is required to acquire a proper and correct tattva-jñāna that leads to moksa and avoid being entrapped in the pitfalls of

erroneous theories. It is with this objective that Vedānta Deśika has undertaken to write this special compendium under the title of *Paramata-bhanga*.

The question may be raised whether this objective has been accomplished in this work. A dispassionate study of the critical review of the text will reveal that this is satisfactorily achieved. As Vedānta Deśika points out in the first three chapters and also in the concluding chapter, a sound system of philosophy should admitathe three fundamental metaphysical principles viz., cit or jīvātman, acit or the primordial cosmic matter and Iśvara or the Supreme Being, as stated in the Śvetāśvatara Upanisad. All the three are to be admitted as real and also different from each other by virtue of their intrinsic nature, as clearly enunciated in the bheda-śrutis or the Upanișadic texts which speak of difference between them. In the same way, on the basis of the abheda-śrutis or the Upanişadic texts which speak of non-difference between the three tattvas, these are to be admitted as one in the sense that *Īśvara* as organically related to cit and acit is a visista-tattva. When three ontological entities are admitted, a proper relationship between them, that is, between Iśvara and jīva as well as Iśvara and jagat, needs to be established. The Antaryāmī Brāhmaṇa of the Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad explicitly states that Brahman is immanent in all sentient and non-sentient entities and that it is the universal Self (Atman) as Inner Controller (Antaryamin) and also that the universe including the jīvas are its body in the metaphysical sense. On the authority of this Scriptural text, Viśiṣṭādvaita Vedanta upholds that Brahman as organically related to cit and acit is one ultimate Reality. Thus on the basis of the body-soul relation, it establishes a satisfactory relationship between Brahman and the two other ontological entities— Jīvas and jagat. Herein lies the merit of Viśiṣṭādvaita as a philosophical system.

Judged from this standpoint, all other schools of thought including Advaita, Bhedābhedavāda and later school of Vedānta are found defective. The Cārvāka school does not admit jīva and also *Īśvara*. Buddhist schools do not admit the eternal jīvātman. Nor does it admit *Īśvara* as the Creator and Ruler of the universe. Though the Jainas accept jīva, they do not

believe in the existence of God other than Arhan as an omniscient person. Coming to the Vedic schools, Sāṅkhyas admit only tow entities—puruṣa and prakṛti. Though the Yoga school believes in Īśvara, He is regarded only as puruṣa-viśeṣa and nimitta-kāraṇa of the universe. The schools of Nirīśvara-mīmāṁsā, Vaiśeṣika, and Nyāya admit jīva, universe and Īśvara, but Īśvara is not accorded an important place. The Pāśupata accepts Śiva, a Vedic deity, as Īśvara, but He is the nimitta-kāraṇa of the universe.

Taking the Vedānta schools, though Advaita accepts all the three tattvas, Brahman alone is admitted as absolutely real, whereas jīvas and the universe are illusory in character. The Bhedābheda schools admit all the three tattvas but they do not provide a satisfactory relationship between Brahman and jīva as well as Brahman and universe. The later Vedānta schools suffer from the same defect. The schools of Śivādvaita admit Śiva as the Supreme Deity instead of Brahman on the authority of the Śaivāgamas.

Further, the rival schools do not uphold a satisfactory theory of upāya and puruṣārtha. As stated by Vedānta Deśika in the chapter on puruṣārtha, all the schools which are opposed to the Vedic teachings (Vedabāhyāḥ) and also those which accept the Vedic authority but misinterpret the Upaniṣadic texts by adopting fallacious logical arguments (kudṛṣṭayaḥ), are of no value (niṣphalāḥ) because their teachings do not help to attain mokṣa which is the Supreme Goal. This view of Vedānta Deśika is well supported by the following statement of Manu:

yo vedabāhyāḥ smṛtayaḥ yāśca kāscana kudṛṣṭayaḥ; sarvāste niṣphalāḥ pretya hi tāḥ smṛtaḥ.

The teachings of those schools which do not accept the authority of the Vedas and also of those schools which are developed as opposed to the accepted valid *pramānas* and also based on fallacious logical arguments, are of no value because they do not serve the purpose of achieving the Supreme Goal (*mokṣa*) by an individual.

This point is explained in the chapters dealing with upāya and puruṣārtha. As Vedānta is primarily a mokṣa-śāstra aimed to show a way to the liberation of the jīvātman from bondage, it is relevant to judge the value of other schools of thought in terms of their usefulness to attain mokṣa. Hence Vedānta Deśika

justifiably affirms that Viśiṣṭādvaita Vedānta expounded by Rāmānuja on the authoritative sources viz., the Upaniṣads, the *Vedāntasūtra* and other allied texts such as Smṛtis with the support of logic, is a sound system of philosophy.

As already stated, the merit of this system is that it admits the three ontological entities—cit, acit, and Īśvara as mentioned in the Upaniṣads. On the basis of the bheda-śrutis or the Upaniṣadic texts which speak of difference between the three tattvas, these are regarded as different from each other by virtue of their intrinsic nature. Similarly on the authority of the abheda-śrutis or the Upaniṣadic texts speaking of non-difference between the three tattvas, these are taken as one in the sense that Īśvara as organically related to cit and acit is one viśiṣṭa-tattva

in the primary sense (mukhya-vṛtti).

An objection may be raised against the above conclusion justifying the soundness of the Viśistadvaita system of philosophy on the basis of reconciling the bheda and abheda śrutis by conceiving the relation of śarīra-ātma-bhāva or the relation of body to the soul. How can the non-sentient jagat and sentiment jīvas be regarded as the śarīra or body of Paramātman? This is a major objection that is generally raised by the critics of Viśiṣṭādvaita and in particular by post-Rāmānuja theistic schools which do not accept the śarīrātma-bhāva between the three tattvas. Vedānta Deśika himself raises this question in chapter 2 on cit-tattva. Is it appropriate to conceive the jīvātman who is the owner of the physical body, as the śarīra or body of Paramātman? In reply, he explains, on the basis of the arguments advanced by Rāmānuja in the Śrībhāsya, that the term śarīra is not to be taken in the ordinary sense as the physical body. The Naiyāyikas have defined body as that which is the seat or abode of activity, sense organs and experience in the form of pleasure and pain. This definition of body is considered defective because it is too wide or too narrow. If the body is a seat of activity, even a pot becomes a sarīra in so far as it is locus of cestā or some activity. Again the body in the state of swoon does not have any activity but it still continues to be the body. The definition of the body as the abode of sense organs is too narrow as it excludes such material entities which are regarded in the Antaryāmī Brāhmaņa as bodies but do not have sense organs. That body is the basis for the experience of pleasure and pain is faulty because such experience belongs to the soul or the empirical ego (antahkarana) but not to the physical body. Further, the definition offered by the Naiyāyikas does not apply to the physical elements such as prthivi, ap and other entities described in the Antaryami Brahmana as śarīra of Paramātman. Rāmānuja therefore offers an appropriate definition of śarīra which would be applicable to all entities both sentient and non-sentient. Thus it is defined: yasya cetanasya yaddravyam sarvātmanā svārthe niyantum dhārayithum ca śakyam tacchesataika-svarūpam ca tat-tasya śarīram.<sup>2</sup> It means: "In respect of a sentient being, either Paramātman or jīvātman, whatever entity is wholly and always controlled and supported for its own purpose and which stands to the self in an entirely dependent relation, is called śarīra." The significance of this definition<sup>3</sup> is that the śarīrātma-bhāva or the relation of body-soul holds good between two entities (dravyas) of which one should be a sentient being, either pvātman or Paramātman and both of which should also be inseparably related as long as they endure (aprthak-siddhimat). Taking the example of the physical body of an individual, it is inseparably related to the  $\bar{p}va$ . The body is sustained and controlled by jīva. The body exists for the purpose of jīva. Thus jīva is the śarīrī or the owner of the physical body. On the basis of this analogy, the relationship between jīvātman and Paramātman and so also other entities in the universe are regarded as sarīra of Paramātman in a metaphysical sense. That is, as that which is wholly and always controlled and sustained by a sentient being. If the term śarīra is not understood in the above sense, the twenty-two entities referred to in the Antaryami Brahmana of the Brhadaranyaka Upanișad as śarīra of Paramātman who is the universal soul (śarīrī) by virtue of His being the Antaryāmin or Inner Controller, would not be meaningful. The term sarīra used in the Antaryāmī Brāhmaņa cannot be taken in a figurative sense as conceived by Śańkara and Madhva. It is employed in the Brhadāranyaka Upanisad and also in the Subāla Upanisad to imply the ontological relationship that exists between Paramatman and the universe including jīvas.

Brahman as the  $\hat{s}a\bar{n}\bar{n}$  signifies three important characteristics of the Ultimate Reality: (1) That it is the ground or source (ādhāra) of the entire universe; (2) that it is the controller (niyantā) of all; (3) that it is the Lord (śeṣī) of all. All these characteristics are well established in the Upanisads. Brahman as the primary cause of the universe establishes the fact that it is the ground or ādhāra of the inverse of cit and acit. Thus the Chandogya Upanisad affirms that all beings have their root in the sat (Brahman) and that they are grounded in the sat (sanmulāḥ saumya imāḥ sarvāḥ prajāḥ sadāyatanāḥ satpratiṣṭhāḥ).4 The Antaryāmī Brāhmana declares that Brahman is the controller of the entire universe including the jīvas. 5 Brahman as the creator of the universe and the universe created by Him out of His sankalpa as a sport (līlā) reveals the fact that the universe including the jīvas are intended to subserve the purpose of the Supreme Lord similar to the pleasure-garden created by an individual for the benefit of its owner. Thus the definition of śarīra offered by Rāmānuja is well-supported by the Upaniṣadic teachings.

On the basis of the theory of śarīrātma-bhāva or the bodysoul relation, the Viśistadvaita Vedanta maintains that the entire universe of cit and acit stands in a relation of a body to the soul. All sentient and non-sentient beings constitute the śarīra or body of Brahman in the technical sense, viz., the former are wholly dependent on the latter for their existence (sattā); they are completely controlled by Brahman and they subserve the purpose of the Supreme Being. Brahman is called the Atman or śarīrin because it is the ground (ādhāra) for the universe, it is the controller (niyantā) of the universe and it uses it for its own purpose (seṣī). The three concepts used to explain comprehensively the ontological relationship that exists between Brahman and the universe of cit and acit are: (1) ādhāra-ādheya (sustainer and sustained), (2) niyantāniyāmya (controller and controlled), and (3) śeṣī-śeṣa (the self-subsistent and dependent). On the basis of this organic relationship that exists between jīva and Brahman, Vedānta Deśika defines cit or jīvātman as that which is necessarily ādheya, vidheya, and seșa.6 These three characteristics constitute the very svarupa of not only cit but also acit.

Another significant philosophical implication of this relation is that it satisfactorily reconciles the apparent conflict between the bheda-śrutis and the abheda-śrutis. That is, it accounts for bheda or difference that exists between the three ontological entities viz., Brahman, cit and acit by virtue of their intrinsic nature as taught in the Upanisads. It also explains abheda or non-difference between them in the sense of oneness or organic unity (visista) between Brahman as well as cit and acit. In other words, Brahman as organically related to cit and acit is one viśista-tattva. If such an explanation is not admitted, then it would not be possible to reconcile both the abheda and bheda relation between Brahman and the other two ontological entities in the primary sense. Śańkara accords greater importance to the abheda-śrutis and regards the bheda-śrutis as less important. Madhva, on the contrary, accords greater importance to the bheda-śrutis and lesser importance to the abheda-śrutis which are taken in a figurative sense. This is not appropriate because all the Upanisadic texts have to be admitted as equally valid and authoritative. The stand taken by Rāmānuja therefore accords equal importance to both abheda- and bheda-śrutis. This stand taken by Rāmānuja has the support of the Vedāntasūtras dealing with the nature of jīva's relation to Brahman and also the relation between Brahman and the universe. Bādarāyaņa employs the term amsa to explain the jīva's relation to Brahman. The term amsa interpreted in the sense of an integral part of the whole or the essential attribute as inherently related to the substance, provides the satisfactory explanation for both difference and non-difference. Epistemologically a substance and attribute are different by virtue of their nature, like the red rose and its colour redness, but the substance as inherently or inseparably related to the attribute is one complex entity, similar to the rose as inseparably related to its redness. The colour does not subsist by itself except as inherent in the substance. In the same way the pure substance without its attributes, is inconceivable. As Vedānta Deśika points out, all entities in the universe, both material as well as spiritual such as jīva and Paramātman, are visista in character, that is, qualified with some attributes. A pure substance without any

qualities is non-existent, like the sky-flower. The difference between substance and attribute is unquestionable, as explained in the first chapter of *Paramata-bhanga* and in detail in the *Tattva-muktā-kalāpa*.<sup>7</sup>

According to Rāmānuja, Brahman is organically related to cit and acit at all times, both during the state of dissolution and even after creation of the universe. During the state of dissolution it is associated with cit and acit in their subtle form (sūkṣmāvasthā) and in the state after creation, the same Brahman becomes associated with cit and acit in their gross or manifest state (sthūlāvasthā).

An objection may be raised whether such a visista entity can be regarded as the Ultimate Reality. The Chandogya Upanisad states: "sadeva idam agra āsīt ekameva advitīyam." The same fact is also stated in the Brhadaranyaka and Aitareya Upanisads dealing with the causation of the universe.8 If these texts are taken as they are, they emphasise that the Ultimate Reality is one only without a second. That is, the Ultimate Reality is one undifferentiated Being (nirvisesaentity) devoid of all attributes. This is the view maintained by Advaita Vedānta. Vedānta Deśika refutes this theory. Oneness of Reality in the sense of svarūpaikya or tādātmya, as Advaitin maintains is untenable. As explained in chap. 1, all entities, both material and spiritual such as Brahman and jīvātman is a quality one (viśiṣṭa). That is, that which is characterized by attributes. A pure being devoid of any quality is a metaphysical abstraction similar to the skyflower and it is beyond logical and mental comprehension.

Further, as stated earlier, if the validity of both bheda-śrutis and abheda-śrutis is to be upheld in the primary sense (mukhyārtha), it is possible to do so only by admitting it in the sense of viśistaikya, that is, Brahman as organically or inseparably related to cit and acit is one. As stated by Vedānta Deśika, though there is absolute difference between Īśvara and the other two ontological entities and also between the individual souls and matter, the Ultimate Reality is considered as one because as an organic entity it is one (prakāra-prakārinoh prakārānām ca mitho atyanta bheda api viśiṣtaikyādi-vivakṣaya ekatva vyapadeśah). This is the only way of reconciling the apparent conflict between the bheda-śrutis and abheda-śrutis. This fact is well brought

out in our analysis of the Bhedābheda schools of Vedānta as well as other post-Rāmānuja theistic schools and, in particular, Dvaita.

Vedanta Desika is therefore fully justified in coming to the following conclusion after the critical review of all other schools of thought, viz., that Visistadvaita Vedanta as expounded by Rāmānuja on the authority of the Upanişads, Vedāntasūtra and Smrti texts supported with logic is the soundest system of philosophy. A mumuksu or one who aspires for moksa should adopt the right way of spiritual life as established by the Sacred texts properly interpreted in accordance with sound logical arguments and also by making use of allied treatises such as Smrti texts which elucidate the Vedic teachings. One should also be guided by the path shown by great sages and ācāryas such as Manu, Parāśara, Śuka, Śauṇaka, Nāthamuni, Yāmuna, and Śrī Rāmānuja. Those who attempt to establish philosophical truths only on the basis of tarka or logical arguments are bound to go wrong since tarka alone without the support of Scriptural texts cannot conclusively establish a theory since it is possible by the adoption of same logical arguments to disprove a theory. In the opinion of Vedanta Desika, it is safer and appropriate to follow the way shown by the great sages for overcoming bondage and attaining the Supreme Spiritual Goal.

### REFERENCES

- 1. See Nyāyasūtra, I.1.1: Ce' şitendriyārthāśrayah śarīram.
- 2. See RB, II.1.9.
- 3. See FVV, pp. 50-51, for fuller details of significance.
- 4. Ch. Up., VI.8.4.
- 5. See Br. Up., V.7.7.
- 6. See supra, chap. 1 on Cit-tattva.
- 7. See TMK, I.1-8. Also, FVV, chap. 1, pp. 26-31.
- 8. Br. Up., I.4.10: Brahma vā idamagra āsīt. Ait. Up., I.1.1: Ātmā vā idam ekameva agra āsīt, nanyat kiñcana mişat.
- 9. See NS, p.1.

# Glossary

abhāva non-existence; a logical category according

to Nyāya-Vaiśesika.

abheda non-difference; identity of jīva and

Brahman according to Advaita.

abheda-śrutis Scriptural texts speaking of non-difference

between two ontological entities such as

Brahman and jīva.

abhivyakti manifestation of what is latent in a causal

substance.

abhimāna attachment.

acetana that which is devoid of the capacity to know,

such as dharma-bhūta-jñāna, nitya-vibhūti, as contrasted to jīva, according to Viśiṣṭādvaita.

acintya indescribable or inconceivable.

acit non-sentient matter, the primordial cosmic

matter.

adharma deeds prohibited by the sacred texts; evil;

principle of rest according to Jainas.

adheya that which is wholly and always supported

and controlled by a Higher Being, as in

the case of jīva and cosmic matter.

adhikāra a chapter dealing with a specific subject.
topical section comprising one or more

Vedāntasūtras, dealing with a specific subject.

adhyavasāya determination.

adravya non-substance; an attribute which does

not serve as substrate of another quality.

Āgamas sacred texts.

āgantuka accidental.

ahamartha entity denoted by the notion of "I;" nvātman

according to Visistādvaita.

ahankāra an evolute of brakrti; the ego caused by

delusion

ahikundala serpent and its coil.

what is spiritual, such as God, nva, etc. ajada ajñāna ignorance or absence of knowledge; cosmic ignorance which causes world illusion,

according to Advaita.

akarmavasya no subject to karma.

ākiñcanya utter incapacity of a person to do an act

enjoined in the scripture.

jīva; also Brahman prakrti associated with aksara

the aggregate of nvas (nva samasti).

having no beginning or origin. anādi

ānanda-tāratamya gradations in the experience of bliss of

Paramātman by muktas.

andaja other realms.

Anekāntavāda the theory of the Jainas that all things in

the universe are of indeterminable nature; the doctrines of relative pluralism.

internal sense-organ. antah-karana

antariksa sky.

Brahman as inner controller by being Antaryāmin

immanent in all jīvas.

that which is monadic in nature. anu

knowledge or consciousness; the transanubhūti

cendental knowledge according to SB. inference as a means of knowledge.

anumāna one who approves the action of another anumantā

individual.

entry of Brahman along with jīvas into anupraveśa

the bodies.

mutual non-existence. anyonya-abhāva

knowledge of immediate nature; direct aparokṣa-jñāna intuition of Reality, according to Advaita

apasiddhānta wrong theory.

that which is inseparably related. aprthak-siddha apūrva

the potency generated by the performance of rituals according to Pūrvamīmāmsā.

asatkāryavāda the theory of causality which upholds that the effect does not exist in the cause,

according to Nyāya-Vaiśesika.

āśrama stages of life.

āstika orthodox; one who accepts Vedas as

authority.

atīndriya that which is beyond the scope of sense-

perception; super-sensuous.

aupādhika what is caused by *upādhi* or limiting adjunct. avasthā an accident modification of a substance. avasthiti

abiding of one thing in another.

avayava parts of a whole.

the whole consisting of parts; the aggregate avayavī

of avayavas according to Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika.

that which is unknowable. avedya

ignorance; the cosmic principle which  $avidy\bar{a}$ 

causes the appearance of Brahman as the universe according to Advaita.

prakṛti in its unmanifest form. avyakta that which exists as unmanifest. avyākṛta

invariable connection between two entities ayuta-siddha

such as guna and gunī.

the *nva* associated with bondage. baddha

bondage. bandha

refutation; critical review. bhanga

The relation of difference and non-difference bhedābheda

between two entities.

Scriptural texts speaking of difference bheda-śrutis

between two ontological entities such as

ñva and Brahman.

the object of experiences; prakṛti and its bhogya

products according to Viśistadvaita.

the one who experiences pleasure and bhoktā

pain.

physical element. bhūta consciousness.

the entity which is sentient in character caitanya cetana

such as jīva.

rit sentient being; the individual self.

Daršana school of thought; a well-developed system

of philosophy.

dharmarighteousness; principle of action according

to Jainas.

dharma-bhūta-jñāna knowledge as the essential attribute of the

self; attributive knowledge as distinct from

svarūba-iñāna.

substance: the substrate in which dharma  $dharm\bar{\imath}$ 

inheres according to Visistādvaita.

directions such as east, west, etc. dik

dravya substance: that which serves as the substrate

of qualities according to Visistadvaita. combination of two primary atoms.

gandha odour.

dvyanuka

hita the ways and means to be pursued to achieve

the Spiritual goal.

Īśvara The Supreme Being; Brahman; God of

religion.

that which is material, such as prakrti, pot, jada

etc.; inert; inanimate object.

generic character; unique characteristic jāti

of an object, according to Visistadvaita. liberation of a jīva while embodied.

jīvanmukti capacity to know; knowership. iñātrtva

cognitive sense organs. jñānendriyas

object of knowledge. jñeya

the state of existence of the individual self kaivalya

dissociated with its mind and functions, according to Sānkhyas; blissful state of existence of a jīva free from bondage.

kalpa epoch.

sensual pleasures; desire. kāma

Scriptural statements dealing with causation kārana-vākya

of the universe.

prescribed ritualistic deeds; action in the karma

form of movement of an object according to Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika; results of past deeds.

cognative sense-organs. karmendriyas

- the agent of action; nva. kartā kartrtva capacity to do an act.
- the absolute instant, according to Buddhists; ksana the conglomeration of various causal factors which are operative in producing an effect
  - according to Viśistādvaita.
- ksanika momentary.
- mahat the first evolute of prakrti.
- Manipravāļa Tamil language interspersed with Sanskrit
  - words.
- a well-developed system of philosophy; mata
  - religious sect.
- cosmic principle which gives rise to the  $mar{a}yar{a}$ 
  - world illusion according to Advaita; the primordial cosmic matter; that which is an instrument of wonderful creation
  - according to Visistadvaita.
- illusory; that which is neither real nor mithyā
  - unreal but different from both, according
  - to Advaita.
- liberation from bondage. moksa
- the jīva liberated from bondage. mukta
- the liberated jīva.  $mukt\bar{a}tm\bar{a}$
- state of liberation of jīva from bondage. mukti
- primordial cosmic matter. mūlaprakṛti
- one who is desirous of attaining moksa. mumuksu
- cruelty. nairghanya hell. naraka
- destruction. nāśa
- heterodox; one does not accept Vedas as nāstika
  - authority.
- instrumental or efficient cause. nimitta-kārana
- devoid of attributes; undifferentiated; nirguna devoid of defilements (heyaguna) according
  - to RB.
- indeterminate; devoid of all qualities. nirvikalpaka devoid of modification or any change. nirvikāra
- devoid of all differentiation. nirviśesa
- jīva which is eternally free from bondage. nitya-mukta

pañca-bhūtas five gross elements.

pañcikarana admixture of five elements in certain

proportion.

parāk what manifests itself for others such as

dharma-bhūta-jñāna.

paramākāśa transcendental world.

paramāņus partless, imperceptible and infinitesimal

reals, according to Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika; atoms; smallest particles according to Viśiṣṭādvaita. the Supreme Abode; the abode of Viṣnu.

paramapada the Supreme Abode; the abode of Viṣṇu.
pāramārthika real; transcendental real according to

Advaita.

paratantra dependent on something else for its

existence.

pariccheda limitation. parimāņa dimension.

parināma modification; evolution of an entity into

a different state.

paryāya modifications; modes according to Jainas. pradhvamsa-abhāva posterior non-existence of an object.

prāgabhāva prior non-existence of an object.

pralaya dissolution of the universe.

pramānas means of valid knowledge, such as

perception, inference and verbal testimony.

prāṇa vital breath. prapañca universe.

prapatti the doctrine of self-surrender to God as

a direct means to moksa.

prasāsitāra One who commands all beings.

pratijnā the statement to be proved; the declaration.

pratyak what is self-revealed such as viva

pratyak what is self-revealed such as jīva.
pratyakṣa perception as a means of knowledge.

pratyabhijñā knowledge by the recognition of what is

seen earlier.

pravrtti capacity to function.

pṛthaktva separateness.

pudgala the means given by the Jainas to the cosmic matter which undergoes modification.

purusārtha the goal of human endeavour; the Supreme

Spiritual goal such as moksa.

rajas one of the three qualities of prakrti, which

stands for whatever is active.

śabda-brahma Cosmic sound essence as Brahman conceived

by the grammarians.

sādharmya having common features.

saguna that which is qualified with attributes. sahopalambha that which is cognized as together, in-

variable association.

śakti potency; the power inherent in an entity

according to Viśistadvaita.

samādhi the state of trance; the final stage of eight-

fold yoga discipline.

samārādhana worship of Paramātman.

samaṣṭi aggregation or collection of several parts. samaṣṭi-sṛṣṭi creation of the aggregate universe.

samavāya the relation of inherence.

samsarga to become united with another entity.
samskāra latent impressions of past experience.

samyāvasthā state of equilibrium. samyoga relation of conjunction.

sanghāta aggregate.

saptabhangi sevenfold description of an object,

according to Jainas.

śaraṇāgati see prapatti.

śarīra body; that which is wholly and always

supported and controlled and which serves

its purpose.

śarīrī one who is the owner of the body; the

Supreme Being who sustains and controls the universe including jīvas, according to

Viśiṣṭādvaita.

sarvagata omnipresent. sarvajña omniscient.

Śāstra Sacred texts accepted as authoritative source

in spiritual matters.

satkāryavāda the theory of causality which upholds that

effect is pre-existent in a potential form in the causal substances, according to Sānkhya; the theory that an affect is the modified state of the causal substance

according to Visistādvaita.

existence of an object. sattā sound rational arguments. sat-tarka

one of the three qualities (gunas) of prakrti. sattva which stands for whatever is fine and light.

one whose will is not obstructed. satvasankalba determinate: differentiated. savikalbaka

that which exists for the purpose of the śesa

Supreme Being.

essence of sound which produces knowledge sphota

> of things: it also denotes the śabda-brahma as conceived by the grammarians as the

ultimate Reality.

inanimate object. sthāvara

continuation of an object produced. sthiti

sthūla gross.

spiritual substance; transcendental realm śuddha-sattva

according to Visistādvaita.

subtle. sūksma

the theory of Madhyamika Buddhism that śūnyavāda

everything in the universe is void and non-

existent: nihilism.

the state of dreamless sleep. susupti

the nature of an object; the characteristics svabhāva

of an object, according to RB.

that which is natural. svābhāvika

bare unrelated particular presented in svalaksana

the initial stage of perception, according

to Buddhism.

independent. svatantra

prakrti in its subtle form combined with tamas

nvas in their subtle form, according to Visistādvaita; one of the three qualities

of prakrti, which causes ignorance.

the subtle elements. tanmātras logical arguments. tarka

metaphysical categories. tattva

tattva-jñāna spiritual knowledge of metaphysical Reality.

fire. tejas

trivitkarana admixture of three elements. tryanuka combination of three atoms. non-existent.

tuccha upādāna-kāraņa

material cause. limiting adjunct.

upādhi upāya

the means or the spiritual discipline

adopted to attain a higher goal.

exit of the jīva from the body after death. utkrānti

production. utpatti

having distinctive features. vaidharmya

partiality. vaisamya

state of disturbance. vaisamyāvasthā

all-pervasive. vibhu

That which is wholly and always controlled vidheya

by a Higher Being, such as jīva.

injunction. vidhi

branches of learning which serve as supvidyāsthāna

plemental treatises for acquiring knowledge, such as the six Vedāṅgas—Kalpa, Sikṣā, Vyākaraṇa, Jyotiṣa, Nirukta, and

Chandas.

knowledge; series of mental ideas according vijñāna

to Buddhism.

the evolutes which evolve from prakrti and vikrti

which also serve as the cause of other

evolutes.

destruction. vināśa

individuality as a special quality that subsists viśesa in eternal objects according to Vaisesikas.

quality; attribute. viśesana

substance or substrate in which quality viśesya

inheres.

that which is qualified with attribute; a viśista

characterized entity.

oneness or organic unity of a substance viśistaikya

as inseparably related to its attributes. illusory appearance of an entity as different

vivarta from what it actually is. vyāpti pervasion; invariable concomitance bet-

ween two objects.

vyasti-srsti creation of the variegated universe.

vyāvahārika empirical; that which is accepted as real

for practical purposes.

yadrcchā chance.

# **Bibliography**

#### PRIMARY SOURCES

Paramata-bhanga of Vedānta Deśika with the commentary Desikāśaya Prakāśa, in Sanskrit by Villivalam Vatsya Narayanacharya, 2 vols., Madras, 1979 and 1982; with the commentary Anapāya-prabhā, in Tamil by Uttamur Veeraraghavacharya, Madras, 1978; with the commentary Maṇipravāla by Ayya Krishna Tatarya, vol. 1, ed. Srimad Anandavan Asramam, Srirangam, 2005.

Śrībhāṣya of Rāmānuja with Śrutaprakāśikā commentary of Sudarśana Sūri, ed. Uttamur Veeraraghavacharya, 2 vols. Madras, 1967.

Adhikaraṇa-sārāvalī of Vedānta Deśika with the commentaries of Kumara Varadacharya and Srivan Satakopa Ramanuja Yati, ed. Ahobala Mutt, Madras, 1940.

Mīmāmsā-pādukā of Vedānta Deśika, ed. P.B. Annangaracharya, Conjeevaram, 1940.

Nyāya-siddhāñjana of Vedānta Desika with commentaries of Rangaramanuja and Kanchi Krishna Tatarya, ed. Uttamur

Veeraraghavacharya, Madras, 1976. Nyāya-pariśuddhi of Vedānta Deśika, ed. P.B. Annangaracharya,

Conjeevaram, 1940. Śatadūṣaṇī of Vedānta Deśika, ed. Srivatsankacharya, Madras,

1973.

Şaddarsana Samuccaya of Haribhadra with the commentary of Manibhadra, Chaukhamba Sanskrit Series, Banaras, 1905.

Sānkhyakārikā of Īśvarakṛṣṇa.

Sānkhyatattvakaumudī of Vācaspati Miśra.

- Sarvadarśanasangraha of Mādhavācārya, ed. Vasudeva Shastri Abhyankar, Poona, Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute, 1924.
- Śeśvara Mīmāmsā of Vedānta Deśika, ed. P.B. Annangaracharya, Conjeevaram, 1940.
- Tattva-mūktākalāpa with Sarvārtha-siddhi commentary of Vedānta Deśika, ed. Uttamur Veeraraghavacharya.
- Vedārthasangraha of Rāmānuja with Tātparya-dīpikā commentary of Sudarśana Sūri, ed. T.T. Devasthanam, Tirupati, 1954.

#### SECONDARY SOURCES

- Chari, P.N. Srinivas, *The Philosophy of Viśisṭādvaita*, Madras: Adyar Library and Research Centre, 1978.
- —, The Philosophy of Bhedābheda, repr., Madras: Adyar Library Research Centre, 1972.
- Chari, S.M. Srinivasa, Advaita and Viśiṣṭādvaita—A Study Based on Vedānta Deśika's Śatadūṣaṇī, Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1976.
- —, Fundamentals of Viśiṣṭādvaita—A Study Based on Vedānta Deśika's Tattva-muktākalāpa, Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1998.
- Chattopadhyaya, Deviprasad, Carvaka/Lokayata: An Anthology of Source Materials, New Delhi: Munshiram Manoharlal Publishers, 1994.
- Cowell, E.B., trans., Udayana's Kusumānjali.
- and A.E.Gough, trans., Sarvadarśanasangraha of Mādhavācārya, repr., Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 2000.
- Dasa, Satyanarayana, "Caitanya and Bengal School of Vaiṣṇavism," in *Theistic Vedanta*, New Delhi: Centre for Studies in Indian Civilization, 2003.
- Dasgupta, S.N., A History of Indian Philosophy, 5 vols., Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1975.
- Deva, Ramesh M., "Navya-Viśiṣṭādvaita," in *Theistic Vedanta*, New Delhi: Centre for Studies in Indian Civilization, 2003.
- Ghate, V.S., The Vedānta—A Study of Brahmasūtras with the Bhāṣya of Śamkara, Rāmānuja, Nimbārka, Madhva, and Vallabha, third edn., Poona, 1981.
- Hiriyanna, M., Outlines of Indian Philosophy, repr., Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass.

ed

Jaini, J., Outlines of Jainism, Cambridge University Press. Keith, A.B., Buddhistic Philosophy, Cambridge University Press.

-, Indian Logic and Atomism.

Mahadevappa, N.G., "Vīra Śaivism," in *Theistic Vedanta*, New Delhi: Centre for Studies in Indian Civilization, 2003.

Mishra, Kamalakar, "Kashmir Śaiva Advaitism," in *Theistic Vedanta*, New Delhi: Centre for Studies in Indian Civilization, 2003.

Murty, Sat Chidananda, trans., Ṣaḍdarśana Samuccaya (with notes), Delhi: 1986.

Radhakrishnan, S., Indian Philosophy, 2 vols.

Sharma, B.N.K., *Philosophy of Madhvāchārya*, repr., Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1991.

Shastri, Sunanda Y., "Philosophy of Vallabhācārya," in *Theistic Vedanta*, New Delhi: Centre for Studies in Indian Civilization, 2003.

Shastri, Yajneshwar S., "Svābhāvika-Bhedābheda of Nimbārka," in *Theistic Vedanta*, New Delhi: Centre for Studies in Indian Civilization, 2003.

Sinha, Jadunath, Indian Philosophy, 3 vols., Delhi: Motilal

Banarsidass.

Sinha, Nandalal, The Sāmkhya Philosophy containing Sāmkhya Pravacana Sūtra, New Delhi: Munshiram Manoharlal Publishers, 2003.

Vidyabhusana, S.C., trans., The Nyaya-sutra of Gotama, New

Delhi: Munshiram Manoharlal Publishers, 2003.

## Index

abheda(-vāda) 164-65
Acintya-Bhedābheda Vedānta 191
acit, the nature of 12; types of 12
Ahikuṇḍalādhikaraṇa 171
ākāśa, the theory of 21
Aṁśādhikaraṇa 166
Ānanda-tāratamya, the theory of 173-74. See also Vedānta schools...,
Dvaita Vedānta
Ārambhaṇādhikaraṇa 170
Aupādhika-Bhedābhedavāda 187,

bheda (-vāda) 164-65 Bhedabhedavada 165-66, 176 Brahman, also *İśvara*, the doctrine of 29; the distinguishing characteristics of 29, 37; principal attributes of 39; as upādāna kāraņa of the universe 30, 163; as nimitta kārana of the universe 30, 162-63; its relation to fiva 165-69; its relation to jagat 171-72; as a viŝista-tattva 32, 166, 232–33; Śaṅkara's theory of 30; Bhāskara's theory of 182-83; Yādavaprakāśa's theory of 27, 178-80; Vaisesika's theory of 105-6; Pūrva-mīmāmsā's theory on 112-14; Pāśupata's view on 133

Brahma-pariṇāma, Viśiṣṭādvaita view of 37; theory of other schools on 37

Buddhism, review of 68; four main school of 68–70; critics of the Mādhyamika school of 70–73; criticism of the main theory of Yogācāra school of 73, 76–77; criticism of the theories of Sautrāntika school of 78–81; criticism of the theories of Vaibhāṣika school of 82–84; criticism of its doctrines of momentariness (kṣanikatva) of objects 85–86

Cārvāka school (Lokāyatika mata), review of 49; the philosophy of 50–53; criticism of its philosophical theories 54–59; criticism of its theory of consciousness (caitanya) 58–59, 60–61

jagat (Universe), as the śarīra of Brahman 5; as distinct from indriyas (sense organs), the origin of 17, 19

Jainism, critical review of 87; criticism of its theory of tattvas 90; criticism of its doctrine of jīva 90-91; criticism of its theory of pudgala 91-92; criticism of the theory of kāla and ākāśa 92; criticism of its doctrine of sapta-bhangī 92-94

jīva, also Jīvātmā (Individual self). the doctrine of essential nature of according to Vedanta 3; as ādheya and vidheya of Paramātman 4-5; as sesa of Paramātman 5; as śarīra of Paramātman 5-6; as anu 6; as ahamartha 7; as jñāna-svarūpa and jāāna-gunaka 7; as eternal (nitya) 8, 63-66; types of 8; Advaitin's theory of 7-8; Bhāskara's theory of 183; Yādavaprakāśa's theory of 179-81; Jaina's theory of 6; Vaiśesika's theory of 22; Pāśupata's theory of 131; Sāṅkhya's theory of Ātman 123 - 24

 $k\bar{a}la$  (time), the theory of 26–27

Mīmāmsā school, review of 111; its relation to Vedānta 111-13; its views on the theory of *Īśvara* 113

Nayāya school, review of 107; as one of the *vidyāsthānas* 107-8; methods of reconciliation of its theories with Vedānta 109-10

Pāñcarātra school, its evaluation as an acceptable śāstra 136–37; examination of the objections against its authoritativeness 137–39; conformity of its teachings on the mode of worship and religious practices with Vedic teachings 139–40

pañcikarana 20

Paramata-bhanga, the nature and contents of 5–6; its objective 227; its importance as a philosophical treatise 227–29

Pāśupata school, its critical review of 131; criticism of its theory of enumeration of tattvas 131-32, 134; criticism of its doctrine of *Īśvara* 133; criticism of its theory

of tattvas 134; its oppositions to Vedic teachings 135

Prakṛṭi (primordial cosmic matter), nature of 12; Sāṅkhya theory of 117; three guṇas of 13–14; evolutes of 16, 20; Sāṅkhya theory of the order of evolution of 121,123; Viśiṣṭādvaita view regarding the order of evolution of 20

Puruṣārtha (Supreme Goal), the doctrine of 215; critical evaluation of the theories presented by various school on 215–18; Viśiṣṭādvaita theory of 218

Sāṅkhya school, review of 116; the central doctrine of 116; its theory of cause and affect 117–18; criticism of Satkāryavāda of 118; criticism of its theory of pariṇāma 119–20; criticism of its theory of evolutes 121–22; criticism of its theory of Ātman 123–24

*śarīra*, its concept of, its definition and implications according to Vedānta 5, 230-31

śarīrātma-bhāva 231 śuddha-sattva, the theory of 27 Svābhāvika Bhedābhedavāda 176, 187, 191

tattvas, Jaina's theory of 90-91; Pāśupata theory of 131-32; Pāñcarātra of 136-37; Vaiśeşika's theory of 96

trivitkarana 21

upāya (means of attainment of Supreme Goal), the doctrine of 203; critical review of the theories of other school 203–8; Viśiṣṭādvaita theory on 194, 208, 214; upāsanā as the direct upāya to mokṣa 211; Śaraṇāgati (prapatti) as an alternative direct upāya

to moksa, implications of the Gītā verse enjoining Śaraṇāgati212–14

Vaiśeṣika school, review of 96; its theory of abhāva 97; its theory of samavāya 98-99; its theory of viśeṣa as a separate category 99; its theory of sāmānya 101-2; its theory of karma as movement 101-2; its theory of guṇas 103; its theory of dravya 102-4; criticism of its views on the nature of jīvātman as jaḍa and vibhu 105; its theory of Īśvara 105-6

Vākyānvayādhikaraņa 166

Vedānta schools: Śabda-brahma-Vivartavāda, critical review of 142; criticism of the theory of Śabda-brahman as the ultimate Reality 142; criticism of its theory of sphoṭa 144-46; criticism of its theory Śabdānuvedha 145; criticism of its theory of Śabdādhyāsa 147; Advaida Vedānta of Śaṅkara, critical review of 149; its affinity to Buddhism 149-50; criticism of its theory of Nirvišeṣa Brahman 152-54; criticism of its theory of mithyatva 155-56: criticism of the theory of removal of avidyā 156-57criticism of its theory of eka-iiva 157; criticism of the theory of māvā 168: different schools of Advaita 159-60: Bhedābheda Vedānta of Bhāskara and Yādavaprakāśa, review of 176; criticism of the doctrines of Yadavaprakasa 178-79; criticism of the doctrines of Bhāskara 182-85; Dvaita Vedānta of Madhva, review of 161; as having closer affinity to Višistādvaita 161; criticism of its theory of Brahman as nimitta kārana only 162-63; criticism of its theory of jīva's relation to Brahman 169: criticism of its theory of jagat's relation to Brahman 172-73; criticism of its theory of ananda-taratamya 173-74: Svābhāvika-Bhedābheda Vedānta of Nimbārka 187-90; Acintya-bhedābheda Vedānta of Caitanya school, review of 190-93; Śuddhādvaita of Vallábha, its critical review 193-96: Śivādvaita school 198

d



Dr S.M. Srinivasa Chari was a distinguished scholar trained up by eminent traditional teachers. He did his PhD from the University of Madras. His other published works are: Advaita and Viśistādvaita: A study based on Vedānta Deśika's Śatadūṣaṇī with a Foreword by Dr S. Radhakrishnan; Fundamentals of Viśiṣṭādvaita: A study based on Vedānta Deśika's Tattva-muktā-kalāpa; Vaiṣṇavism—Its Philosophy, Theology and Religious Discipline, The Philosophy and Theistic Mysticism of the Alvars; The Philosophy of the Vedantasutra: A study based on the Evaluation of the commentaries of Sankara, Rāmānuja, and Madhva; The Philosophy of the Upanisads: A study based on the Evaluation of the commentaries of Śańkara, Rāmānuja, and Madhva; The Philosophy of the Bhagavadgītā: A study based on the Evaluation of the commentaries of Šankara, Rāmānuja, and Madhva; and The Philosophy of Viśistādvaita Vedānta: A study based on Vedānta Deśika's Adhikarana Sārāvalī.

### Books of related interest

Advaita Vedanta R. Balasubramanian, ed.

A Critical Study of Hinduism Sarasvati Chennakesavan

A Critique of Vedanta L.V. Rajagopal

Development of Nyaya Philosophy and its Social Context Sibajiban Bhattacharya

The Epistemology of Visistadvaita Vedavalli Narayanan

The Fundamentals of Advaita Vedanta
The Philosophy of the Vallabha School of Vedanta
K. Narain

The Labyrinth of Solitude, 2 pts.
An Essay on Dharma as Ontology in the Narrative of the Mahabharata
K.D. Prithipaul

The Philosophy of the Bhagavadgita The Philosophy of the Upanisads The Philosophy of the Vedantasutra S.M. Srinivasa Chari

The Vedantasutras with the Sribhasya of Ramanujacarya, 3 vols. M. Rangacharya and M.B. Varadaraja Aiyangar, trans.

The Vedantasutras of Badarayana Srisa Chandra Vasu

Munshiram Manoharlal Publishers Pvt. Ltd. New Delhi www.mrmlbooks.com

